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4Abstract
Concerns about increasing expenditures on new biologic medicines has speared interests in
finding solutions to contain healthcare delivery costs whilst, at least, maintaining population
health indicators at the same levels. Often overlooked are investments in pharmaceutical
manufacturing research, which perhaps is because manufacturing costs are thought to only
make a small fraction of drug prices, and hence any impact on healthcare delivery costs is
small enough to be ignored. This thesis provides evidence, to the contrary, that the impact on
healthcare delivery costs cannot be trivialized.
Starting with a systematic review of literature, this thesis finds that there are
inconsistencies in what items are included or excluded from estimates of drug administration
costs. On the back of this finding, this thesis evaluated drug administration costs for a sample
of biologic drugs to identify manufacturing choices that explain most the observed variation
in administration costs. It presents an algorithm pharmaceutical manufacturers could use to
predict the expected administration-cost savings from reformulating biologic drug candidates
still in development and/or existing medicines already on the market. This thesis goes further
to argue that a primary focus on the monetary costs of drug administration ignores intangible
benefits from satisfying end-user preferences for different modes of drug administration. The
monetary value of these intangible benefits could be in the same order of magnitude as
savings on the direct monetary costs of drug administration.
In addition, this thesis shows that using cost-reducing process innovations in drug
manufacturing, as opposed to cost-increasing ones, is associated with a higher number of
products available for clinical use and lower prices over time; whilst the likelihood that a
drug product is no longer available is seemingly unrelated to the process innovation deployed
in manufacturing. The evidence put together indicate significant societal benefits from
developing and implementing innovations in pharmaceutical manufacturing.
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8INTRODUCTION
91 Context of Work
1.1 Background
Biologic drugs and related macromolecular therapies (for example, therapeutic proteins,
vaccines, monoclonal antibodies, allergy immunotherapies, blood components and fusion
proteins as well as gene and stem-cell therapies that are still under research) are a new group
of complex products that are derived from living organisms or organic substances and costly
to manufacture relative to conventional small-molecule chemically-synthesized medicines. It
is often thought that the underlying complex process of manufacturing these medicines, using
living cells that vary naturally, is the reason why biologic drugs are pricey, costing up to
£70,000 per patient per year in the United Kingdom(UK)[1]. Indeed, high (fixed) costs of
manufacturing is one of the reasons why researchers expect less market entry for generic
biologics and higher prices relative to chemically-synthesized medicines[2].
It follows that guaranteeing efficient supply and consumption of new biologic
medicines will require, among other factors, significant improvements in manufacturing
(process innovations) if the UK pharmaceutical industry and National Health Service (NHS)
are to realize the full social benefits of their investments in pharmaceutical research and
development (R&D), be it process or product innovations. This raises a number of interesting
questions: what is the nature of the relationship between manufacturing, the “high” prices and
availability of biologic drugs? If there are links between pharmaceutical manufacturing
efficiency and healthcare delivery costs, why hasn’t previous research considered this issue?
One of the reasons why manufacturing has received disproportionately less attention in
research on the pharmaceutical industry can be traced to economic theory. This posits that
once new medicines become available, sunk or fixed R&D and production costs should have
no influence on pharmaceutical prices. Prices of medicines are driven mostly by demand
conditions and the incremental or marginal costs of production. Since the incremental or
marginal costs of production (roughly approximated as cost-of-goods) are often considered a
small fraction of total price, most research or analysis of drug pricing ignore manufacturing
process improvements[3].
The gaps in research (which this thesis aims to fill) is evidenced by the fact that I
found only one study[4] that conducts a detailed economic analysis of the links between the
efficiency of pharmaceutical manufacturing, drug prices and public health. This study
showed that there are societal benefits from lower manufacturing costs if this translates into
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lower prices for payers/ consumers and better access to beneficial medicines in the short-run.
Even if lower manufacturing costs are not translated into lower drug prices, there will still be
significant societal benefits in the long-run as part of the increase in net sales revenues can be
used to finance future R&D in more efficacious new medicines. Whilst this argument is
convincing, it is only valid in a healthcare payer environment where, ex post of market
launch, demand for new medicines are not linked to formal, scientific measurements of cost-
effectiveness or value-for-money. It assumes products are demanded once they meet
regulatory requirements for safety and efficacy.
In contrast to the situation where healthcare payers are only concerned about the net
health benefits offered by medicines they purchase (that is, efficacy minus safety risks),
value-based pricing proposed within the UK NHS (sometimes called benefit-based pricing)
and presumably intended to be administered by the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE), aims to ensure prices and demand for new medicines reflect the clinical
and economic value to patients and the broader NHS[5],[6]. In such an environment, an
investigation of manufacturer’s choice of which production process to use and how this
affects total healthcare delivery costs; and consequently estimates of cost-effectiveness will
be useful for the ex ante determination of the manufacturability of biological drug candidates
as well as determination of the societal benefits from (public or private) investments in
pharmaceutical manufacturing research.
The current approach to investigate these issues is to conduct health economic
evaluations, or broadly speaking health technology assessments (HTA). This typically
involves scientific measurements of the incremental total healthcare delivery costs and health
benefits associated with new medicines relative to existing treatment alternatives.
The diagram below shows the types of evaluations that researchers and analysts usually
perform. NICE in most occasions undertakes cost-effectiveness or cost-utility analyses on
behalf of the NHS in England and Wales. From this diagram, one is able to identify the
manufacturing-related determinants of the costs and cost-effectiveness of health technologies.
The variables of interest, and which are amendable to improvements in pharmaceutical
manufacturing, are drug acquisition costs and drug administration costs.
The contribution of this thesis to existing literature is therefore to provide empirical
evidence and new insights on the societal benefits of innovations in pharmaceutical
manufacturing, focusing primarily on healthcare delivery costs.
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Source: Adapted from Mills and Drummond[7] and Drummond[8].
Notes: Pj refers to price of product j, Rj is its dosage regimen and formulation, and Ej refers to its
clinical effectiveness. *Included or excluded depending on whether a payer or societal perspective is
taken. †The measure of interest could be quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) or disability-adjusted
life years (DALYs).
In this thesis, I describe changes to how drugs are manufactured as “process
innovations” or “improvements in pharmaceutical manufacturing”. These changes could lead
to an increase or reduction in manufacturing costs (measured as cost-of-goods); and/or
changes in healthcare delivery costs. I define healthcare delivery costs as the sum of drug
acquisition costs and administration costs. The latter covers indirect/ intangible costs related
to preferences for different modes of administering drugs. Acquisition costs here refer to the
product of drug prices and demand volumes. I ignore future, post-treatment healthcare-related
costs from my analyses as I do not expect advances in pharmaceutical manufacturing to have
any significant or generalizable effects on future healthcare costs. The point here is: even if
manufacturing improvements or innovations amplify and/or reduce the uncertainty around
health benefits derived from a given drug (and hence change the stream of future healthcare-
related costs), accounting for these effects will require some clinical-trial or observational
evidence that is most likely to be product-specific.
Health economic evaluation
Resource Cost
C1 = Direct costs
ܥଵ =ܥ௝଴൫ܲ ௝൯+ ܥ௝ଵ൫ܴ ௝൯+ Ʃܥ௝ଶ(ܧ௝)
ܥ௝
଴൫ܲ ௝൯= acquisition costs for product j
ܥ௝
ଵ൫ܴ ௝൯= administration costs
Ʃܥ௝
ଶ(ܧ௝) = future healthcare-related costs
C2 = Indirect costs* (productivity losses)
C3 = Intangible costs*
Types of economic evaluation
Cost Analysis: C1; C1+C2
Cost-effectiveness Analysis (CEA): (C1+C2)/E; (C1 – B1)/E; (C1+C2 – B1 – B2)/E
Cost-utility Analysis (CUA): (C1+C2)/U; (C1 – B1)/U; (C1+C2 – B1 – B2)/U
Cost-benefit Analysis (CBA): B1+B2 – C1 – C2; (B1+B2)/(C1+C2)
Health Benefits (expected)
E= Benefits in natural units
U = Benefits in utility units†
B = Benefits in monetary terms (£, $)
B1 = direct benefits
B2 = indirect benefits (productivity benefits)*
B3 = intangible benefits*
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This seemingly simple definition of healthcare delivery costs (as made up of drug
acquisition and administration costs), however, provides useful insights on the potential
sources of the societal benefits from improvements in pharmaceutical manufacturing.
Manufacturers’ ability to predict and control the healthcare delivery costs and cost-
effectiveness of new medicines (especially for drug candidates that are still in development)
may well be the crucial determinant of their ability to recover the costs of sunk R&D
investments whilst making adequate competitive profit to maintain their business interest in
drug research and development. Improvements in pharmaceutical manufacturing may well be
the difference between patients having access or no access to treatments that offer positive
net health benefits but are not considered recommended cost-effective options.
1.2 Aims and objectives
The aims of this thesis are to establish and evaluate the links between pharmaceutical
manufacturing costs (or more generally speaking, improvements in pharmaceutical
production) and healthcare delivery costs, focusing on new and emerging stream of biologic
medicines and related macromolecular therapies. Although the focus is on biologic medicines
(and emergent macromolecular therapies), it aims to provide outputs that are also of
relevance to small-molecule chemically-synthesized medicines.
Given the simplified definition of healthcare delivery costs above, and prior expectations
that improvements in pharmaceutical manufacturing may influence healthcare delivery costs
via (1) drug acquisition costs and (2) drug administration costs; my objectives are as follows:
1. To investigate and develop new insights on the relationship between pharmaceutical
manufacturing (costs) and drug pricing;
2. To conduct a systematic literature review of administration costs for biologic drugs and
the implications for biopharmaceutical manufacturing;
3. To develop a regression-based algorithm for the evaluation of drug administration costs;
and
4. To conduct a discrete-choice modelling of preferences for different modes of drug
administration.
The research objectives listed above are organized under two broad themes:
“manufacturing and drug administration costs” and “manufacturing and drug acquisition
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costs”. The chapters and contents of this thesis are structured to follow the themes and
objectives listed above. They should, however, not be considered as separate parts. A brief
description of my research plan including the theories, tools and techniques used are given
below.
1.2.1 Manufacturing and drug administration costs
Systematic literature review of drug administration costs
The first research stream under “Manufacturing and Drug Administration Costs” is to
conduct a systematic review of published, peer-reviewed literature that report estimates of
drug administration costs for biologics within the UK NHS. The systematic review is
intended to shed some light on how different components of drug administration costs have
been quantified and to examine how differences in dosage forms and regimens can influence
administration costs. I first developed a framework of drug administration costs; and used this
framework to evaluate administration costs for biologics. From the outputs of the literature
review, I discussed the implications of my findings for research in biopharmaceutical
manufacturing, focussing on how healthcare delivery costs and associated drug formulation
issues may affect or influence manufacturing and R&D decisions.
Development of algorithm for evaluating drug administration costs
The second research stream under the theme “Manufacturing and Drug
Administration Costs” is a de novo analysis of administration costs for a sample of biologics
with UK marketing authorization. The analysis makes use of the framework on drug
administration costs above to compute, first, deterministic estimates of drug administration
costs and then to perform some Monte Carlo simulations to reflect more closely variation in
administration costs in routine clinical practice. Using the simulated outputs, I developed a
regression-based cost algorithm that can be used to evaluate: (1) how the administration costs
for a given biologic medicine varies across acute and chronic clinical indications; (2)
variation in administration costs by route of administration; and (3) differences in drug
administration costs for different dosing regimens of a given biologic. This algorithm can be
used, within reasonable margins of error, to predict the administration costs of biologic drug
candidates that are under development.
Preferences for different modes of drug administration
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The third research stream under “Manufacturing and Drug Administration Costs”
investigates the hedonic, non-monetary attributes of different modes of drug administration
that is preferred by end-users, i.e., patients (otherwise healthy people) or healthcare
professionals acting on behalf of patients. It focusses on preferences for modes of drug
administration in terms of convenience, continuity of treatment, less disruption of daily
activities, avoidance of needles etc. And makes use of a discrete choice experiment (DCE)
which is one of a number of methodologies used for the valuation (in monetary terms) of
goods and services for which no market exists; or that observed demand curves do not
provide a valid measure of benefits (in excess of costs) due to market imperfections and the
like.
Following the arguments and recommendations made by practitioners in the
field[9],[10],[11], the DCE consisted of the following general steps:
1. Conceptualizing the choice process (within the tenets of random utility theory),
2. Identifying the characteristics (attributes) of different modes of drug administration,
3. Assigning levels to the characteristics (attributes) identified,
4. Developing choice scenarios for the DCE questionnaire,
5. Questionnaire design and piloting,
6. Collecting choice or preference data via responses to the questionnaire, and
7. Econometric analysis of the choice data generated.
I evaluated the choice preferences of (1) people from the UK general public and (2)
healthcare professionals from the US – and these were collected from a web-based survey.
The inclusion of US healthcare professionals rather than those in the UK simply reflects the
resource and time constraints for this research. I considered that having some idea of the
preferences of agents acting on behalf of patients, in contrast to evaluating just the choices of
patients, will help provide a better picture of the desirable attributes of different modes of
drug administration.
1.2.2 Manufacturing and drug acquisition costs
Pharmaceutical manufacturing, market conduct and pricing
This work investigates possible relationships between manufacturing (costs) and
pharmaceutical pricing and market conduct. The main objective is to generate some empirical
evidence in support of or against the existence of significant societal benefits from advances
in biopharmaceutical manufacturing. The existence of these benefits could then be used to
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determine whether there is a case for private or public investments in pharmaceutical
manufacturing research. I first conducted a selective non-systematic review of literature on
the benefits of pharmaceutical manufacturing efficiency; and then used elements of market
theory and theories of the firm to describe a framework that highlights the welfare
implications of using process innovations that reduce or increase production costs, relative to
previous manufacturing processes. This is followed by an empirical econometric analysis to
establish the relationship between improvements or innovations in manufacturing and drug
prices, the number of products available for clinical use and the hazard of product exit. The
empirical analyses (conducted using panel and survival regression methods) were based on
NHS data on a sample of biologic medicines over a period of time covering on-patent and
off-patent periods. From these analyses, I draw some arguments and conclusions as to
whether the manufacturing process innovations embodied by biologic medicines have a
bearing on drug pricing, number of products available and how long these products remain
available on the NHS market.
1.3 Thesis layout
The rest of this thesis is organized into two broad parts: “Manufacturing and drug
acquisition costs” and “Manufacturing and drug administration costs”. The first part consists
of only one chapter investigating the links between pharmaceutical manufacturing, market
conduct and pricing. The second part is made up of three chapters, describing (1) a systematic
review of literature reporting on drug administration costs; (2) a de novo analysis of drug
administration costs; and (3) a discrete-choice evaluation of preferences for different modes
of drug administration. References and appendices will be found at the end of the thesis.
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MANUFACTURING AND DRUG ACQUISITION COSTS
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2 Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, Market Conduct and Pricing:
Lessons for Future Biologics
2.1 Introduction
The success of biologic drugs1 in the treatment of indications such as cancer and autoimmune
diseases has led to them becoming the fastest growing class of new medicines in the
pharmaceutical sector: 40% of drug candidates in R&D are biologics with a worldwide
market forecast of circa $145 billion, growing at more than 15% annually [12]. However,
from a healthcare payer perspective, biologics are among the most expensive drugs available:
for example, the annual acquisition cost per patient can exceed £70,000 for monoclonal
antibody treatments for cancer [13]. This is a major financial burden on attempts to ensure
wider access to the health benefits provided by these new drugs. This burden has led the UK
NHS to use increasingly complex coverage and reimbursement criteria to justify funding for
these newer but more expensive drugs. In England and Wales, for instance, NICE uses
clinical- and cost-effectiveness criteria to advise the NHS on decisions regarding which drugs
to adopt. Cohen et al. [14], for example, report that 40% of health technologies including
medicines assessed by NICE are conditionally recommended for restricted use and < 10% are
not recommended at all due to concerns about clinical and cost effectiveness. Why are
biologic drugs so expensive and what can be done to make them affordable?
The high acquisition cost of biologic drugs can be justified (1) as rewards for the
incremental benefits they offer, i.e., measured clinical or economic value – and (2) as
contribution margins towards the cost of manufacturing, R&D expenses on successful and
failed drugs; selling, general and administrative expenses; and a reasonable profit return. Cost
of goods (COG), i.e., the cost to manufacture biologics is reported to typically represent 15-
40% of the selling price [15;16],[17]. However, the cost of manufacturing biologic drugs
need not be or remain ‘high’. Older biologically-derived pharmaceuticals such as antibiotics
introduced in the 1940s and vaccines were at first hard and expensive-to-manufacture but
then experienced significant price reductions over time when they became easier and
cheaper-to-make. Of course, price reductions could be due to changes in output (i.e., widened
1 In this chapter “biologic drugs” are defined as active substances or medicinal products derived from a
biological living system (of plant, animal or microbial origin), irrespective of how small or large the molecules
are. This definition covers not just recombinant proteins, monoclonal antibodies, blood and immunological
products (vaccines, sera, allergens etc.), advanced technologies such as gene and cell therapies – but also semi-
synthetic products of biological origins that do not belong to any of the groups listed above.
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patient access to medicines) but the question I ask is: are there manufacturing lessons to
extract from these older antibiotics and vaccines and possibly extended to the current cohorts
of biologic drugs?
This chapter explores how manufacturing-cost reductions over time might contribute
to changes in market conduct that provide significant societal benefits in terms of affordable
medicine access and security of supply. It focuses on the number of products available (what
I call product density), the hazard of product exit and variation in product prices over time. In
particular, it tests whether, through improvements in manufacturing, existing and emergent
biologic drugs (such as monoclonal antibodies) may go through the transition from being
‘hard-to-manufacture’ and ‘expensive-to-buy’ to products that are ‘easy-to-make’ and ‘less-
costly-to-buy’. My analyses are based on data from the UK NHS for the following
biologically-derived pharmaceuticals: penicillins, hepatitis B vaccines, influenza vaccines,
poliomyelitis (hereafter polio) vaccines and the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccines. I
focus on these drug classes because the principles behind the methods used to manufacture
the selected sample products are similar to or formed the bases of production processes used
to make current and emerging cohorts of biologics. This chapter, however, concentrates on
only the short-run impact improvements in pharmaceutical manufacturing may have on
market structure and conduct. It does not consider the long-run impact of process innovations
on the intensity of product R&D.
This chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 provides a selective review of
existing literature on the value of manufacturing process innovations and describes the
theoretical framework underlying my analysis. Section 2.3 describes the data and statistical
methods used in this study and section 2.4 presents my results. I discuss in section 2.5 my
findings and present my conclusions in section 2.6.
2.2 Value of pharmaceutical process innovations
2.2.1 Related Work
Vernon, Hughen and Trujillo[4] report significant societal benefits of improving
pharmaceutical manufacturing efficiency from a short-run or long-run perspective. The
stream of benefits depend crucially on how manufacturing efficiency gains alters the structure
of and conduct in drug markets. The paper focuses on two boundary scenarios in which
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society can benefit from improvements in pharmaceutical manufacturing. In the first scenario
A, lower manufacturing costs in the short-run translate into lower short-run (profit-
maximizing) prices whilst keeping price-cost margins the same. In what is supposed to be the
more realistic scenario B, efficiency in manufacturing does not lead to a fall or rise in prices
but short-run price-cost margins increase. Scenario B reflects the notion that there is no
guarantee that pharmaceutical companies will pass on manufacturing-cost savings as lower
prices for consumers or healthcare payers acting on their behalf – especially when
competitive pressures are absent, non-functional or imperfect. That is to say, given prevailing
demand conditions, the structure of the supply market is critical to whether changes in COG
will result in consumer price changes. The authors, however, argue that while price-cost
margins in scenario B may rise in the short-run, society still stands to gain in the long-run
from increased investments in product innovations used by consumers and their households.
They cite Scherer [18], who reported a cyclical relationship between gross price-cost margins
and the intensity of pharmaceutical R&D in product innovation. Higher gross price-cost
margins in the short-run are associated with higher R&D expenditures and vice versa; a
correlation of +0.92.
This is consistent with other studies. Basu et al. [19], using published data in the
annual reports of twenty-two US pharmaceutical companies over the period 1994 to 2005,
report that COG for brand-name ethical companies exhibited a significant declining trend
whilst R&D expenses exhibited an increasing trend over the same period. Correlation
between COG and R&D expenses is reported to be –0.93 for brand-name companies. Ethical
pharmaceutical firms do appear to reserve, at least, some of the savings on COG for product
R&D rather than appropriate all cost-savings as pure profits. The same argument, however,
cannot be extended to generic firms as the sort of product R&D they engage in is developing
new formulations for existing drugs. For generic companies, the study found a correlation
between COG and operating incomes of –0.92: manufacturing cost savings resulted in purely
an increase in profit margins. For biotechnology firms, COG and R&D expenses did not
change significantly over the specified time period and no clear trend was observed.
The upshot is: irrespective of whether reductions in COG are reflected in price
reductions or not, manufacturing process innovations should lead to improvements in
consumer or social welfare via either lower prices in the short-run or in the long-run, supply
of new products having significant impacts on mortality (life years saved) and/or morbidity
(increments in health-related quality-of-life). Lichtenberg’s [20] estimation of the
contribution of pharmaceutical R&D to US life expectancy suggests for every $926 invested
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in R&D, one life year is saved. Using this statistic and a cost-effectiveness threshold of
$100,000 per life year gained to compute a monetary value for health benefits, Vernon et al.
[4] report that the societal gains from scenario B is approximately 12 times that from scenario
A. However, for the higher price-cost margins realized from process innovation to represent a
welfare gain in the long-run, pharmaceutical firms must invest a proportion of ‘profits’ in
product innovation.
2.2.2 Theoretical Framework
Figure 2.1: Price, output and welfare consequences of process innovations
Figure 1 above depicts the private and societal benefits of improvements in
pharmaceutical manufacturing. Figure 1 is not drawn to scale and it shows, for simplicity, a
linear aggregate NHS demand curve (in a given year) for a given therapeutic class of drug
products with similar chemical structure, pharmacologic mode of action or clinical
indications for single or multiple illnesses. This is the definition of the ‘market’ here and the
line AH can be considered as a series of short-run NHS demand curves over the lifecycles of
the products demanded. Whilst Figure 1 appears similar to the static textbook model of
NHS demand curve
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monopoly, I give it a dynamic interpretation by considering that each therapeutic ‘market’
goes through three possible stages: (1) a monopolistic class containing a patented drug with
no substitutes; (2) a duopoly or oligopolistic class containing patented drugs with streams of
similar but differentiated therapeutic substitutes; and (3) a competitive class containing off-
patent generic equivalents. See DiMasi and Paquette [21]. I label these stages T0, T1 and T2
respectively.
In each year of the monopolistic stage T0, a manufacturer supplies a first-in-class drug
with a constant average cost of production (C0) which is equal to marginal costs (MC0). The
manufacturer (within government-imposed limits on drug pricing or total profits earned over
a firm’s portfolio of products supplied to the NHS) faces a marginal revenue curve MR;
charges a profit-maximizing price Pm for supplying Qm of the patented drug2; and captures
per year quasi-rents, i.e., revenues in excess of production costs (also referred to as producer
surplus) given by the rectangle PmBMD. Net consumer surplus per year accruing to the NHS
and its patient populations is given by the triangle PmAB. This includes the health benefits
derived from the drug supplied.
Let’s first focus on the welfare effects of cost-reducing process innovations. If the
manufacturer is able to develop and implement a cost-reducing process innovation to lower
COG to C1, it will charge a new profit-maximizing price that is lower than Pm, increase
output beyond Qm and capture per year quasi-rents given by the rectangle P0RNE, which is
greater than PmBMD. If the manufacturer pursues a constant price-quantity strategy, it will
reap incremental quasi-rents given by the rectangle with edges EDM. Net consumer surplus
per year then increases by PmBRP0. (I assume here that the expected increment in quasi-rents
more than offsets the associated fixed costs of developing or reverse-engineering the
manufacturing process – otherwise the manufacturer wouldn’t consider implementing a
process innovation.)
If the manufacturer is able to develop and implement a cost-reducing process that
lowers production costs to C2, it will charge a new lower profit-maximizing price, increase
output by a larger amount, and capture a higher volume of quasi-rents per year given by the
rectangle bounded by P1SOI. Introducing a cost-reducing process innovation effectively
increases the market size for the manufacturer – once the fixed costs of introducing the
process innovations are covered. Net consumer surplus per year is now given by triangle
2 Depending on current clinical and economic evidence available, such monopolistic first-in-class products may
face actual or potential competition from existing products from other therapeutic classes/ markets if these
products have licensed or unlicensed uses for treating or managing the same set of illnesses. I assume here that
the manufacturer of a first-in-class drug sets its profit-maximizing price taking into account these “out-of-class”
alternatives and its residual demand curve.
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P1AS – but observe the fall in profit-maximizing prices is much smaller than the associated
fall in COG. The monopolist doesn’t offer price cuts but its profit-maximizing price falls with
successful attempts to lower manufacturing costs. This highlights the problem posed by a
‘progressive’ monopolist: as the manufacturer gets more successful with process innovation,
the deadweight loss per year increases from triangle BMC at C0 to triangle RNG at C1 to
triangle SOL at C2, whilst net consumer surplus only increases by the small trapeziums along
the line BRS. See Reksulak et al. [22].
Beyond stage T0, the volume of quasi-rents enjoyed by the first-mover manufacturer
under temporal monopoly power will, sooner or later, incite competitive rent-seeking in
stages T1 and T2 by therapeutic substitutes and in stage T2 by generic equivalents. The greater
the volume of quasi-rents available to be appropriated, the larger the incentive for
competitive rent-seeking and the higher the number of competing manufacturers or products
attracted to the ‘market’, especially when it is easy to duplicate the (patented) manufacturing
process or reverse-engineer a me-too process. Repeated improvements in manufacturing that
lowers production costs will shift the potential competitive price-quantity combination from
P0(C0)-Q0(N0) to P1(C1)-Q1(N1) to P2(C2)-Q2(N2) and so forth; where N is the number of
products that ensure (near) complete dissipation of all quasi-rents available and its
transformation into consumer surplus over periods T1 and T2. Holding all else equal, N2 > N1
> N0; the inverse price-N relationship gets steeper as N increases; the potential net consumer
surplus per year increases from triangle ADC to AEG to AIL; and the products that constitute
N2 will embody a (richer) history of cost-reducing process innovations3.
Note that the increments in net consumer surplus over stages T1 and T2 come not only
from lower prices (or more cost-effective delivery of health benefits) but having an expanded
arsenal of alternative product options to cater for heterogeneous clinical needs. Also, the
extent to which prices fall in periods T1 and T2 with changes to drug manufacturing will
depend on whether competitive pressures are functional and effective. Indeed, a lot more can
3 The theoretical framework presented captures in a parsimonious, non-mathematical manner events that occur
over periods T0, T1 and T2. The behaviour of (progressive) monopolists; the competitive and anticompetitive
actions and reactions of manufacturers of equivalent or differentiated products; the effects of market-entry
barriers (for instance, patents for process innovations), are all assumed to occur year after year until Q(N) is
reached. The time path to the competitive price-quantity outcomes may be characterised by entry of products
and firms who ex ante expect to earn positive quasi-rents or exit of products and firms earning negative returns
ex post. If the hazard of product exit exceeds the rate of entry, the market will experience a ‘shakeout’: a
persistent decline in the total number of products until N is reached. One may then observe an inverted (skewed)
U-shaped distribution for product density over time; but it is also possible that the repeated stream of process
innovations (and demand conditions) will be such that the market will not experience any shakeout until N is
reached – in which case one will observe an upward-trending distribution for product density.
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be said about the nature of the price-N relationship by expressing the inverse demand curve in
Figure 1 as:
P୧୨ୡ(t) = Dିଵ൫Q୧୨ୡ, P୥ୣ൫N୥୨൯, P୲ୱ(Nେ, Mୡ), …൯
where Q୧୨ୡ is demand quantity for product i in molecule j in therapeutic market c; N୥୨is the
number of generic products in molecule j; Nୡ is the number of substitute molecules for
product i in molecule j; Mୡ is the mean number of products for the Nୡ− 1 other substitute
molecules on the market; P୥ୣ and P୲ୱ is the mean price of generic equivalents and therapeutic
substitutes respectively. On condition that NHS demand is and remains price-sensitive,
∂P୧୨ୡ ∂Nୡ⁄ < 0, ∂P୧୨ୡ ∂Mୡ⁄ < 0, ∂P୧୨ୡ ∂N୥୨⁄ < 0. If generic equivalents are considered closer
alternatives than therapeutic substitutes, then ห∂P୧୨ୡ ∂N୥୨⁄ ห>ห∂P୧୨ୡ ∂Nୡ⁄ ห. If product classes
embodying cost-reducing process innovations (abbreviated as “costredinnov”) have higher
product density, then it follows that ∂P୧୨ୡ ∂costredinnov୧୨ୡ⁄ < 0.
One will also expect ∂P୧୨ୡ ∂Q୧୨ୡ⁄ < 0 as, by definition, being price-sensitive means
offering more than equiproportionate increases in demand volumes in return for price
discounts. Another factor that might influence the price-N relationship is the age of a product.
If the incremental clinical value of new products (in terms of better efficacy, safety or both) is
substantial, then one will expect a (near) complete shift of demands from older, less effective
products to newer, more effective products that often carry a price premium constrained only
by the NHS estimation of the value-for-money offered by these products. On the other hand,
if the difference in clinical value is ‘small’, then we will expect price competition to evolve
such that over a product’s lifecycle, ∂P୧୨ୡ ∂Age୧୨ୡ⁄ < 0. Older products will have lower prices
as long as they are still demanded and embody a history of repeated efforts to lower COG.
Let’s now turn our attention to the welfare effects of cost-increasing process
innovations. Initially the manufacturer supplies a first-in-class drug in stage T0 at a cost of
C2(MC2); but to address concerns about efficacy and safety, it introduces a cost-increasing
process that shifts the average cost of production to C1(MC1). Introduction of an even costlier
manufacturing process will shift the average cost curve to C0(MC0) leading to an increasing
schedule of profit-maximizing prices, lower supply quantities and shrinking volume of quasi-
rents for the same level of demand. The incentive for competitive rent-seeking in stages T1
and T2 is thus dampened such that we will not expect prices to fall to the same extent or the
price-N relationship to be as steep as in the case of introducing a cost-reducing process
(1)
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innovation. But if because of concerns about efficacy and safety, a drug product is not used or
its level of consumption is restricted below what is prescribed in its marketing authorization,
then prior to introducing a cost-increasing process innovation, and at production costs of
C2(MC2), the quasi-rents a manufacturer can expect to capture in a year will be less than
P1SOI, if not zero. Net consumer surplus per year will also be less than P1AS, if not zero.
Unless the (fixed) costs of introducing a cost-increasing process innovation exceeds
the residual product or firm demand (in which case one would expect product or firm exit),
the introduction of a cost-increasing process innovation (that resolves efficacy and/or safety
concerns) will actually increase the market value of the manufacturing firm if it captures
quasi-rents per year of P0RNE at production costs of C1(MC1). In fact, to the extent that
introducing a cost-increasing process innovation leads to a positive and more certain
realization of net consumer surplus per year (P0AR), the manufacturer could charge a
premium on its profit-maximizing price – again with the size of the price premium
constrained by the NHS willingness-to-pay for health benefits.
Note that even when a cost-increasing process innovation is employed, to displace
what was an existing cost-reducing manufacturing process, the period after its introduction
typically involves attempts to reduce COG through automation and troubleshooting
manufacturing issues, for example. These efforts to reduce COG or supply costs will be
complemented by gains from learning-by-doing effects and economies-of-scale. That is, the
initial upward shift in manufacturing cost to say C0(MC0) from introducing a cost-increasing
process innovation will be followed by attempts to bring costs down to C1(MC1), C2(MC2)
and further down if possible. The incentive for competitive rent-seeking (in a product class
embodying costly process innovations) should increase as demand uncertainty is resolved;
product density should also rise and excluding a (near) complete shift in clinical preferences
towards new or improved products, we will also expect ∂P୧୨ୡ ∂Age୧୨ୡ⁄ < 0. Thus a ‘market’
that first experiences cost-reducing process innovations and later cost-increasing process
innovations will be characterised by a steady decline in the number of products and firms.
Conversely, a ‘market’ that experiences cost-increasing innovations and later cost-reducing
process innovations will tend to be characterised by multiplicity of products; and a more
downward pressure on prices.
It is worth emphasizing that the diagrammatic exposition above assumes a fixed linear
demand curve. The effect of changes to drug manufacturing on the price-N relationships,
patterns of product exit and net consumer surplus will vary in the case of probabilistic linear
demand curves. Consider a shift of the line AH in Figure 2.1 upwards and to right to
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represent medicinal demands (per year) for treating a severe disease affecting a larger number
of people and for which the expected discounted present value of quasi-rents supports a
higher level of R&D in new products. The competitive market outcomes with the use of cost-
reducing process innovations will lie beyond Q2(N2). Next consider a shift of the line AH
downwards and to the left to represent medicinal demands (per year) for treating a rare
disease affecting a smaller number of people and for which the expected discounted present
value of quasi-rents only supports limited investments in product R&D. In this case, the
competitive outcomes with changes to drug manufacturing will lie in the proximity of
Q*(N*).
In what follows, I do not attempt to measure (in monetary terms) the size of changes
in consumer-welfare described above but seek to empirically evaluate the relationships
between the various parameters that determine the size of changes in net consumer surplus
over the lifecycle of drug products, i.e., price changes over time, the likelihood (hazard) of
product exit, product density (i.e., the number of products available); the number of
manufacturing firms, residual demand volumes (per firm) in a given therapeutic market; the
number of generic equivalents and therapeutic substitutes; product age; the cost-reducing
nature of the process used in drug manufacturing and the availability of imported products
that might have different manufacturing-cost profiles.
2.3 Data and methods
2.3.1 Resolving an Estimation Problem
There are two ways of evaluating the welfare implications of changing the
manufacturing process embodied by products in a given therapeutic class. The first is what I
call the ‘direct approach’ which involves looking at the actual production costs (COG) for a
sample of biologically-derived products supplied by a number of pharmaceutical companies
over a defined period of time. One can then try to establish a relationship between the trend in
production costs with price trends, the number of products or any other metric that is
considered appropriate. The problem is: it requires detailed data on the COG for the selected
product sample. Typically, there is a lack of data on COG, and if such data were available, it
was unlikely to be disclosed by companies because of commercial reasons.
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The second is what I refer to as the ‘indirect approach’. This (again using a sample of
biologically-derived pharmaceuticals) relies on expectations that the density of products will
be higher in ‘markets’ where products embody a history of repeated process innovations to
lower COG. And, if this higher product density persist (i.e., the hazard of product exit is low,
close to zero or remains constant, in spite of competitive pressures on prices), then the
steadiness and magnitude of this trend gives us (greater) confidence of the impact of cost-
reducing process innovations. The point is: falling product prices cannot sustain overcrowded
therapeutic markets without efforts to lower COG and if manufacturers do not realize some
‘profit’ margin on production costs, they will exit the market. But if price competition is such
that a product class embodying a cost-reducing process innovation experiences a shakeout,
i.e., the hazard of exit increases over time, then the ceteris paribus effect of process
innovation may be confounded, making it more difficult to separate out the effect of process
innovations from changes in demand conditions or the intensity of price competition.
This indirect approach (which bears some resemblance to what Stigler [23] calls the
‘survivorship technique’) tests the following hypotheses:
1. Ceteris paribus, the more a given therapeutic drug class or ‘market’ is characterized by or
embodies cost-reducing (cost-increasing) process innovations, the greater (lower) the
number of products that can be sustained in that market;
2. Ceteris paribus, the hazard of exit will be lower (higher) in a ‘market’ where drug
products embodies cost-reducing (cost-increasing) process innovations – even in the
presence of competitive pricing; and
3. Ceteris paribus, the higher (lower) the number of products in a ‘market’ that is
characterized by cost-reducing (cost-increasing) process innovation, the more (less)
intense competitive pressures will act to lower product prices.
2.3.2 Product Sample and Data Sources
My product sample covers drug classes that I believe are closely related to, or at some
point time shared the characteristics of current and emerging cohorts of biologic drugs. The
drug classes are: penicillins, hepatitis B vaccines, influenza vaccines, polio vaccines and
MMR vaccines. See Appendix 2A.
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I considered that each product in the sample embodies either a cost-increasing or cost-
reducing process innovation depending on whether their initial introduction contributed to an
increase or a reduction in COG, relative to the previous process innovation(s). This was based
on a review of published and unpublished texts on manufacturing innovations related to the
selected product sample. This categorization is summarized in Table 2.1 below – and it was
validated in discussions with biochemical engineers and an expert in the development of
biologic products. Note that the process innovations described in Table 1 include what
Mansfield et al. [24] will classify as “product innovations used by manufacturing firms” to
make products (that are used by consumers and their households) as well as “process
innovations” to lower the cost of manufacturing.
The downside of categorizing products according to whether they are made with cost-
reducing or cost-increasing process innovations is: it says nothing about the magnitude of the
reduction or increment in manufacturing costs. I believe, however, that this is a credible way
of capturing the cost impact of process innovations in the absence of the desired data on COG
for each product over time. From Table 2.1, the penicillins (as a class) embody the richest
history of cost-reducing process innovations, with some penicillins made with a number of
pre-2000 “old” innovations whilst other penicillins are manufactured with “new” post-2000
technologies. I had no information to indicate which of these innovations were deployed in
manufacturing a specific drug product, nor did I have any information to indicate whether all
these innovations were adopted in a one-step change. Although Table 2.1 provides a timeline
of when the process innovations were introduced, I had no information as to whether
originators or generic entrants in each therapeutic class took the lead in introducing these
process innovations. All that can be inferred from Table 2.1 is whether (a series of) process
innovations led to a fall in COG or not. I had no data on the magnitude of the fall or rise in
COG of the products in each therapeutic class.
In my analyses, the categorization in Table 2.1 (which is not based on product-
specific COG data) is accounted for by a dummy variable labelled COSTREDINNOV to
indicate products made with cost-reducing process innovations or not. For example, consider
two products A and B belonging to the same class or therapeutic market. If the newer process
by which drug A is manufactured is less costly than the older process by which drug B is
manufactured, then the COSTREDINNOV variable for drug A will take the value of one
whilst that for drug B will take the value of zero. Values for the COSTREDINNOV variable
switch from zero to one, one to zero within a product class (therapeutic market), not within a
drug product. Now because the products that embody the process innovations in Table 2.1
29
have become generic for some time, it is important to disentangle the effects of
“genericisation” from the effects of (a series of) changes to the drug manufacturing process. I
do this using regression methods that control for the number of generic equivalents a given
product has (see section 2.3.3).
Courtesy of the NHS Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC), I obtained
data on products (in the selected therapeutic markets) that were prescribed in the NHS over
the period 1991 to 2012. The HSCIC did not have data preceding the year 1991. My dataset
therefore only offers truncated snapshots of the economic lifecycle of products in my sample:
it contains a heterogeneous mix of incomplete product lifecycles. I collected information on:
(1) the net-ingredient-cost per (NIC) item, which I use as a rough proxy for product price; (2)
the number of products on the NHS market in each year; (3) the number of manufacturers of
each product type; and (4) time of product entry into the NHS market and the time of exit,
i.e., when a product is no longer available on the NHS. Data on the NIC per item was
specifically chosen to reflect the direct acquisition costs to the NHS: it excludes cost
components such as discounts, prescription and dispensing fees and other sources of health-
staff income. All product ‘prices’ have been adjusted to 2011 values using the Hospital and
Community Health Services pay and price inflation index. I also collected data on demand
volumes (proxied by the number of prescription items) and NHS expenditures (i.e., the
product of NIC per item and the number of prescription items) on these products for each
year. A graphical analyses of the HSCIC dataset will be found in Appendix 2B.
I used the information presented in Table 2.1, Appendices 2A and 2B, and the HSCIC
dataset as the basis of the statistical modelling in the following sections of this chapter. Table
2.2 on page 32 describes all the variables used in my analyses; and which are constructed
from the data sources listed above. The selection of these variables is based on the theoretical
framework and arguments presented in section 2.2.2. The last paragraph of that section also
provides a list of the variables of interest. A number of the variables are expressed in logged
forms to account for possible skewness in the data and to enable the computation of
elasticities with respect to a specified outcome or dependent variable4.
4 I found that the HSCIC dataset contained a multicollinearity feature: an approximately linear relationship
between ln(N_PPTS) and the therapeutic class indicator D for the polio vaccines. An OLS regression of D on a
set of all other explanatory variables that contained N_PPTS yielded an R-square of 1.000. I attribute this to the
“single-product single-supplier” equilibrium created by the exclusive concentration of demand on IPV (see
Appendices 2A and 2B). I dealt with this by dropping the variable ln(N_PPTS) from the regressions.
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Table 2.1: A history of improvements in pharmaceutical manufacturing
Product Type Process Innovation Year of
Introduction
Type of Process Innovation
Penicillins Batch fermentation in lactose medium; sterilization performed in
batches; use of depth filters for air filtration; bioassays; only
temperature controlled for; batch-by-batch recovery and
purification; mycelium removed by filtration; no recovery of side-
chain precursors: it is discarded; tank reactor volumes of 10-20,000
gallons.
Fed-batch fermentation in glucose/sucrose medium; continuous
sterilization; use of membrane filters for air filtration; high-
performance-liquid-chromatography assays; computerized control
of the process (temperature, pH, dissolved oxygen etc.); semi-
continuous recovery and purification; mycelium removed by whole-
broth extraction; recovery of side-chain precursors for reuse; use of
larger tank reactors (volumes of 20-60,000 gallons).
1950
2000
Cost-reducing process innovation (titres of
0.5-1.0 g/L, efficiency of 70-80%, bulk
product cost of US$275-350 per kg).
Cost-reducing process innovation aimed at
increasing productivity (titres of > 40g/L,
efficiency > 90%, lower bulk product cost to
US$15-20 per kg despite an increase in cost
of labour, energy and raw materials) [32;33].
Hepatitis B vaccines Plasma-derived hepatitis B vaccine licensed (after 13 years of
research).
Recombinant hepatitis B vaccine licensed – the first viral subunit
(virus-like particle) vaccine to prevent human cancer and first
vaccine manufacturing using recombinant DNA technology.
Production involves expression of hepatitis B surface antigen
(HBsAg) in yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae.
Manufacturing improvements to reduce COG, allowing a reduction
of price per dose to approximately $25.
Indian manufacturers express HBsAg in more productive yeast
Pichia pastoris.
1981
1986
1990’s
2006
-
Cost-increasing process innovation to address
(1) the safety risks of using blood from
previously infected people, and (2) the
inadequate supply of human carrier plasma.
Cost-reducing process innovation.
Cost-reducing process innovation that allows
supply of hundreds of million doses for a
price of < 40¢ per vial [34-37].
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MMR vaccines Licensure of measles-mumps-rubella vaccine. The combination
vaccine was introduced in the UK in 1988.
1971 Cost-increasing process innovation. Shift
from separate monovalent vaccines to
trivalent combination vaccines allows single
dose administration in children [35].
Influenza vaccines Licensure of purified influenza vaccine grown in embryonated
chicken eggs.
Adjuvanted killed (inactivated) influenza vaccine prepared in
embryonated chicken eggs that is given by intramuscular or
intradermal administration.
Switch from inactivated influenza vaccines to live attenuated
influenza vaccines, also grown in fertilized chicken eggs.
Gradual but growing interest in moving from egg-based
manufacturing to inactivated influenza vaccine grown in tissue cell
culture, which could be Madin-Darby canine kidney cells; so-called
VERO cells derived from African Green monkeys; or human
embryonic retinal cells.
1969,1970
1973
2003
2004, 2006
-
-
Cost-reducing process innovation that
allowed intranasal (needle-free) delivery of
the vaccine.
Cost-increasing process innovation to
increase manufacturing capacity, provide
flexible and speedy manufacturing scale-up
to meet fluctuations in demand – and ensure
reliability of supply; and offer an alternative
for people allergic to egg proteins [35;37].
Polio vaccines Licensure of killed (inactivated) Salk polio vaccine grown in
primary monkey kidney cells.
Licensure of oral (attenuated/weakened) Sabin polio vaccine grown
in so-called VERO cells derived from monkey kidney cells.
Development of improved/enhanced Salk IPV.
1955
1957
1960’s through
1970’s
-
Cost-reducing process innovation: oral polio
vaccine (OPV) was cheaper to make and
cheaper to administer (than inactivated polio
vaccine [IPV]). IPV required repeated
booster doses whist OPV offered longer-
lasting immunity.
Cost-increasing process innovation to address
safety concerns about OPV risk of vaccine-
associated paralytic polio and vaccine-
derived polioviruses[36-39].
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Table 2.2: List of variables
Variables Definitions Mean (SD)
COSTREDINNOV Dummy indicator for products embodying a cost-reducing process innovation (= 1) or cost-increasing process
innovation (= 0) as defined in Table 1. The variable refers to product innovations used by firms to make the
medicines supplied as well as improvements made to the manufacturing process itself.
0.85 (0.35)
YRSINDEXP Length of time (in years) of industrial experience in using a given process innovation prior to each cross-sectional
wave of the dataset. The variable captures the time-dimension to process improvements, i.e., regardless of whether
a process innovation (in comparison with an earlier process) is cost-reducing or not, the period after its
introduction will be characterized by cumulative (year-after-year) efficiency gains from learning-by-doing effects
and economies-of-scale.
45.92 (10.88)
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP Interaction term of COSTREDINNOV and YRSINDEXP that captures any joint impacts of the nature of process
innovation and the cumulative efficiency gains over time.
42.3 (18.33)
PRODUCTAGE This refers to the time gap between a given cross-sectional wave and the year in which a product introduced on the
NHS market or the year 1991 if there was no information on when a product was introduced on the NHS.
9.78 (6.35)
PRODUCTAGE2 A quadratic term for PRODUCTAGE that is intended to: (1) capture any (skewed) inverted U-shaped distribution
that might exist for product density over time; and (2) test whether ∂P୧୨ୡ ∂Age୧୨ୡ⁄ < 0 is subject to diminishing
marginal effects.
136.04 (153.49)
ln(N_FIRMS) Natural logarithm of the number of firms or sellers in each therapeutic market. Controlling for the number of
suppliers indirectly captures the impact of market-entry barriers due to trade secrets, process patents, intellectual
property disputes, or difficulties in duplicating a process innovation.
3.30 (0.96)
IMPORTS Dummy indicator for products imported. This takes the value of one if a product is imported and zero otherwise. 0.017 (0.13)
ln(N_PRODUCTS) Natural logarithm of an aggregated measure of the number of products (in a given year). 4.60 (1.10)
ln(N_TS) Natural logarithm of the number of therapeutic-substitute molecules (in a given year). 2.51 (0.95)
ln(N_PPTS) Natural logarithm of the number of products per therapeutic-substitute molecule (in a given year). 1.91 (0.44)
ln(N_GE) Natural logarithm of the number of generic equivalents for a given product (in a given year). 3.30 (0.96)
ln(DEMANDVOL) Natural logarithm of demand volumes measured by the number of prescription items (in a given year). 6.77 (4.40)
ln(PRODUCTPRICE) Natural logarithm of product prices measured by the net-ingredient-cost per item. 2.38 (1.40)
A Dummy indicator for the penicillins as a group. This takes on the value of one and zero otherwise. 0.85 (0.36)
B Dummy indicator for hepatitis B vaccines. This takes on the value of one and zero otherwise. 0.07 (0.25)
C Dummy indicator for influenza vaccines. This takes on the value of one and zero otherwise. 0.06 (0.23)
D Dummy indicator for polio vaccines. This takes on the value of one and zero otherwise. 0.01 (0.12)
E Dummy indicator for MMR vaccines. This takes on the value of one and zero otherwise. 0.01 (0.12)
Notes: SD = standard deviation. The indicators of therapeutic-class or ‘market’ are intended to control for therapeutic-class-specific effects. I implement this in the regressions as a
set of four dummy variables (A, B, C and D) with the MMR vaccines embodying cost-increasing process innovations and not imported as the baseline or reference category. This is
because of the demand uncertainty created by the ‘Wakefield Hoax’, which I consider as a random historical event. Since I do not know of any similar random historical events or
controversies that created demand uncertainty for the other product classes, I believe this should help control confounding and allow identification of the ceteris paribus effects of
manufacturing process innovations.
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2.3.3 Empirical Modelling
To test the hypotheses listed in section 2.3.1, I conducted some econometric
modelling that is best appreciated if one considers that, in contrast to Figure 1, in the real
world, the products in my sample will have in each year and over time, different NHS
demand curves with discontinuities and undefined segments. This can be attributed to:
disease epidemiology (for example, severity or rarity of an illness); uncertainty in medicinal
demands; advertising, marketing and changing government regulations; entry of new
products (for unmet clinical needs) and exit of other products compensated by importation of
products from foreign suppliers when and where demand exceeds local supply; random
historical events etc. That aside, within each year, the sample products supplied will embody
the product innovations (cost reducing or not) used by manufacturers to make these products
as well as the process improvements made up to that year.
This is best captured within a multilevel or longitudinal framework where there is
natural clustering of products demanded by the NHS within each time period. Using the
terminology of Rice and Jones [25], the individual products are micro-units clustered within
each cross-sectional year as the macro-unit. For each hypothesis, I estimated a number of
econometric models to check whether the outputs of the preferred model is consistent with
alternative competing models, even if one believes the outputs of the preferred model are
biased.
Hypothesis 1. With this, I wanted to establish the nature of the relationship between
(cost-reducing) process innovation and product density. Using a multilevel framework, I
specified a linear random-intercept model, in which the macro-units can be treated as having
random-effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE). The RE model assumes error terms for the macro-
and micro-units are randomly distributed and it can be written as:
Y୧୲= β଴ +઺૚܆୧୲+ μ଴୲+ ϵ୧୲
μ଴୲~ N൫0, σஜଶ൯, ϵ୧୲~ N(0, σ஫ଶ)
VPC = σஜ
ଶ σஜ
ଶ + σ஫
ଶൗ , corr(܆୧୲, w୧୲) = 0
where Y୧୲ is the outcome of interest; ܆୧୲is a vector of explanatory variables, β଴ is the
intercept and ઺૚ is a vector of coefficients. The subscript i (= 1, 2, 3, …, M) indexes the
individual products supplied by manufacturers; t (= 1, 2, 3, …, T) indexes the cross-sectional
years of the dataset; w୧୲= μ଴୲+ ϵ୧୲ is the composite error term, where ϵ୧୲ refers to
(2)
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idiosyncratic errors that vary over individual products; μ଴୲refers to year-specific
unobservable error and VPC is an error variance partition coefficient.
The FE model, which considers the error term for the macro-unit as a fixed parameter
to be estimated, can be written as:
Y୧୲= β଴+ μ଴୲+઺૚܆୧୲+ ϵ୧୲ ⇔ β଴୲+઺૚܆୧୲+ ϵ୧୲
β଴୲= β଴+ μ଴୲, ϵ୧୲~ N(0, σ஫ଶ), corr(܆୧୲, μ଴୲) ≠ 0, corr(܆୧୲, ϵ୧୲) = 0
The random-intercept models above can be modified into (1) a pooled or population-averaged
[PA] model or (2) a mixed-effects [ME] linear model that allows consideration of both
random-intercepts and random coefficients. The PA model is a pooled ordinary least squares
estimator that can be written as follows:
Y୧୲= β଴ + ઺૚܆୧୲+ v୧୲(= μ଴୲+ ϵ୧୲)
ϵ୧୲~N(0, σ஫ଶ), corr(܆୧୲, v୧୲) = 0
where μ଴୲= 0, and v୧୲= ϵ୧୲. If μ଴୲≠ 0, then v୧୲≠ v୧ୱ, forݐ≠ ݏand the error terms will be
serially correlated even if ϵ୧୲ is identical and independently distributed with a zero mean and
variance σ஫ଶ. For the ME model, where random-intercepts and random-slopes can be
considered simultaneously, we can write the following:
Y୧୲= β଴ + (઺૚+ μଵ୲)܆୧୲+ μ଴୲+ ϵ୧୲
ϵ୧୲~N(0, σ஫ଶ),ቀμ଴୲μଵ୲ቁ~N൫૙,ષૄ൯,૙ = ቀ00ቁ,ષૄ = ቆσஜ଴ଶσஜ଴ଵ σஜଵଶ ቇ
where μଵ୲captures randomness in the coefficients (slopes), σஜ଴ଶ is the variance of the random
intercept, σஜଵଶ is variance of the (selected) random slopes and σஜ଴ଵ is covariance between the
random intercepts and random coefficients. I estimated the ME model with the variable for
cost-reducing process innovation having a random slope [26; 27].
For product density as the outcome of interest, I estimated the RE, FE, PA and ME
models using the following regressors from Table 2.2: COSTREDINNOV, YRSINDEXP,
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP, PRODUCTAGE and its quadratic term; ln(N_FIRMS),
IMPORTS, ln(DEMANDVOL), ln(PRODUCTPRICE) and the therapeutic-market indicators:
A, B, C, D.
(3)
(4)
(5)
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For the second hypothesis, I moved away from the multilevel framework to a
“survivorship technique”. I initially performed a non-parametric survival analysis under the
assumption of non-informative censoring. I constructed Nelson Aalen plots of the cumulative
hazard of product exit differentiated by (1) therapeutic classes; and (2) the cost-reducing
nature of the process innovation(s) deployed in drug manufacturing. A well-known problem
with such non-parametric survival analysis is that it doesn’t allow for any differences
observed to be confidently attributed to the key variable of interest, COSTREDINNOV. That
is, one cannot tell whether other confounding variables contributed more or less to the
differences in exit hazard. I therefore conducted a number of parametric survival analyses
using: (1) continuous-time Cox, Weibull and Gompertz models, and (2) discrete-time
complementary log-log models (hereafter cloglog).
In the Cox model, the exit hazard for product i at time t, given survival to that time, is
defined by the product of a baseline hazard, h଴(t) as an unspecified function of time, and a
proportionality factor as a function of explanatory variables. This is as follows:
h୧(t|܆୧) = h଴(t). exp(܆୧઺૚+ μ଴୲)h୧(t|܆୧) h଴(t)⁄ = exp(܆୧઺૚+ μ଴୲) ⟺ ln[h୧(t|܆୧) h଴(t)⁄ ] = ܆୧઺૚+ μ଴୲
where μ଴୲ is a gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity (frailty) that is shared by all
products consumed in the NHS in each given year. This shared frailty has unique values
across time periods but constant in each year. Depending on the parametric specification of
the baseline hazard in relation to time, we can write the following:
if h଴(t) = hp. t஡ିଵ,ln[ h୧(t|܆୧)] = (ρ − 1) ln t + β଴ + ܆୧઺૚+ μ଴୲ ⇒ Weibull model;
if h଴(t) = h. exp(γt),ln[ h୧(t|܆୧)] = γt + β଴ + ܆୧઺૚+ μ଴୲ ⇒ Gompertz model,
for which ρ and γ are ancillary parameters to be estimated and β଴ is an intercept. If ρ > 1 for
the Weibull model, the hazard of product exit is continuously increasing; if ρ < 1, the hazard
is decreasing, and when ρ = 1, an exponential (constant hazard) model is obtained. If γ > 0 
for the Gompertz model, the hazard of product exit is increasing monotonically; if γ < 0, the 
(6)
(7)
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hazard is decreasing and if γ = 0, a constant hazard is obtained. I estimated the continuous-
time models with and without shared unobserved heterogeneity [27].
Yet the complexities of real-life are such that modelling the hazard of product exit
over a continuous period may be inappropriate. Considering, for instance, uncertainties in
NHS medicinal demands; discontinuity and time lags in developing and implementing
manufacturing innovations (perhaps due to a reluctance to reopen the regulatory review
process); it might be better to model the hazard of product exit over a series of short-run
periods. I therefore partitioned the continuous time-period (in this case1991-2012) into a
sequence of contiguous periods: (0, tଵ], (tଵ, tଶ], … , (t୨ି ଵ, t୨] where j indexes each discrete
time-interval. (The parenthesis indicates the beginning of each time interval and the square
bracket indicates its end.) I looked at events over 3-year periods, i.e., I partitioned the data
into seven discrete time-intervals with the last time-interval comprising of four years.
I evaluated the grouped survival data created using a cloglog model with and without
frailty, in which the hazard of product exit (h୧୲) within a discrete time-interval (t) is given by:
h୧୲= 1 − exp{−exp[h଴∗(t) + ઺૚܆୧୲+ θ]}log(− log(1 − h୧୲)) = h଴∗(t) + ઺૚܆୧୲+ θ
h଴∗(t) = log቎න h଴(t)dt୲ౠ
୲ౠషభ
቏
θ ≔ log(μ଴୲∗ ) ~N൫0, σஜଶ൯; log(μ୧୲∗ )~gamma(1, σஜଶ)
where the expression − log(1 − h୧୲) is the discrete-time analogue of h୧(t|܆୧) in the
continuous-time models; θ is the unobserved heterogeneity (frailty) that is uncorrelated with
the explanatory variables; h଴∗ (t) is a non-parametric baseline hazard that is constant within
each discrete time-interval [27],[28].
For the cloglog model, I adopted three representations of unobserved heterogeneity.
First is a shared normally-distributed frailty (μ଴୲∗ ) having distinct values of heterogeneity
across each year of each discrete-time interval. Second is observation-level unobserved
heterogeneity (μ୧୲∗ ): individual-product-specific frailty that varies across time periods – and
which I assumed follows a gamma distribution. Third is a discrete non-parametric finite-
mixture frailty that is characterised by two homogenous subpopulations or mass points
consisting of: (1) ‘frail’ products with a higher unobserved exit propensity; and (2) products
(8)
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with a lower latent hazard of exit5. The two groups may or may not be equally mixed within
the sample population but over time, ‘frail’ products exit first and more frequently. The group
with a low latent exit-hazard can be considered as consisting of “medically-necessary” drugs
offering substantial clinical benefits in routine practice – and highly preferred by healthcare
providers and consumers (on the basis of usage experience). The frail group consists of all
other products. The values of the two mass points: m1 for the ‘frail’ group (normalized to
zero) and m2 for the ‘low’ exit-hazard group, conditional on the probabilities of products
belonging to each subpopulation, are estimated with all other parameters of the cloglog
regression.
For the parametric survival analyses above, I used the following explanatory variables
from Table 2.2: COSTREDINNOV, YRSINDEXP and COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP;
PRODUCTAGE, IMPORTS, ln(N_FIRMS), ln(N_TS) and ln(N_GE); ln(DEMANDVOL),
ln(PRODUCTPRICE) and the indicators of therapeutic class (A, B, C and D).
Hypothesis 3. With this, I sought to investigate the relationship (if any) between
improvements in pharmaceutical manufacturing (process innovation) and the observed price
trends for individual products in my sample. Specifically, I aim to identify whether
∂P୧୨ୡ ∂Nୡ⁄ < 0, ∂P୧୨ୡ ∂N୥୨⁄ < 0 and ∂P୧୨ୡ ∂costredinnov୧୨ୡ⁄ < 0. Going back to the
multilevel framework, I first constructed a random intercept RE model using
ln(PRODUCTPRICE) as the dependent variable – and the following explanatory variables:
COSTREDINNOV, YRSINDEXP and COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP; IMPORTS,
PRODUCTAGE and its quadratic variant; ln(N_FIRMS), ln(N_TS) and ln(N_GE),
ln(DEMANDVOL) and the dummies A, B, C and D for therapeutic class. I rerun the analysis
using the FE6, PA and ME models.
5 In principle, the number of mass points should be chosen such that an additional mass point makes no
improvement to the log-likelihood function and the prior probability of products belonging to that additional
mass point is close to zero. I found that moving to three mass points resulted in more convergence problems. I
therefore maintained the default of two mass points for the finite-mixture frailty.
6 Note that because product prices are determined by both “supply” and “demand” factors, there might be an
endogeneity (simultaneity) issue here. One solution is to separate out time-invariant and time-varying
exogenous and endogenous variables, specify variables internal to the model to be used as instruments for the
endogenous variables; and use the instrumental-variables estimators suggested by Hausman and Taylor (HT)
and Amemiya and MaCurdy (AM)[27]. These estimators allow estimation of the ઺෡ vector for time-invariant
variables and are appropriate when the variables are correlated with the unobserved individual-product error
(ϵన୲ෞ ) but inconsistent when the variables are correlated with the unobserved period-specific error (μ଴୲ෞ ). Relative
to the FE estimator, the majority of gains from the HT and AM estimators is with respect to ઺෡ for the time-
invariant variables. Since the HSCIC dataset has no time-invariant variables, these efficiency gains are not
relevant here. In fact, running the –xthtaylor– command in STATA (with or without “amacurdy” option) and
excluding time-invariant variables yields an error message.
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To recap, my regressions on product density and product prices utilized fixed-effects,
random-effects, population-averaged and mixed-effects estimators. The regressions on hazard
of product exit makes use of continuous-time (Cox, Weibull, Gompertz) and discrete-time
cloglog estimators. I performed all my analyses in STATA v.11.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Product Density and Process Innovation
The full set of results from regressions on product density are presented in Appendix
2C. One observes a general consistency in the coefficients estimated from the FE, RE, PA
and ME models without a random coefficient for the variable for cost-reducing process
innovation. A standard Hausman test for a comparison of the FE and RE models suggested
that there are statistically-significant differences between β୊୉෢ and βୖ୉෢ that indicates a
preference for the FE model. An alternative test based on the so-called augmented regression
lends further support for the FE model. On the basis of the log-likelihoods and Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), selected model results are presented in Table 2.3 below. Since
the log-likelihood of the FE model is greater than that of the ME model without a random
slope for the variable for cost-reducing process innovation, and the corresponding AIC is also
lower, I focus, momentarily, on the FE model.
The FE model shows that the process-innovation variables (COSTREDINNOV and
YRSINDEXP) have generally a positive statistically-significant effect on product density.
This positive effect is, however, counteracted by the negative coefficient on the interaction
term for the variables for cost-reducing process innovation and years-of-industrial experience
(COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP). With years-of-industrial experience equated to five
years7, products that are manufactured with a cost-reducing process innovation have 2.76 (= 1
+ [exp(1.1672 – 0.0303(5)) – 1]) times the density of products manufactured with cost-
increasing process innovations, holding all else equal.
The coefficient for the variable for years-of-industrial experience indicates that, for
each additional year of using a cost-increasing process innovation, the gains from learning-
7 Within the HSCIC dataset, the variable years-of-industrial experience has a mean of approximately 46 years, a
minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 62 years. I, in most cases, estimate the partial marginal effects of the
variable for cost-reducing process innovation (over the long-run) by assuming 20 years of industrial experience.
The “long run” here refers to the period 1991 to 2012.
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by-doing and economies-of-scale contributes, on average, 0.93% increase in product density:
a positive but small effect. For products manufactured with cost-reducing process
innovations, product density after two decades is 75.28% (= 100•[exp(1.1672 – 0.0303(20)) –
1]) higher. That the effect of the variable for cost-reducing process innovation on product
density declines with years-of-industrial experience is perhaps because of dynamic
replacement of what becomes ‘obsolete’ manufacturing methods by newer ones; a more
limited scope, or easily exhausted opportunities for process improvements; and/or that efforts
to lower COG are not repeated year after year. Another possible explanation is: products
embodying cost-reducing process innovations, being subject to more intense price-
discounting competition (in overcrowded therapeutic markets), may have relatively higher
exit hazards – see sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 below.
The FE model shows that variable for imported products has a positive effect on
product density: compared to a dependence on only locally-sourced products, imports
increase product density by approximately 5.37% (= 100•[exp(0.0523) – 1]. This is not a
particularly surprising result as the primary motivation behind importation is to correct a
perceived or real mismatch between drug supply and demand forecasts. Another unsurprising
result is observed with the coefficient on the log of the number of manufacturing firms: a
10% increase in the number of firms is associated with a 7.51% increase in product density.
On the other hand, demand volumes and product prices do not seem to have statistically-
significant effects on product density – observe the near zero coefficients (elasticities) for the
log of demand volumes and the log of product prices. Recall that the volume of quasi-rents
available to be appropriated determine the incentives for firm and product entry. It thus
appears that controlling for the number of manufacturing firms and therapeutic-class-specific
effects, leaves a lesser amount of variation in product density that can be explained by
demand volumes and product prices.
I now turn my attention to the results of the ME model with a random coefficient for
the variable for cost-reducing process innovation – as the log-likelihood (AIC) of this model
is greater (lower) than that for the FE model. This suggests that the effect of the variable for
cost-reducing process innovation on product density is not fixed but varies across time
periods (the macro-units). To be specific, the effects of the variable are lower (higher) than
average in time periods where the reference category (i.e., MMR vaccines embodying cost-
increasing process innovations and sourced locally), has higher (lower) product densities: a
correlation coefficient of -0.9701. The average (short-run) effect of the variable for cost-
reducing process innovation is to increase product density by 31.09% (= 100•[exp(0.2952 –
40
0.0049(5)) – 1]), holding all else equal. This heterogeneity in the variable’s effects over the
study period suggest that short-run adjustments differ from the average long-run effects of
process innovations on product density.
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Table 2.3: Regression analysis on product density
Dependent variable: ln(N_PRODUCTS) Number of observations: 3721
Model specified: Fixed-effects model Mixed-effects linear model
Coefficients: β෠୊୉(SE) β෠୑ ୉(SE)a,c β෠୑ ୉(SE)b,c
COSTREDINNOV 1.1672 (0.421)* 1.1522 (0.059)*** 0.2952 (0.086)**
YRSINDEXP 0.0093 (0.003)* 0.0100 (0.001)*** 0.0008 (0.001)
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP -0.0303 (0.008)** -0.0300 (0.001)*** -0.0049 (0.002)**
PRODUCTAGE -0.0008 (0.001) -0.0008 (0.001) 0.0002 (0.001)
PRODUCTAGE2 0.00001 (0.0004) 0.00001 (0.0004) -0.00002 (0.0004)
ln(N_FIRMS) 0.7514 (0.058)*** 0.7529 (0.013)*** 0.6593 (0.014)***
IMPORTS 0.0523 (0.018)** 0.0524 (0.010)*** 0.0552 (0.0093)***
ln(DEMANDVOL) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.0003)
ln(PRODUCTPRICE) -0.0003 (0.0005) -0.0003 (0.001) 0.0001 (0.001)
A 2.0655 (0.240)*** 2.0474 (0.063)*** 2.0735 (0.060)***
B 1.2527 (0.106)*** 1.2631 (0.021)*** 1.1549 (0.020)***
C 0.5422 (0.089)*** 0.5433 (0.019)*** 0.6123 (0.018)***
D 0.7832 (0.101)*** 0.7824 (0.021)*** 0.6693 (0.020)***
Regression statistics
Intercept: β଴෢ (SE) 0.1238 (0.122) 0.1323 (0.049)** 0.4635 (0.066)***(σஜ଴ෞ ,σ஫ෞ ;σஜଵෞ ) (0.177, 0.078) (0.167, 0.078) (0.265, 0.070; 0.252)
Covar(μ଴୲ෞ , μଵ୲ෞ ), corr(β෠଴,β෠ଵ୲) − − -0.0648, -0.9701 
Variance partition coefficient 0.8362 0.8213 0.4596
Overall R-squared 0.9769 − − 
Corr(܆୧୲,μ଴୲ෞ ) -0.4833 − − 
Log-likelihood (AIC) 4221.6 (-8417.1) 4137.3 (-8242.6) 4510.4 (-8984.8)
Notes: SE = heteroskedastic-robust standard errors for FE, RE and PA models, default errors for the ME models; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; !p < 0.10; a Without a
random-slope for COSTREDINNOV; b With a random-slope for COSTREDINNOV; c Log-likelihood ratio (LR) test for a comparison with the equivalent single-level model was
statistically significant. LR test for a comparison of (a) and (b) indicates statistically-significant evidence that the effect of COSTREDINNOV is not fixed: it varies across different
time periods; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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2.4.2 Exit Hazard and Process Innovation
The findings from my non-parametric survival analysis are depicted graphically in
Figures 2.2 and 2.3. This shows the cumulative hazard of product exit over the time period
1991 to 2012, differentiated by: (1) the therapeutic market, and (2) the cost-reducing nature
of the process innovation used in drug manufacturing. In general, one observes a low
cumulative exit hazard (below 10%) for all therapeutic classes with the exception of the polio
vaccines.
Figure 2.2 shows that the hepatitis B and influenza vaccines have the lowest exit
hazards. In fact, no exit events are observed for these vaccines until after the year 1996. The
exit hazard for the MMR vaccines first rises steadily before tapering off after year 2000,
which is roughly the time of the outbreak of the MMR controversy. The penicillins exhibit a
constant increase in the hazard of exit over time: a trend that is consistent with the inverted
U-shaped distribution for product density and the shakeout period observed in Figure B1 in
Appendix 2B. Consistent with the trend towards a “single-product single-supplier”
equilibrium, the cumulative exit hazard for polio vaccines rises to just under 30% by year
2012. On the other hand, Figure 2.3 shows that exit hazard is generally higher for products
embodying a cost-reducing process innovation relative to those made with a cost-increasing
process innovation. A Wilcoxon test shows a statistically-significant difference in exit hazard
(p value = 0.0003) and a log-rank test confirms this (p value = 0.0009).
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Figure 2.2: Hazard of product exit by therapeutic class
Figure 2.3: Hazard of product exit by type of process innovation
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Table 2.4A: Regression analysis on hazard of product exit – without unobserved heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Product exit Number of observations: 3673
Model specified: Weibull model Cloglog model
Coefficients: β෠ଵ(SE) HR β෠ଵ(SE) HR
COSTREDINNOV -3.4433 (4.001) 0.0320 0.4095 (3.302) 1.5061
YRSINDEXP 0.0828 (0.064) 1.0863 0.0120 (0.037) 1.0121
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP 0.0532 (0.091) 1.0547 0.0454 (0.070) 1.0465
PRODUCTAGE -0.0916 (0.019)*** 0.9124 0.2363 (0.030)*** 1.2665
ln(N_FIRMS) 3.1111 (0.652)*** 22.4459 1.2796 (0.755)! 3.5951
ln(N_GE) -0.2218 (0.070)** 0.80110 -0.0759 (0.073) 0.9270
ln(N_TS) -1.8181 (0.580)** 0.1623 -2.1717 (0.668)** 0.1140
IMPORTS -0.5315 (0.450) 0.5877 -0.3051 (0.444) 0.7371
ln(DEMANDVOL) -0.6116 (0.042)*** 0.5425 -0.5177 (0.058)*** 0.5959
ln(PRODUCTPRICE) -0.2680 (0.051)*** 0.7649 -0.0631 (0.052) 0.9389
A -3.2243 (2.491) 0.0398 -0.2805 (2.827) 0.7554
B 2.1866 (1.6464) 8.9045 1.8047 (1.067)! 6.0781
C -2.3171 (1.232)! 0.0986 -0.2721 (1.352) 0.7618
D 4.2768 (0.884)*** 72.0131 1.8534 (0.893)* 6.3816
(0,t0] − − -2.2455 (1.516) 0.1059  
(t0,t1] − − -2.8780 (1.528)! 0.0562
(t1,t2] − − -3.7825 (1.541)* 0.0228
(t2,t3] − − -5.0872 (1.516)*** 0.0062
(t3,t4] − − -6.1063 (1.456)*** 0.0022
(t4,t5] − − -6.7779 (1.522)*** 0.0011
(t5,t6] − − -9.6622 (1.634)*** 0.0001
Regression statistics
Intercept: β଴(෢ SE) -8.4685 (2.259)***  −   
Ancillary parameter: ρ, γ (SE) 1.4842 (0.071)***  −   
Log-likelihood (AIC) -689.7 (1411.3) -406.7 (855.4)
Notes: HR = hazard ratio = exp(β෠ଵ); SE = heteroskedastic-robust standard errors for the continuous-time models, default errors for the discrete-time model; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01;
*p < 0.05; !p < 0.10; (0,t0]…(t5,t6] = discrete-time-interval dummies; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 2.4B: Regression analysis on product exit – controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Product exit Number of observations: 3673
Model specified: Weibull model Cloglog model
Coefficients: β෠ଵ(SE) β෠ଵ(SE)a
COSTREDINNOV -3.5224 (4.044) -0.2204 (9.619)
YRSINDEXP 0.0861 (0.059) -0.0826 (0.097)
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP 0.0515 (0.091) 0.1134 (0.152)
PRODUCTAGE -0.0760 (0.020)*** 0.2935 (0.111)**
ln(N_FIRMS) 2.7630 (0.772)*** 3.1174 (1.391)*
ln(N_GE) -0.2301 (0.065)*** -0.0892 (0.208)
ln(N_TS) -1.4200 (0.761)! -4.4599 (1.601)**
IMPORTS -0.5309 (0.405) -0.5967 (1.271)
ln(DEMANDVOL) -0.6139 (0.039)*** -0.6968 (0.134)***
ln(PRODUCTPRICE) -0.2738 (0.044)*** 0.1354 (0.117)
A -3.1438 (3.048) -0.3587 (9.247)
B 2.2799 (1.276)! 2.5370 (2.568)
C -1.8953 (1.242) -3.8139 (4.566)
D 3.9973 (1.023)*** 2.9925 (2.437)
(0,t0] − -0.3862 (3.606)
(t0,t1] − -1.8735 (3.572)                
(t1,t2] − -4.1532 (3.498)                   
(t2,t3] − -5.9550 (3.536)!
(t3,t4] − -8.2742 (3.638)*
(t4,t5] − -7.6864 (3.688)*
(t5,t6] − -12.2111 (5.634)*
Regression statistics
Intercept: β଴෢ (SE) -8.3810 (1.982)*** − 
Log-likelihood (AIC) -688.7 (1411.4) -162.2 (370.3)
σஜ
ଶ (Chi-square ∀ H଴: {μ଴୲;μ୧୲} = 0) 0.0534 (1.91)! −                 
Notes: SE = heteroskedastic-robust standard errors for the continuous-time model, default errors for the discrete-time models; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; !p < 0.10; a Model
with finite-mixture unobserved heterogeneity; (0,t0]…(t5,t6] = discrete-time-interval dummies; H଴ = null hypothesis for unobserved heterogeneity; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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The full set of results from my parametric survival analysis without controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity are shown in Appendix 2D. On comparing the log-likelihoods and
AIC of the different models, I focus on the continuous-time Weibull and the discrete-time
cloglog models; see Table 2.4A above. But bear in mind that the continuous-time Weibull
model estimates exit hazard over a truncated “long-run” period (in this case 1991-2012)
whilst the discrete-time cloglog model estimates exit hazard over a series of “short-run”
periods indexed by time-interval dummies. The Weibull model shows that products made
with cost-reducing process innovations have a lower exit hazard albeit this is not a
statistically-significant effect. This yields a statistically-insignificant hazard ratio of 0.0926
(= exp(-3.4433 + 0.0532(20)) although this effect is not statistically significant. The ancillary
Weibull parameter (ρ = 1.4842) suggests that baseline exit hazard increases monotonically
over time. On the other hand, the cloglog model tells a slightly different story, which, of
course, is dependent on how the survival data was partitioned. Within each short-run (i.e.,
each discrete time-interval), the coefficient of the variable for cost-reducing process
innovation suggest an increase in exit hazard: a hazard ratio of 1.8899 (= exp(0.4095 +
0.0454(5)) albeit this is not statistically significant. This positive effect, however, is
counteracted by the negative coefficients on the interval-specific dummies, which suggests a
monotonic decline in the baseline exit hazard.
However, without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the models in Table 2.4A
implicitly assume that all variation in exit hazard is determined by the chosen set of
explanatory variables. This could lead to biased estimates of “duration dependence” (how
exit hazards vary over time) and the incremental/ marginal effects of the explanatory
variables specified. For this reason, I shift my focus to models that account for unobserved,
omitted or unmeasured heterogeneity. A full set of results from these models are given in
Appendix 2E. On the basis of the log-likelihood and AIC, I focus on the continuous-time
Weibull model with shared frailty and the cloglog model with a two-point finite-mixture
frailty; see Table 2.4B.
The Weibull model with frailty does confirm the negative impact of the variable for
cost-reducing process innovation on long-run hazard of exit. Products embodying cost-
reducing process innovations are less likely to exit: a 91.73% (= 100•[exp(-3.5224 +
0.0515(20)) – 1]) reduction – albeit statistically we are less confident that this is no different
from zero. Not surprising, the coefficient on product age indicates that the older a product
gets (by a year), the lower the hazard of exit: a 7.6% reduction. This perhaps indicates strong
clinical preferences for ageing products that offer positive net health benefits relative to
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newer drugs introduced on the NHS over the study period. The results also show a 10%
increase in demand volumes is associated with 6.14% reduction in exit hazard; a 10%
increase in product price is associated with 2.74% reduction in hazard of product exit; and the
elasticity of exit hazard with respect to the number of firms is 2.76. The ancillary Weibull
parameter in this case is slightly higher (1.4907).
The cloglog model with a two-point finite-mixture frailty suggests that the baseline
hazard declines over each successive short-run period albeit this decline is not monotonic8.
The model does confirm that products made with cost-reducing process innovations, in the
short-run, have a higher exit hazard but again this is not statistically significant – the average
effect of the variable for cost-reducing process innovation is approximately 41.43% (=
100•[exp(-0.2204 + 0.1134(5)) – 1]). The cloglog model with finite-mixture frailty also
indicated, within each short-run: (1) higher exit hazard with increasing number of
manufacturing firms; (2) increased hazard of exit with product age [due perhaps to the
displacement of less-effective older drugs by newer more-effective ones]; (3) lower exit
hazard with the number of therapeutic substitutes; and (4) no statistically-significant effects
of product price and number of generic equivalents on exit hazard. Note that although the
coefficient on the log of demand volumes is consistent with the findings of Virabhak and
Sohn[29], the coefficients on the log of number of therapeutic substitutes and the log of the
number of generic equivalents appear to be inconsistent. A plausible explanation is: I
controlled for the number of manufacturing firms, which is associated with an increased
hazard of product exit. The reported coefficients therefore indicate the marginal effects of the
number of therapeutic substitutes and generic equivalents per firm, holding all else equal.
Table 2.4B shows shared frailty in the Weibull model did not reach statistical
significance at the 5% level; i.e., results with and without frailty are not markedly different.
In contrast, unobserved heterogeneity is statistically significant in the discrete-time cloglog
model with finite-mixture frailty. The unobserved heterogeneity parameter m2෢ = -3.9205 (p
value = 0.041) and there is a 0.59 probability that a given product belongs to the class with a
low latent hazard of exit and a 0.41 probability of belonging to the class comprising of frail
products. Conditional on class membership, the unobserved subpopulation of highly-
preferred medically-necessary drugs are approximately 98% (= 100•[exp(-3.9205) – 1]) less
8 In an unreported analysis using the cloglog model, I specified in place of the discrete-time-interval dummies, a
parametric baseline hazard of the form: h଴ = (q − 1). ln(t) where q is the discrete-time analogue of the
ancillary parameter in the continuous-time Weibull model. The coefficient on ln( t) was -1.3249 (q = -0.3249)
in the model without frailty, and in the model with gamma-distributed frailty this was -6.712 (q = -5.712). This
confirms that, when the data is viewed as a series of short-run periods, the baseline hazard generally declines
over time.
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likely to exit, holding all else equal. The results of the discrete-time cloglog model with
finite-mixture frailty are thus preferred to the estimates reported in Table 2.4A.
Yet, I found, for HSCIC dataset, that the STATA estimators for the cloglog models
with frailty were ‘fragile’, i.e., the log-likelihood as a function of the beta-coefficients is not
globally concave and the results obtained may just be one of several local optima (a single
unique global optimum is not guaranteed). It is safer then to view the estimates in Table 4B
as not the ‘final’ or true values although the models reported no convergence issues at final
iteration. What can be said is: irrespective of when one views 1991-2012 as a truncated
representation of the “long-run” (in the case of the continuous-time Weibull model), or as a
series of “short-run” periods (in the case of the discrete-time cloglog model); there is no
strong evidence of any difference in the exit hazard for products embodying cost-reducing
process innovations versus those made with cost-increasing process innovations.
2.4.3 Price Variation and Process Innovation
The full set of results from regressions on individual product prices are presented in
Appendix 2F. Here one also observes consistent estimates from the FE, RE, PA and ME
models. A standard Hausman test for a comparison of the FE and RE models suggested that
there are statistically-significant differences between β୊୉෢ and βୖ୉෢ (p value < 0.0182) with a
preference for the FE model. The alternative test based on the so-called augmented regression
suggested that the difference between β୊୉෢ and βୖ୉෢ are borderline statistically-significant (p
value = 0.0476): a confirmation that the FE estimates are preferable. On the basis of the log-
likelihoods and AIC, selected model results are presented in Table 2,5 below. Since the log-
likelihood of the FE model is greater than that of the ME model with and without a random
slope for the variable for cost-reducing process innovation; and the corresponding AIC is also
lower, I focus on the FE model.
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Table 2.5: Regression analysis on price variation (using individual product prices)
Dependent variable: ln(PRODUCTPRICE) Number of observations: 3721
Model specified: Fixed-effects model Mixed-effects linear model
Coefficients: β෠୊୉(SE) β෠୑ ୉(SE)a,c β෠୑ ୉(SE)b,c
COSTREDINNOV -3.1883 (1.131)* -3.3181 (0.740)*** -3.3181 (0.740)***
YRSINDEXP 0.0119 (0.010) -0.0212 (0.009)* -0.0212 (0.009)*
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP 0.0373 (0.019)! 0.0465 (0.015)** 0.0465 (0.015)**
PRODUCTAGE -0.0112 (0.018) -0.0106 (0.012) -0.0106 (0.012)
PRODUCTAGE2 -0.0003 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001)
ln(N_FIRMS) 0.2174 (0.128) 0.2718 (0.137)* 0.2718 (0.137)*
ln(N_GE) -0.4769 (0.025)*** -0.4748 (0.021)*** -0.4748 (0.021)***
ln(N_TS) -0.1342 (0.098) -0.0065 (0.154) -0.0065 (0.154)
IMPORTS 0.9624 (0.159)*** 0.9423 (0.162)*** 0.9423 (0.162)***
ln(DEMANDVOL) -0.0579 (0.006)*** -0.0581 (0.005)*** -0.0581 (0.005)***
A 1.4620 (0.591)* 1.2916 (0.731)* 1.2916 (0.731)*
B 1.4906 (0.202)*** 0.8582 (0.239)*** 0.8582 (0.239)***
C 0.4099 (0.196)* 0.1958 (0.327) 0.1958 (0.327)
D 0.3277 (0.196) 0.2970 (0.327) 0.2970 (0.327)
Regression statistics
Intercept β଴෢ (SE) 3.0685 (0.354)*** 4.0042 (0.327)*** 4.0042 (0.327)***(σஜ଴ෞ ,σ஫ෞ ;σஜଵෞ ) (0.249, 1.224) (4.97E-9, 1.222) (1.06E-8, 1.222; 9.59E-9)
Covar(μ଴୲ෞ , μଵ୲ෞ ), corr(β෠଴,β෠ଵ୲) − − < 0.0000001, 0.9088 
Variance partition coefficient 0.0398 < 0.0005 < 0.0000001
Overall R-squared 0.2140 − − 
Corr(܆୧୲,μ଴୲ෞ ) -0.2691 − − 
Log-likelihood (AIC) -6013.1 (12054.2) -6025.9 (12085.7) -6025.9 (12081.7)
Notes: SE = heteroskedastic-robust standard errors for the FE, RE and PA models, default errors for the ME models; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; !p < 0.10; a Without a
random-slope for COSTREDINNOV; b With a random-slope for COSTREDINNOV; c Log-likelihood ratio test for a comparison with the equivalent single-level model was not
statistically significant. LR test for a comparison of (a) and (b) indicates no statistically-significant evidence that the effect of COSTREDINNOV is not fixed: it does not vary
across different time periods; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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The FE model suggests that, over time, products that are manufactured with cost-
reducing process innovations have significantly lower prices than those manufactured with
cost-increasing process innovations. Ignoring the average time trend (β଴෢ ) that suggest
increasing prices over the study period, the incremental effect of the variable for cost-
reducing process innovation is a reduction in product prices of 91.30% (= 100•[exp(-3.1883 +
0.0373(20)) – 1]), holding all else equal. That is, the average drop over time in prices of
products that are cheaper to make is roughly twice that of products that are costly to make.
The coefficient on years-of-industrial experience and its interaction term
(COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP) all are positive but fail to reach statistical significance at
the 5% level. That the marginal effects of years-of-industrial experience are “inconclusive”
suggest that what matters more is whether clinically-beneficial drug products are
manufactured with cost-reducing production plans, rather than how long firms have used a
specific process innovation for drug manufacturing. On the other hand, this could be due to
discontinuity in innovation efforts and/or time lags in developing and implementing process
innovations.
The coefficient on the variable for imported products suggests that imported products,
on average, carry a price premium of roughly 1.62 (= exp(0.9624) – 1) relative to locally-
sourced products. This increase in payments probably reflects the fact that imported products
are often sourced in emergency situations (to correct shortfalls between supply and demand),
leaving little scope for healthcare payers to credibly exercise the threat of taking their
business elsewhere. Holding all else equal, a 10% increase in the number for firms is
associated with 2.17% increase in individual product prices. (Note that this effect is not
significant in the FE model but significant in RE, PA and ME models.) This perhaps is
because manufacturing firms seek to avoid any cutthroat price competition and engage in
oligopolistic (imperfect) rivalry supplying new specialized or differentiated products for
which they could charge a price premium.
I found that the coefficients (elasticities) for the variables product age, the quadratic
for product age, log of the number of therapeutic substitutes, generic equivalents an demand
volumes have the expected signs (as highlighted in section 2.2.2). However, for product age,
the quadratic term for product age and the number of therapeutic substitutes, one is less
confident (statistically) that their effects are not different from zero. Consistent with the
notion that generic equivalents are closer treatment alternatives, and therapeutic substitutes
compete on both quality and price dimensions, the magnitude of price reduction in response
to the number of generic equivalents is greater than that due to the number of therapeutic
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substitutes. A 10% increase in the number of generic equivalents results in a 4.77% price
reduction whilst a 10% increase in the number of therapeutic substitutes results in 1.34%
reduction in price. In addition, a 10% increase in demand volumes is associated with 0.58%
reduction in individual product prices, holding all else equal. This is consistent with
arguments by Ellison and Snyder [30] that the effect of purchaser size (demand volumes per
se) on the magnitude of price discounts is small relative to the ability to engage in
‘comparison shopping’.
Note, however, that the results of the ME model with a random coefficient for the
variable for cost-reducing process innovation shows that there is no significant variation in
the effect of the nature of process innovation used by manufacturing firms on individual
product prices; the log-likelihood and AIC for the two variants of the ME model are roughly
the same. This homogeneity in the slope coefficient for the variable suggest that, in contrast
to the results for product density, short-run adjustments are no different from the average
long-run effects of process innovation on individual product prices.
2.5 Discussion
Summing up the results, I want to emphasize two things. First, the preferred FE
models use longitudinal variation in product density, product price; the variable for cost-
reducing process innovation and other independent variables within individual products over
time. As noted by Kaufman [31], this effectively ignores cross-section variation across the
products within each given year. Granted, the FE model is generally consistent with the RE,
PA and ME models that use more than just within-product variation.
Second, the relative effect of the variable for cost-reducing process innovation, on its
own, is of little practical significance – and it applies to a baseline with cost-increasing
process innovation. Take, for example, product prices as the outcome of interest. The best
way to interpret my results is that in an environment where manufacturing firms will prefer to
engage in oligopolistic rivalry (or insure against profit risk by introducing differentiated and
specialized products carrying a price premium), socially-beneficial competition will be
facilitated by the existence of price-sensitive healthcare payers (willing to offer incremental
demand volumes in return for price cuts); a higher number of generic equivalents/ therapeutic
substitutes and manufacturing products using cost-reducing process innovations. The results
indicate the average drop, over time, in prices of products that are cheaper to make (for e.g.
egg-based live-attenuated influenza vaccines) may be roughly twice that of products that are
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costly to make (for e.g. tissue-cell-cultured influenza vaccines). This suggests that using cost-
reducing process innovations may make firms more willing to consider discounted prices as a
profit-maximizing strategy in competitive environments. Placed in the context of the work by
Vernon et al. [4], my finding that products that are easy or less-costly to make also have
lower prices fits more with boundary scenario A where some or all of the cost savings from
manufacturing process improvements are passed on to consumers (via their healthcare
payers) in the form of lower prices.
Besides the impact on price variation over time, I found that products manufactured
with cost-reducing process innovations have, on average, higher product densities over time.
This is consistent with theoretical predictions that cost-reducing process innovations
effectively increase the volume of quasi-rents available to be appropriated and needed to
sustain a multiplicity of manufacturing firms and a multiplicity of products. My findings also
lend support to the notion that through improvements in manufacturing, the current cohort of
biologics may go through the transition from difficult-to-manufacture/high-price/low-density
products to easy-to-make/low-price/high-density products. My results, in addition, provide
identifiers as to the type of products that are prone to risk of supply interruptions; to be
precise, older products that are relatively expensive and complex to manufacture (or difficult
to formulate) and have a small number of manufacturers. But I did not find any conclusive
evidence that products embodying cost-reducing process innovations have lower
instantaneous hazard of exit relative to products that are costly and difficult to manufacture.
There are, however, a number of issues with generalizing my findings to the current
existing and emerging cohorts of biologic drugs.
The first relates to the fact that my product sample has a significant proportion of
penicillins (> 80%) that are semi-synthetic small-molecule pharmaceuticals that are not made
with purely bioprocessing methods – some chemical modification steps are involved. Why
then did I include the penicillins in my sample? Why not just focus on the vaccines? I
included the penicillins because they are thought to have gone through the transition from
products that are difficult-to-manufacture and expensive-to-buy to commodity products that
are cheap and easy-to-manufacture. Yet another reason for including the penicillins is that the
principles behind their method of manufacturing have been used for the production of
biologically-derived products including anticancer agents, hypercholesterolaemic agents and
immunosuppressants [32]. What is more, the dummies A, B, C and D effectively controls for
any unobserved or unmeasured class-specific effects. It is worth mentioning that the
penicillins’ richer history of manufacturing-cost reductions is partly due to changes that
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occurred during and after World War II where public health urgency meant less stringent
regulatory standards operated at the time [33]. The reported relative effects of the variable for
cost-reducing process innovation may therefore be applicable to current and emerging
biologics if and only if these products embody repeated efforts to reduce manufacturing costs
over long periods of time.
Second, the manner in which I defined products as embodying cost-reducing or cost-
increasing process innovations says nothing or, more accurately, hides the extent to which a
given process improvement or innovation contributed to a fall or rise in COG. I am therefore
unable to isolate the effects of incremental cost-reducing process innovations used to
manufacture a given product or class of products. As discussed in section 2.3.1, only a direct
approach (given availability of detailed data on COG for whatever product sample is
selected) will provide answers to whether the magnitude of the cost-reduction achieved
matters. This cannot be determined with my data. Third, because my data covers different
periods of the lifecycle of products in my sample, my estimates may simply reflect
longitudinal variations in product density, exit hazards, and prices at different points of
market “disequilibrium”. For instance, it is possible that the reported coefficient for the
variable for cost-reducing process innovation may reflect the fact that most of the products in
my sample are off-patent. Off-patent generic prices, under intense competition, depend more
on manufacturing costs; whilst prices of branded on-patent drugs are largely determined by
demand (for the hedonic/ quality attributes of these products). Hence a product sample with a
lot more on-patent drugs may yield a coefficient that is perhaps closer to zero. This, however,
is precisely what the framework in section 2.2.2 predicts: the outcome will be akin to that of
the ‘progressive’ monopolist.
Fourth, using net-ingredient-cost-per-item as a proxy for product prices may have
biased upwards the magnitude of the coefficients reported. Although my regressions
controlled for demand volumes (proxied by the number of prescription items), this may not
have fully compensated for the heterogeneity bias introduced by differences in pack sizes,
dosages forms, dose strengths and duration of treatment. Finally, my analyses are based
solely on data from the NHS; I did not consider drug consumption patterns in the UK private
healthcare sector.
Based on these limitations, I suggest future research using a (more balanced) sample
of products from the current and emerging cohorts of biologics to shed further insights.
Notwithstanding, this research sheds light on a less-researched topic of the importance of
manufacturing innovations in biologic-drug markets. The evidence here (i.e., a combination
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of lower prices, higher product density, and no conclusive difference in hazard of product
exit) suggests that repeated efforts to improve manufacturing efficiency could offer some
insurance protection against drug shortages and reduce the dependence on emergency
purchases of imported products. Even if supply interruptions or shortages occur, one will
expect such interruptions to be brief and short-lived for products that are cheaper and easier
to make. What is more, multiple product options should offer the scope to cater for
heterogeneous clinical needs of patients. This carries important policy implications as to the
sort of measures that can be used to address supply shortages, lower the budget impact of
health technologies, and ensure more cost-effective delivery of health benefits to patients.
This chapter argues that, compared to a reliance on emergency purchases of pricey imported
products to increase product density (availability), a better solution is investing in bioprocess
development (pharmaceutical manufacturing research).
2.6 Conclusions
There are substantial potential benefits from improvements in pharmaceutical
manufacturing. Controlling for various sources of confounding, this study finds that
biologically-derived pharmaceuticals made with cost-reducing process innovations may be
associated with lower hazards of exit although I did not find any statistically strong evidence
in support of this. I found statistically-significant evidence that products that embody cost-
reducing process innovations tend to have higher product density and lower prices over time.
The evidence suggests that making biologically-derived pharmaceuticals with cost-reducing
process innovations should make manufacturers more willing to offer discounted prices as
their profit-maximizing strategy when faced with price-sensitive healthcare payers. Based on
my findings, one will expect the current cohorts of biologics (such as monoclonal antibodies)
to make the transition from speciality medicines that are expensive and difficult-to-make to
products that are cheap and easy-to-make – as long as these products embody cost-reducing
process innovations and a history of repeated process improvements.
I will argue that investments in pharmaceutical manufacturing research (in
developing cost-reducing process innovations) should be considered as one of the tools for
preventing shortages of medically-necessary biologics and for encouraging socially-
beneficial price competition to improve access, affordability and even more cost-effective
delivery of health benefits to patients.
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MANUFACTURING AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION COSTS
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3 Systematic Review of Drug Administration Costs
3.1 Introduction
Increasingly healthcare payers are concerned about the affordability of biologics and question
whether these technologies offer value for money. Sikora[53] and Kelly and Mirr[54], for
instance, note that the rapid uptake of biologics for cancer, costing £30,000 per patient per
year in the case of bortezomib (Velcade®), and £70,000 per patient per year for bevacizumab
(Avastin®), cannot be sustained in publicly funded healthcare systems such as the UK NHS.
While acquisition costs of biologics are considered to be relatively high compared with other
drugs, the costs of treating patients with these drugs also depends on the cost of
administration, which can vary substantially, and can be sizeable. It is feasible that a low-
priced drug could have the same delivery costs as a high-priced drug once the administration
costs are included. For example, two biologics A and B with acquisition costs of £7889 and
£9980 per treatment cycle respectively will have roughly the same total delivery costs per
cycle if biologic A, requiring 15 clinic visits or injections, incurs £3195 in administration
costs whilst biologic B, requiring 5 clinic visits or injections, incurs £1065 in administration
costs.
For this reason, when assessing value for money it is important, first, that
administration costs are accounted for, and second, that the full range of these costs are
included. There are, obviously, other cost components in an economic evaluation. The value
for money offered by a biologic product, relative to other treatment options, is typically
measured by the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, which compares the discounted total
(lifetime) costs of delivering the biologic with the discounted total (lifetime) health effects it
is expected to offer. The discounted (lifetime) costs of each option is estimated by summing
acquisition costs determined by the selling price; the associated administration costs
determined by the chosen dosage regimen, route of administration and formulation; and
future healthcare-related costs that are, in part, determined by the clinical effectiveness of that
option. In this chapter, I focus on the resources costs of drug administration and how these
costs vary from one dosage form to the other.
Following Aulton[55], I categorize routes of drug administration and associated
dosage forms as: (1) oral routes involving solutions, syrups, tablets and capsules; (2) rectal
routes involving suppositories and ointments; (3) topical routes involving the use of
ointments, creams, topical aerosols and transdermal patches; (4) parenteral routes involving
intravenous (i.v.), subcutaneous (s.c.) and/or intramuscular (i.m.) injections; (5) respiratory
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routes involving the use of aerosols, inhalations and sprays; (6) nasal routes involving
solutions and inhalations; (7) conjuctival and intraocular routes involving eye solutions,
ointments and creams; and (8) solutions, suspensions, ointments and creams administered via
the ear. According to Speers and Bonnano[56], oral formulations are the most preferred by
patients and in terms of dosage regimen (frequency of administration), once per day dosing is
most attractive to clinicians and patients. The authors define a hierarchy of drug
(re)formulation that ranks modes of administration in the following order of increasing
‘attractiveness’: i.v. injections, i.m. injections, s.c. injections, injectable sustained release
depot; transdermal (topical) applications; nasal and aerosol (respiratory) delivery; oral tablets
or capsules administered more than once daily; and oral sustained release formulations that
are administered once daily.
For biologics, consideration of the most appropriate drug delivery system is critical
given they consist of large molecules with delicate structural forms of poor oral
bioavailability. While oral biologics presents an opportunity for the industry in terms of
increase in market demand and sales (Speers and Bonnano[56]), they also present a
significant challenge for biopharmaceutical manufacturing as the delicate link between the
macromolecular structure of biologics and their efficacy and safety profiles is such that
moving from injectable to oral dosage forms may change the pharmacokinetic and/or
pharmacodynamic properties. Although needle-free and oral delivery of biopharmaceuticals
seem a desirable focus for manufacturers, parenteral, injectable routes seem to be the most
realistic routes for most biologics, at least in the short term. An investigation of biologic
administration costs associated with injectable routes is needed.
The aims of this chapter are to develop a framework of drug administration costs and,
as a case example, use this framework to evaluate the administration costs of biologics within
the UK NHS. My objective is not compare the magnitude of the costs of acquiring and
administering drugs. As illustrated above, even if drug acquisition costs are greater than
administration costs, differences (variation) in administration costs may be the determinant of
differences in healthcare delivery costs. The objective here is (1) to conduct a systematic
review of published, peer-reviewed studies to provide empirical estimates of the costs of
administering biologic drugs within the UK NHS; and (2) to explore the sources of variation
in these estimates, for instance, whether this is due to differences in the method of
measurement or routes of administration. From the outputs of the literature review, I
highlight the implications of my findings for research in biopharmaceutical manufacturing,
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e.g., how healthcare delivery costs and associated drug formulation issues may affect or
influence manufacturing and R&D decisions.
3.2 A framework of drug administration costs
Figure 3.1: Framework of drug administration costs
For this review, I adopted a broad definition of the components of administration
costs covering not just the physical administration of a biologic drug through one of the
routes mentioned above, but also proximal costs incurred before or after physical
administration of a drug. Figure 3.1 above depicts a framework that is intended to highlight
the need to be explicit about what constitutes drug administration costs. The framework
serves as a guide for thinking through all potential costs associated with the administration of
biologics and other medical technologies. The framework is generic as one would not expect
the components of drug administration costs for biologics given via a particular route to differ
markedly from that for non-biologics administered via the same route.
Proximal costs.
1. GP and clinic visits (outpatient and/or
inpatient attendance)
2. Costs of education or training for self-
administration
3. Costs of pre-therapy counselling
4. Pharmacy costs (inventory, preparation
and dispensing)
5. Pre-treatment medication costs
6. Costs of post-treatment, progress checks
7. Cost of (laboratory) tests, assessment or
evaluations.
Costs of physical administration.
1. Staff (doctor/nurse) costs
2. Cost of equipment and consumables
3. Cost of concomitant medications.
Components of drug
administration costs
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3.3 Literature review methods
3.3.1 Search strategy and study selection
I searched the following electronic databases for relevant studies: the Centre for
Review and Dissemination databases (DARE, NHS EED and HTA); EMBASE (The
Excerpta Medica Database); MEDLINE using the OVID interface; and Econlit (EBSCO). I
used a number of search terms to identify studies providing estimates of the administration
costs of biologics. The search terms used and the number of articles retrieved are in Appendix
3A. Additional searches conducted using the Tuft’s Medical Centre’s Cost Effectiveness
Analysis (CEA) Registry and Google Scholar employed terms that included: “time”,
“motion”, “drug”, “administration” and “costs”. The terms “time” and “motion” were
included to identify time-and-motion studies that estimate the direct costs of drug
administration by measuring the time it takes to gather materials, prepare medications and
administer them to patients. I combined the various search outputs, and titles, abstracts and
full texts of the resulting set of articles were assessed. Details of the studies identified and
selected are shown below in Figure 3.2.
In selecting studies for full text assessment, I did not set any limits on the year of
publication and used the following exclusion criteria when assessing the title, abstract and
full text of the articles retrieved. I excluded: non-UK studies; non-English language studies;
conference abstracts; studies that do not report on drug administration costs; studies that do
not study biologics for human use; and newspaper articles. I excluded studies that did not
consider or include drug administration costs in their analysis. I considered that these studies
would have underestimated total treatment costs and overestimated cost effectiveness, where
it is evaluated. I also excluded studies that claim to account for differences in administration
costs but then estimates were not reported, or where administration costs were considered but
ignored. For these studies, one could not tell with surety what costs have been included or
excluded.
For the purpose of this review, I define biologics using the European Medicines
Agency (EMEA) definition stipulated under Directive 2001/83/EC as active substances or
medicinal products derived from a biological living system (plant, animal or microbial
organism) no matter how ‘small’ the molecules are. This definition covers not just
recombinant proteins, monoclonal antibodies, blood products, immunological products
(vaccines, allergens, sera etc.) and advanced technologies (gene and cell therapy products)
but also analogous semi-synthetic biologically-active substances or medicinal products of
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biological origins that do not belong to any of the main groups mentioned. Because of the
broad EMEA definition adopted, technologies evaluated in the set of selected studies are not
restricted to commonly referred macromolecular (protein-based) products but also ‘biologics’
or drugs that might be considered as ‘small molecules’. This review included studies that
compared a biologic (or a combination of biologic-drug or biologic-device or biologic-drug-
device) versus (1) single therapies or combinations of biologics, or (2) small-molecule drugs
or drug-device combinations. Also included in the review are studies comparing different
drug delivery systems irrespective of whether the active substance is a small-molecule
chemically-synthesized drug or a biologic.
Figure 3.2: Study selection
4158 potentially relevant
studies identified for title
and abstract screening.
191 potentially relevant
articles identified for full
text review following
assessment of title and
abstract.
186 duplicate
citations identified
and removed.
9 citations included from
selective searches using the
Tuft’s Medical Centre’s Cost
Effectiveness Analysis Registry
(2) and Google Scholar (7).
3976 citations excluded
following assessment of
title and abstract, and
country of origin.
43 studies included in the
review following full text
assessment.
148 studies excluded from
the systematic review.
4344 potentially relevant
studies identified from the
initial literature searches.
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3.3.2 Data extraction
For the selected studies, I extracted variables relating to: study design and
methodology; disease condition and patient population; interventions and the treatment
alternatives compared; components of drug administration cost (proximal and physical
administration); estimates of cost of administration (and the variation around this estimate if
reported); and the year to which costs apply. To ensure comparability of estimates of costs of
drug administration extracted, I employed the UK NHS Hospital & Community Health
Services (HCHS) Index[57], which is a weighted average of the two separate indices the Pay
Cost Index and the Health Service Cost Index to inflate and express all administration cost
estimates extracted from the selected studies to year 2010 values.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Description of studies
I obtained 4344 potentially relevant studies from my searches, of which 186 studies
were identified as duplicates (Figure 3.2). From the remaining 4158 studies, 3976 were
excluded upon assessment of the titles and abstracts. The main reasons for exclusion were if
studies were conference abstracts or newspaper articles, review papers or editorials; and if
studies were not written in English or that the country-setting was not the UK. From the 191
potentially relevant studies I identified for full text assessment, 43 studies were included in
the literature review and 148 studies were excluded on the basis that they did not provide
evidence specific to the administration and use of biologics within the UK NHS.
Of the 43 studies reviewed, 15 evaluated anticancer treatments; nine evaluated
vaccination and immunization programmes; eight focused on tumour-necrosis-factor
inhibitors for the treatment of psoriatic arthritis, rheumatoid arthritis and Crohn’s disease;
four focused on prophylactic treatments, (two of which were anticoagulants, one was for
prevention of severe respiratory syncytial virus infection and the other study evaluated
prophylactic treatment for haemolytic disease); three evaluated insulin analogues; and the
remaining studies covered infertility treatments, antiviral treatment of hepatitis C, treatments
for Parkinson’s disease and for the control of bleeding in people with severe blunt trauma
(see Appendix 3B).
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3.4.2 Estimates of administration costs for biologics within the UK NHS
From the 43 selected studies, I counted the number of instances ‘biologics’ were
administered by i.v., s.c., i.m., or oral routes. As expected most of the biologics studied were
administered intravenously. Appendix 3B shows that administration costs of health
technologies given intravenously tend to be higher than those administered subcutaneously;
which is higher than those given intramuscularly, which in turn is higher than technologies
given orally. For example, the administration cost of enoxaparin given s.c. is £26 whilst the
administration costs for standard unfractionated heparin given i.v. is £104[58].
Administration cost of 60mg oral vinorelbine (VNB) is £845, while the administration cost of
i.v. VNB (25mg) is £1115[59].
There were differences in the reviewed studies in the components of administration
costs that were included (see section 3.4.3) and variations in how studies report drug
administration costs. Notably, different measurement scales were used. For instance, some
studies report drug administration costs on a per patient basis, while in other studies, costs are
reported on a per treatment basis over different time periods; some studies simply report
administration costs without specifying the measurement scale.
Taking into account the difficulties of finding a common measure of administration
costs across all studies, I computed average estimates of administration costs across a
selective set of twenty-four studies that reported estimates on a comparable scale, namely per
unit of administration, e.g., per single injection or infusion. Based on the figures extracted
from the selected studies, it appears that giving biologics intravenously incurs the highest
administration costs while those for subcutaneous and intramuscular routes are of the same
order of magnitude (see Table 3.1 below). The average administration costs (in year 2010
values) for ‘biologics’ administered intravenously is £213, which is almost six to eight times
that for biologics given subcutaneously (£35) or intramuscularly (£27). Because these
estimates are not derived from statistical analysis of primary data collected from the UK
NHS, the figures should be considered as rough approximations of how much it costs to
administer biopharmaceuticals via the various routes.
It might be argued that my approximations of administration costs for biologics within
the UK NHS were taken from studies comparing different technologies for the treatment of
different diseases and clinically indicated for different patient populations. My estimates may
therefore hide variation in drug administration costs by disease condition. For any biologic,
clinically indicated for two independent disease conditions, one would expect differences in
administration costs if the dosage regimens for the treatment of these diseases are different.
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However, from the studies reviewed, I did not find any consistent evidence of variation in
drug administration costs for a given biologic by disease condition.
To illustrate, infliximab when used in rheumatoid arthritis has administration costs of
£148 per infusion in Chen et al.[60] and £175 per infusion in Jobanputra et al.[61]. In
Cummins et al.[62], infliximab has administration costs of £128 when used in psoriatic
arthritis. Note that while these adjusted figures (in year 2010 values) are quite close to each
other, the unadjusted values reported in these studies are the same irrespective of whether
infliximab is used for rheumatoid or psoriatic arthritis. Similarly, in Woolacott et al.[63] and
Bravo et al.[64], infliximab has administration costs of £307 per infusion when used for
psoriatic arthritis but in Dretzke et al.[65], infliximab administration cost is £285 per infusion
when used in Crohn’s disease. However, the unadjusted values reported in the studies are the
same irrespective of whether infliximab is used for psoriatic arthritis or Crohn’s disease. On
the other hand, annual administration costs for rituximab per patient varies from £369
(corresponding to two infusions) when used in rheumatoid arthritis[66] to £925 (7.4 infusions
or cycles) when used in combination with cyclophosphamide, doxorubicin, vincristine and
prednisone therapy for diffuse large B-cell lymphoma[67] to £1271 (six cycles) when used in
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma[68]. The unadjusted values reported in these studies also vary.
3.4.3 How drug administration costs have been measured
I found that across the 43 studies reviewed there was considerable variation in the
components of administration costs specified or included.
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Table 3.1: Average costs per injection, infusion or unit administration
Le et al.[59], for example, report administration costs of i.v. chemotherapy regimens
for non-small cell lung cancer as consisting of cost of day-time hospitalization (£422) and the
cost of medical oncology outpatient visit (£143). For oral chemotherapy regimens,
administration costs consisted of the cost of pre-therapy counselling with a hospital nurse
(£18) and the cost of a general practitioner (GP) to do a local blood test (£24) but zero costs
Route Estimate Comments
Intravenous £213 This is based on the infusion cost component of administration cost
for a combination of 5-fluorouracil and leucovorin (£201)[69];
infliximab infusion cost (£148)[60]; administration cost of docetaxel
per visit (£23)[70]; infusion costs of temsirolimus (£203) reported in
Hoyle et al.[71]; administration cost of docetaxel (£209)[72]; Cost of
hospital stay for chemotherapy delivery (£355) and cost of outpatient
attendance for chemotherapy (£292.41)[73]; cost of infliximab
infusion (£307 = half rheumatology day case)[74],[75];
administration costs of gemcitabine (£153.50 = cost of medical
oncology outpatient visit); and infusion cost component of
administration costs of protracted infusion 5-fluorouracil (£235)[76].
Subcutaneous £35 This is based on the administration cost of enoxaparin (£26)[58];
administration costs of interferon alfa (£28)[77]; injection cost
component (£25.33) of the administration cost for
gonadotropins[78]; administration cost of peginterferon alfa
(£59)[79]; average administration costs of enoxaparin (£13.75)[80];
per weekly administration cost of etanercept (£24.42) derived from
the figure (£293) reported in Bravo et al.[75] and Woolacott et
al.[54]; and per weekly administration cost (£34) of etanercept and
adalimumab (£68) derived from the figure reported in Cummins et
al.[62].
Intramuscular £27 This is based on the administration costs of anti-D immunoglobulin
G (£12)[81]; administration costs of hepatitis B vaccine (£20)[82];
administration cost for hepatitis B vaccine (£5.40)[83];
administration costs of influenza vaccine (£7.78)[84]; administration
costs of 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (£13)[85];
administration costs of vaccines for varicella infection (£13)[86];
administration costs of meningococcal serogroup C conjugate
vaccine (£8.80)[87]; administration costs of antenatal anti-D
prophylaxis (£4.40)[88]; and administration costs of palivizumab
(£161)[89].
Oral £10 This is based on three studies Cassidy et al.[17], Hoyle et al.[71] and
Martin et al.[79] that report zero administration costs; the
administration costs for rotavirus vaccines (£6.10)[90] and the unit
administration cost for oral chemotherapies (£42)[59].
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for physical administration. In Ward et al.[76], the administration costs assigned to i.v.
gemcitabine was simply the costs of medical oncology outpatient visits (£153.50). On the
other hand, administration costs assigned to 5-fluorouracil given by protracted venous
infusion (£1181) consisted of the costs of insertion and removal of a central line (as day case)
and the cost of checking and flushing the central line or infusion pump (£235), the costs of
hospitalization for drug administration (£711), operations (£209) and concomitant
medications (£26.10). In Knight et al.[67], chemotherapy administration costs consisted of
pharmacy cost of dispensing and doctor/nurse costs for drug administration. In Sweetenham
et al.[68], the administration costs per patient for rituximab consisted of inpatient stay (£423),
outpatient visits (£393) and tests (£455). In this study, test costs covered both tests for
chemotherapy administration and tests associated with adverse events because of problems of
separating the costs of these tests.
In Lloyd et al.[78], administration costs for s.c. human menopausal gonadotropin and
s.c. follicule stimulating hormone consisted of staff costs of administering injections (£25.33)
and the costs of making a clinic visit for drug administration (£28.20). In Woolacott et
al.[74], the s.c. administration costs assigned to etanercept within an initial 3-month period
(£293) consists of the first educational visit for etanercept self-injection (the cost of which is
equated to one outpatient rheumatology attendance [£131]) and four visits to a staff nurse
(each visit costing £40.50) to check on treatment progress. Zero cost is assigned to the
physical administration of etanercept. See also Bravo et al.[23]. In Wolowacz et al.[80],
administration costs assigned to s.c. low molecular weight heparin (LMWH) is made up of
the cost of inpatient visit of £0.85 equivalent to roughly two minutes of nurse time for
administering LMWH injections. (This applies to both people eligible for total knee
replacement and total hip replacement [THR].) In the case of people undergoing THR,
administration costs also included the costs of outpatient visits equal to the cost of district
nurse visit per day at £26. For people able to self-administer LMWH s.c. a one-off cost for 30
minutes of nurse time at £11.92 for training in self-administration is incurred.
Differences in how drug administration costs are measured are also evident in Table
3.1, where orally administered medications are either assigned zero or positive costs. Zero
administration costs for oral medicines are plausible when one focuses on just the costs of
physical administration. That is to say, it costs nothing to swallow a tablet or capsule. If drug
administration costs were measured to include all relevant costs of physically administering a
drug and the associated proximal costs, one will expect some positive administration costs for
oral treatments. For example, in Jit et al.[90], the oral rotavirus vaccines, Rotarix® and
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RotaTeq® incur an administration cost equal to 10 minutes of nurse practice time. In Le et
al.[59], oral chemotherapies studied have non-zero administration costs covering the costs of
outpatient visits and home care; for example, the administration cost of oral VNB is not zero
as self-administration of the oral therapy at home requires pre-therapy counselling with a
hospital nurse and the cost of a GP to carry out blood tests.
But even if analysts and researchers focus on just physical administration, zero
administration costs are not associated with only oral treatments. For instance, Morris et
al.[91] assign zero administration cost to eptacog alfa (NovoSeven®) although it is
administered as an i.v. bolus injection. This (it appears) is because each pack of NovoSeven®
is sold as a bundled product consisting of one vial containing the drug, one vial containing
sterile water for reconstitution, one sterile vial adapter, a sterile syringe for reconstitution and
administration, a sterile infusion set and alcohol swabs. Although one can envisage some
staff costs involved in the administration of eptacog alfa, it easy to see why zero
administration costs is not too unreasonable.
Indeed, a look at the spread of administration costs for each injectable route in Table
3.1 shows some overlap although average estimates differ. One explanation is that there is
legitimate variation in the methods of drug administration, and this is reflected in the
different studies. This seems unlikely given the focus on studies undertaken in a single
country. An alternative explanation is that studies are not providing a complete or consistent
account of the costs of physically administering biologics and the proximal costs involved.
There are ‘hidden’ costs of drug administration that some studies fail to consider. Given the
observed variation in how different studies define the components of administration costs, the
reported average estimates are necessarily imprecise (perhaps conservative) approximations.
3.5 Discussion
Two things can be gleaned from this review. One, administration costs are an
important component of assessing the incremental cost-effectiveness of a given medical
technology relative to its comparators. Two, drug administration costs consist of the costs of
physical administration plus proximal costs incurred before and after physical administration
of a medicine. I found that there is variation in the range of administration costs included.
This review shows that the definition of administration costs for biologics is critical. Not only
do administration costs vary by route of administration but, for any given route of drug
administration, there is variation in costs as a function of the method of measurement.
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Differences in how studies define administration costs seems contrary to
recommendations of various methodological guidelines and quality checklists[40] that all
relevant costs, beyond simple acquisition costs, should be identified, quantified and reported.
A review of pharmacoeconomic evaluations conducted in Ireland and the UK by Hughes et
al.[93] showed that reporting and conduct of cost estimation is in need of improvement. The
authors suggest a checklist of items that, among other things, requires both the route of
administration and costs relating to drug administration are reported. This checklist, however,
separates drug administration costs from “pharmacy charges” covering professional and
dispensing fees; “hospital pharmacy costs” covering the costs of reconstituting parenteral
preparations etc.; and “therapeutic drug monitoring costs” covering, for e.g., biochemical
assays or measurements of plasma concentrations and pharmacodynamic responses. If
researchers are to use the framework presented here as part of or in addition to their
guidelines and quality checklist(s), these items will automatically be incorporated into
estimates of drug administration costs. This will ensure consistency in what cost components
are included or excluded. It must be emphasized that, although the focus was on UK studies,
the framework depicted in Figure 3.1 is ‘global’ and applicable to non-UK settings.
Based on this review, administration costs of biologics given intravenously appears to
be, on average, six or eight times those given subcutaneously or intramuscularly; and
biologics administered orally tend to be assigned zero administration costs. Admittedly, these
average estimates suffer from being taken from a selected sample of studies that offer a
comparable scale of measurement; and of course, the literature data are not necessarily
correct given variations in how the components of drug administration costs are defined
across studies. These average estimates, nevertheless, provide a reasonable guide as to the
costs of administering biologic products within the UK NHS. Yet even for i.v. biologics, near
zero administration costs are possible if manufacturers sell biologics as bundled products
with some of the equipment and consumables employed in administering these products.
There are several rationales for product bundling[94] but my findings suggest there is an
additional advantage from selling biologic products bundled with equipment and
consumables employed in drug administration. This stems from lower administration costs; to
be precise, lower proximal costs of gathering materials and preparing medicines for
administration to patients. Granted, one would expect that, in most cases, the costs of
equipment and consumables will be reflected in the price of the bundled product even if
bundling was intended to conceal price discounts on a drug product that could be sold
separately.
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However, my rough estimates of drug administration costs do not consider increments
or decrements in (administration) costs that might be associated with compliance issues and
medication errors. Webster et al.’s[95] comparison of a Mark II (pre-filled syringe) system
with conventional methods of administering various drugs used in cardiac anaesthesia
indicates that although use of new safety-oriented administration system saved preparation
time before and after anaesthesia, it increased overall costs per anaesthetic administered
(median [range] €178 [102–428] vs. €155 [111–390], p = 0.041). The savings in
administration costs was lower than the purchase cost of the Mark II system. However, this
cost increment is likely to be offset by potential reductions in iatrogenic events via reducing
administration errors, i.e., avoiding cuts in glass ampoules and needle-stick injuries; violation
of sterile techniques during draw up of medicines; injection of minute glass shards and
mislabelling of syringes under the pressure of an operating theatre.
Similarly, Kruse et al.[96] argue that although a move away from i.v. single-agent
therapies for breast cancer to oral formulations may save on administration costs, these
savings may be offset by the added costs associated with oral agents such as noncompliance
or treatment of gastrointestinal and other side effects. Also Harley et al.[97] found that, in
people with rheumatoid arthritis, compliance with, at least, 80% of doses administered was
lower for etanercept (odds ratio of 0.462, 95% CI: 0.290–0.736) and for methotrexate (odds
ratio of 0.385, 95% CI: 0.245–0.604) when compared to infliximab. This possibly reflects
differences in the route and frequency of administration: infliximab is given intravenously
every 8 weeks, etanercept is given subcutaneously twice a week and patients anxious about
self-administering s.c. therapies tend to miss injections and prefer i.v. infusions. The authors
further argue that although other studies report higher administration costs for infliximab,
their study show infliximab was associated with lower facility costs (i.e., physician costs and
other fees related to drug administration) compared to etanercept. This may be due to better
dosage compliance with infliximab (besides problems of small sample sizes, inferring drug
usage rates from insurance claims data, and of course, differences in how studies measure
administration costs).
So what are the implications for (research in) biopharmaceutical manufacturing?
Consider a pharmaceutical manufacturer X who has developed a biologic product Y and
intends to launch this product on the UK NHS market. Following the work of Vernon et
al.[4], there are substantial private and societal gains in the short or long-run from
investments to lower the cost of goods (COGs) for product Y. In the short-run, lower
manufacturing costs, may lead to lower prices and increased consumption, especially when
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faced with competing products. However, even if manufacturer X doesn’t lower prices but
keeps the cost savings, this might still improve social welfare in the long-run as it is known
that increments (decrements) in gross price-cost margins are associated with higher (lower)
intensities of R&D[18]. That is, part of the accumulated savings or ‘profits’ from reducing
COGs over time will be used to finance future R&D and product innovations. Indeed, Vernon
et al.[4] report that the societal gains from keeping the cost savings could be as much as
twelve times that of the gains from passing cost savings on to consumers in the form of lower
prices. However, that argument assumes existing demands for product Y expressed by a
healthcare payer who is concerned with only net clinical benefits offered by product Y
(efficacy minus safety) and its acquisition costs; and not the total delivery costs to the
healthcare system.
Currently the UK NHS relies on NICE to make technology adoption decisions on its
behalf, on the basis of cost-effectiveness evidence, besides other factors. Following Dakin et
al.[98], the outcomes of NICE’s decision-making can be categorized as “Yes” (i.e.,
recommended for use within the EMEA approved marketing authorization), “No” (i.e., not
recommended and in which case, demand effectively falls to zero) and “Yes, but” (i.e.,
recommended for restricted use – in which case demand will be less than anticipated prior to
market launch). In the worst-case scenario of zero demand, there will be a costly loss of on-
patent sales revenue; and no societal gains in the short- or long-run from process innovations
to reduce COGs. Things get better with a “restricted” demand for product Y but this still falls
short of what is attainable in the best-case scenario. But the chosen formulation for product Y
and the associated administration costs, if the full range of costs is measured, may be the key
determinant of whether product Y is considered cost-effective or not; the level of demand for
product Y and the flow of clinical benefits to patients (see also Cheng et al.[99]). This means
that besides concentrating on selecting biologic drug candidates on the basis of net clinical
benefits, “getting a product out”, and ensuring the COGs for biologic products is below
defined (company-specific) thresholds or rules-of-thumb, manufacturer X should pay equal
attention to issues around formulation, drug administration costs and total healthcare delivery
costs of product Y as early as possible over the R&D timescale.
I do not know for sure whether manufacturers of biologics routinely consider
administration costs and total delivery costs that will be borne by healthcare payers when
making manufacturing and R&D decisions. It is possible that costs to healthcare payers are
seldom considered by biologic companies in R&D and manufacturing decisions (or perhaps
do so only when faced with therapeutic competitors); and this might reflect conflicting
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internal priorities or organizational disconnection between companies’ manufacturing
(process development) units and marketing departments. I will argue that manufacturers of
biologic medicines should consider formulation issues, drug administration costs and total
healthcare delivery costs as early as possible in their manufacturing and R&D decisions.
This study, however, suffers from two limitations. First, this chapter focused on only
the cost of administering biologic medicines within the UK NHS. This means my findings
may not be applicable to other country contexts or to small-molecule chemically-synthesized
medicines. That said the framework of drug administration is still useful for consistent
evaluations of drug administration costs irrespective of the country context or whether the
focus is on small-molecule chemically-synthesized medicines. A de novo analysis is
ultimately needed to assess the magnitude and importance of drug administration costs within
the UK NHS, with researchers using Figure 3.1 as a tool to ensure inclusion of all relevant
costs of physically administering biologics and the associated proximal costs. Second, I did
not assess the studies included in the review for their methodological quality, for sources of
systematic error or bias (internal validity), or their external validity. Third, my searches,
using the same inclusion criteria, retrieved HTA reports but not NICE technology-appraisal
submissions which may have additional evidence on drug administration costs. The reason
why NICE submissions were not part of my review is because they are not peer-reviewed or
their titles and abstracts did not match my combinations of search terms. These limitations
provide yet another reason why the estimates of administration costs for biologics should be
considered rough approximations, and why a de novo analysis of administration costs for
biologics within the UK NHS is worth pursuing.
Key points
 Drug administration costs include the costs of physically administering a drug, plus
proximal costs incurred before or after physical administration.
 Drug administration costs vary by route of administration. On average, administration
costs are higher for biologics given intravenously when compared to those given by
intramuscular or subcutaneous routes.
 There is variation in the way administration costs have been measured in research studies.
 Formulation issues, drug administration and healthcare delivery costs should be
considered as early as possible when making manufacturing and R&D decisions.
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3.6 Conclusions
The key points from this literature review are listed in the textbox above. Drug
administration costs vary by route of administration with average estimates for intravenous
routes higher than that for subcutaneous administration, which is higher than that for
intramuscular administration, which in turn is higher than that for oral routes. These findings
are, however, tied to the definition of the components of administration costs used in the
studies reviewed. Within each route of administration, there is variation in costs as a function
of the method of measurement. This matters as estimates of administration costs will differ
across studies and according to what cost components are included or excluded. Also, my
results may need to be modified in lieu of issues around medication errors and compliance
but this study has provided evidence as to how administration costs of biologics can be
lowered by selecting the most appropriate dosage form and regimen, and route of
administration. In some cases, it is possible to lower administration costs via bundling
biologic products with equipment and consumables used in drug administration.
This chapter argues that it is not enough to focus on getting a commercially-viable
product out and the market price ‘right’, especially when faced with healthcare payers who
rely on the outputs of economic evaluation to guide their technology adoption decisions.
Besides, process innovation efforts to reduce the cost of goods for biologic products,
manufacturers should consider (in the early phases of drug development) formulation issues
and the impact on administration costs and total costs of healthcare delivery.
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4 Development of an Administration Cost Algorithm
4.1 Introduction
The adoption and utilization of beneficial medical technologies including biologic drugs has, in
recent times, been subject to a number of regulatory, marketing, reimbursement (coverage) and
other demand-side hurdles including the so-called risk-sharing arrangements. The demand-side
hurdles, in particular, have evolved out of increasing concerns by healthcare payers about the
high acquisition costs and budgetary impacts of these medical technologies. In response to these
concerns, healthcare payers, acting as responsible agents on the behalf of their patient
populations, have turned to the use of CEA, budget impact analysis or HTA to estimate cost-
effectiveness and affordability prior to the deciding whether to adopt or reimburse the usage of
biologics within their original or restricted marketing authorization or not. This typically
involves comparing, over a specified time period, total disease management or healthcare
delivery costs (i.e., the sum of drug acquisition costs plus administration and future healthcare-
related costs) associated with a given technology and the total health benefits expected. Holding
all else constant, the estimated cost-effectiveness of a biologic drug may be dictated by how
much of healthcare resources are spent on drug administration, and whether trade-offs exist
between drug acquisition costs and administration costs.
On the supply-side, it has been observed that biological drug candidates are developed
with a skewed focus on clinical efficacy and safety to the neglect of issues related to the ease of
manufacturing, affordability and cost-effectiveness of these therapies to healthcare payers. This
often leads to unnecessary waste and excessive reworking of manufactured products, and a
growing concern over the failures and struggles manufacturers face in passing through what is
becoming an increasingly complex set of regulatory and demand-restricting hurdles. That latter
is known to be associated with significant delays in market launch, in addition to the time and
revenue lost in price negotiations[111]. But besides worrying about the ease of manufacturing, it
is also useful for manufacturers to, at least, consider prior to market launch, the administration
costs (and total healthcare delivery costs) associated with the different ways they choose to
manufacture and formulate their products. In that case, manufacturers’ evaluation of drug
administration costs should be done in the same manner as it will be conducted by healthcare
payers. The argument here is not that drug manufacturers pay little attention to routes of drug
administration; but that the contribution of administration costs to total healthcare delivery costs
should not be trivialized or ignored. Differences in drug acquisition costs could be eroded by
differences in administration costs, leaving healthcare delivery costs unchanged.
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The aim of this chapter is to conduct to a de novo analysis of administration costs of
biologic drugs, to identify the factors that affect variation in these costs, and argue why such
evaluations are an important step in the conduct of biopharmaceutical manufacturing prior to
market launch. That is, I explore why pharmaceutical manufacturers should consider the link
between administration costs (and how this is influenced by formulation and manufacturing),
total healthcare delivery costs and value-for-money when making their go-no-go R&D decisions.
This research stream is motivated by two key points. First, in a systematic review of the
economic value of reducing medication dosing frequency using drug delivery systems, Cheng et
al.[98] found that in most cases drug products with less-frequent dosing schedules tend to be cost
effective when compared to conventional (standard) formulations containing the same active
moiety – although these ‘advanced’ or ‘improved’ delivery systems may be expensive to make.
Second, the systematic review in Chapter 3 of this thesis identified possible trade-offs
between acquisition and administration costs: a drug that appears cheap to buy may (in the long-
run) have higher total healthcare delivery costs as more NHS resources are spent on drug
administration. The budgetary impact of a biologic with high acquisition costs (because of
complex and costly manufacturing, for example) but relatively low administration costs could be
the same as or lower than that of a less expensive biologic with higher administration costs.
Recall this systematic review also found that there are inconsistencies in how studies define
administration costs and consequently, differences in the type of costs included or excluded from
estimates of drug administration costs. See also Tetteh and Morris[112]. These differences in
what cost items are included or excluded from estimates of drug administration costs means
some of the reported differentials in administration costs for biologic drugs may not be real and
cannot be used unreservedly in economic analyses. Once differences in cost estimates simply
reflect differences in methods of measurement, one cannot tell for sure whether trade-offs exist
between administration costs and drug acquisition costs or not; and to what extent administration
costs could influence conclusions reached about the cost-effectiveness of medical technologies.
Taking into account these points, I evaluated variations in the administration costs for a
sample of eighteen biologic drugs listed for use in the UK NHS, taking care to ensure consistent
inclusion or exclusion of all relevant costs related to drug administration. I do this to ensure very
little variation in drug administration costs can be attributed to differences in the method of
measurement.
I then developed an administration-cost algorithm to help manufacturers predict, prior to
market launch, the administration costs associated with their formulation choice for each
biologic drug candidate in their portfolio. I believe this, together with manufacturer’s
expectations of product prices, should help them consider the possible trade-offs between drug
76
acquisition and administration costs; and generate credible estimates of total healthcare delivery
costs of their drug products and the likelihood that these products will receive favourable
recommendations from healthcare payers. The algorithm allows us to highlight cases where (1)
administration costs for a given biologic medicine varies across different clinical indications and
patient populations, (2) administration costs for a given biologic medicine differs by the route of
administration, (3) differences in drug administration costs for different dosing regimens of a
given biologic medicine, and (4) administration costs can be lowered via bundling medicinal
products with some of the equipment and consumables used in administering drugs.
The chapter is structured as follows. I first describe in section 4.2 the methodological
approach taken, the underlying assumptions made in my analyses, and the data sources used.
This is followed by sections 4.3 and 4.4 with results and discussions. Section 4.5 completes this
chapter with my conclusions.
4.2. Data and methods
As indicated above, this research aims to evaluate the administration costs of a sample of
biologics to identify factors that affect the magnitude of (differences) in drug administration
costs. To avoid overcomplicating the analysis, I assume clinical outcome neutrality in that for
any comparison of different modes of administering the same biologic drug, there are no
differences in net health benefits (i.e., efficacy minus safety concerns) or that differences in net
health benefits have no bearing on the magnitude or variation in administration costs. For
example, differences in the incidence and severity of adverse events between two or more
formulations of a given biologic drug will have no bearing as to how much is spent on drug
administration costs. I also ignore other costs associated with disease management.
4.2.1 Identifying and measuring administration costs
From an economic perspective, costs measured should reflect the opportunity costs of
NHS resources deployed in administering biologic drugs that could otherwise have been used
elsewhere had the drug in question not been administered. An accurate measurement of drug
administration costs thus requires identifying all resources that will be expended or the ‘cost
centres’ where resources will be consumed and costs incurred[113]. To identify the ‘cost
centres’ related to the administration of biologic drugs (from a healthcare payer perspective), I
employed the framework of drug administration described in Chapter 3, page 59 (see also Tetteh
and Morris[112]) that makes a distinction between the proximal costs of drug administration
77
and the costs of physical administration. In that framework, proximal administration costs (Pc)
refer to costs incurred before or after physical administration of the drug into the body whilst
physical administration costs (PAc) refer to the costs of physically introducing the drug into a
patient via one of the established routes for administration. Each component labelled in that
framework constitutes a (micro-level) cost centre where resources are consumed and costs
incurred.
I used this framework to ensure consistency in what type of administration costs are
included or excluded in the analysis. Using a common yardstick, I believe, should support (1)
complete or near complete accounting of the opportunity costs associated with drug
administration, and (2) “apples to apples” comparison of the administration costs of biologic
drugs such that very little variation in administration costs can be attributed to the method of
measurement. For the same reasons, I defined a common time frame over which drug
administration costs will be estimated. I chose to evaluate annual costs of drug administration
costs as this fitted well with the dosing regimens of all products in my sample. For simplicity,
the analysis based on a single patient that successfully completes a single full treatment course
over a 12 month period. It might be argued that this will introduce bias against biologics
indicated for an acute illness with typically ‘short’ treatment episodes. However, extending the
time frame beyond one-year period will actually amplify the cost differences between acute and
chronic biologics whilst a 6-month period will not fit with the dosing regimen of some of the
products in my sample. What is more, I do not consider repeat treatment episodes over the one-
year period. Hence, my estimates of annual drug administration costs should not be biased
against biologics indicated for acute illnesses.
4.2.2 Product sample and dosing regimens modelled
My analysis makes use of an unbalanced sample of 18 therapeutically-active biologics; of which
eight are administered intravenously, eight given by subcutaneous delivery and two given
intramuscularly. Within this sample, fifteen of the products are humanized monoclonal
antibodies (mAb) with the remainder comprising of one fragmented monoclonal antibody (fAb),
a fusion protein and an interferon protein. The characteristics of this product sample are
presented in Table 4.1 below. This sample follows a list prepared under the research flagships of
the EPSRC Centre for Innovative Manufacturing in Emergent Macromolecular Therapies. I
make no argument that this sample is representative of all existing or emergent biologics or
macromolecular therapies. It is possible that this selective list excludes some important biologic
therapies. Although there are a host of orally-administered semi-synthetic biologically-derived
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medicines, none of the biologic therapies in Table 4.1, at the time of conducting this research,
were given orally. The general argument is that biologic drugs have poor bioavailability when
swallowed. That said, there is a lot of research underway to develop biologics for oral
administration – and the cost algorithm presented in this chapter could be easily updated in
future research with an expanded sample of biologics including those given orally.
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of product sample
Product name Product type Clinical indication considered Disease type
Biologics given intravenously
Basiliximab†, Simulect® mAb Prophylaxis of acute organ rejection in allogeneic renal transplantation. Acute
Bevacizumab, Avastin® mAb First-line treatment of adult patients with non-small cell lung cancer. Chronic
Cetuximab, Erbitux® mAb Treatment of epidermal-growth-factor-receptor (EGFR)-expressing, Kirsten Rat
Sarcoma-2 (KRAS) wild-type metastatic colorectal cancer.
Chronic
Infliximab, Remicade® mAb Treatment of active rheumatoid arthritis that is unresponsive to disease modifying
anti-rheumatic drugs (DMARDs) or those with severe active disease not previously
treated with methotrexate (MTX) or DMARDs.
Chronic
Oftamumab†, Arzerra® mAb Treatment of chronic lymphocytic leukaemia that is refractory to fludarabine and
alemtuzumab.
Chronic
Panitumumab, Vectibix® mAb Treatment of wild-type KRAS metastatic colorectal cancer. Chronic
Tocilizumab, Actemra® mAb Treatment of moderate-to-severe active rheumatoid arthritis. Chronic
Trastuzumab, Herceptin® mAb Treatment of advanced and metastatic breast cancer. Chronic
Biologics given subcutaneously
Adalimumab†, Humira® mAb Treatment of moderate-to-severely active Crohn’s disease in children. Chronic
Canakinumab†, Ilaris® mAb Treatment of cryopyrin-associated periodic syndromes (CAPS) in adults. Chronic
Certolizumab pegol†, Cimzia® fAb Treatment of moderate-to-severe active rheumatoid arthritis in adults when response
to DMARDs including MTX has been inadequate.
Chronic
Denosumab†, Prolia® mAb Treatment of osteoporosis in post-menopausal women at increased risk of fractures. Chronic
Etanercept†, Enbrel® Fusion protein Treatment of active and progressive psoriatic arthritis that has not responded
adequately to DMARDs.
Chronic
Golimumab†, Simponi® mAb Treatment of moderate-to-severe active ankylosing spondylitis. Chronic
Omalizumab†, Xolair® mAb Management of immunoglobulin-E mediated asthma. Chronic
Ustekinumab†, Stelara® mAb Treatment of moderate-to-severe plaque psoriasis. Chronic
Biologics given intramuscularly
Palivizumab†, Synagis® mAb Prevention of serious lower respiratory tract disease caused by respiratory syncytial
virus (RSV) in children at high risk of RSV disease.
Acute
Interferon beta-1a†, Avonex® Interferon
protein
Treatment of relapsing multiple sclerosis in adult patients, i.e., two or more acute
exacerbations in the previous three years without evidence of progressive disease.
Chronic
Notes: † refers to biologics that are sold bundled with some of the equipment and consumables used in drug administration.
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To estimate the costs of administering the biologic drugs in my sample, some idea or
knowledge of the dosing regimen for patients considered eligible to receive a given biologic
drug is needed. I used the dosing regimen indicated by the marketing authorisation for a given
biologic drug, gathering this information from the posology described in the drug’s package
inserts, the summary of product characteristics (SmPC) posted on the European Medicines
Agency (EMA) website; the British National Formulary (BNF) or the electronic Medicines
Compendium (eMC). Obviously, within UK NHS settings, the prescribed pathway suggested by
the regulatory license or marketing authorization may not necessarily coincide with actual
clinical practice – bearing in mind possible gaps between recommendations in HTA guidance
and clinical guidelines and implementation of these recommendations in routine practice; as well
as practice-specific watch-and-wait treatment strategies.
To avoid the complexity introduced by what happens in routine clinical practice, I simply
modelled the drug administration instructions given in the products’ package inserts or the
SmPC. For this, I assumed continuous dosing of a given biologic for the whole year unless the
marketing authorization or SmPC provides clear indications as to the maximum number of doses
or recommended duration of treatment. This is because I found it hard to make any
unquestionable assumption about the proportion of treatment-responders and non-responders.
4.2.3 Analysis
I first conducted a deterministic analysis with the estimated costs of drug administration
disaggregated into proximal costs and the cost of physically administering the drug. I used the
framework described in Chapter 3, page 59, as a guide to selecting which cost item to include as
long as there was publicly-available data for that cost item. My analysis was done using an
economic model built in Microsoft Excel with data inputs from the BNF and eMC, the NHS
Reference Costs 2011-2012, the NHS electronic Drug Tariff and the 2012 edition of the PSSRU
(Personal Social Services Research Unit) Costs for Health and Social Care, and from published
and grey literature.
One issue with such deterministic analysis is the well-known fact that there is: (1)
uncertainty in the incidence and severity of illness and for that matter, demands for health
intervention using biologic drugs; plus (2) uncertainty with regards to treatment outcomes,
which fuels future demands for healthcare intervention; for example, dose reduction or
escalation; modifications to dosing regimens and treatment protocols and/or deployment of
alternative (salvage) interventions in complementary or substitutive ways[114],[115]. For this
reason, the quantity and costs of NHS resources expended on the administration of biologic
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drugs cannot be described by fixed values – considering also deviations of what happens in
routine clinical practice from the EMA-approved posology.
I resolved this issue by introducing parameter uncertainty via fitting a gamma
distribution to the deterministic estimates of proximal costs (Pc) as well as the costs of physical
administration (PAc), and running 1000 Monte Carlo simulations9 for each product. Note that
the choice of a gamma distribution is not arbitrary but reflects the observation that healthcare
resource use and costs are skewed with non-negative values ranging from zero to positive
infinity. As argued by Nixon and Thompson[116], skewed parametric (gamma, log-logistic,
lognormal) distributions fit medical cost data better than a normal distribution and should in
principle be preferred for estimation. What is not clear, however, is which skewed parametric
distribution is best. Here I chose a two-parameter gamma distribution, and given the absence of
real-life data that reflects the uncertainty of healthcare demands requiring intervention with
biologics, I adopted the simplest assumption that the mean and standard error (SE) for
administration costs for any given biologic drug in my sample is the same (see Briggs et
al.[117]). I do not expect this to introduce any systematic bias as the assumption will apply to all
products within the sample.
From the synthetic dataset generated, I computed summary statistics including 95%
confidence intervals for mean expected administration cost for each biologic drug. I also
identified what proportion of total administration costs are due to proximal costs or physical
administration costs for my sample of biologic drugs (categorized according to their respective
routes of administration) by graphing a log-log plot of Pc versus PAc. I took logs of proximal
and physical administration costs because of the skewness of a gamma-distributed cost data and
to narrow down the range of (large) values. And estimated the proportion of simulations where
the ratio of proximal costs to physical administration costs (PAc/Pc) is greater than or equal to 1.
The essence of this exercise is to identify the source of cost savings from changes in drug
formulation and manufacturing.
4.2.4 Identifying the algorithm
Recall that one of my research objectives is to develop an algorithm that will allow
manufacturers to predict how administration costs change with how they choose to manufacture
and formulate a given biologic drug candidate. On a priori grounds, I defined this algorithm as a
9 The choice of 1000 simulations is not arbitrary. A simulation convergence test, which is not reported in the paper,
suggests a virtually flat administration-cost curve with the number of simulation trials ranging from 1000 to
200,000. I do this by running each 1000 simulation 200 times.
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population regression function linking drug administration costs (ADMINCOST) and a number
of independent explanatory variables (ܺ). I considered my simulated (synthesized) dataset as one
of a number of finite-sized datasets (samples) randomly drawn from this population distribution
of biologic administration costs, which can be described by ൫ܺ ଵ,ܺଶ, … , ௃ܺ;ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ൯݆ and
the data-generating function: ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ = ݃൫ܺ ଵ,ܺଶ, … , ௃ܺ;ߚ଴,ߚଵ, … ,ߚ௞൯݆ , where j = 1,
2,…, J is an index for each biologic drug, the β’s are parameters to be estimated and k is an
index for each explanatory variable.
The explanatory variables I chose are those that I believe (bio)pharmaceutical
manufacturers will have some information on, or an idea of, as they work on a number of
promising biologic drug candidates, and decide which candidates to take forward to the next
stage of process R&D or product development, and which ones to reserve as contingency or
backup options. Given the skewness of the simulated data for ADMINCOST (on the raw scale),
I estimated the following (linear) sample regression function with a log-transformed dependent
variable:
݈݊ (ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ )= ߙ+ ߚ଴ܴܱܷܶܧܣܦܯ ܰܫ 1 + ߚଵܴܱܷܶܧܣܦܯ ܰܫ 2 + ߚଶܦܱ ܵܨܴܧܳ+ ߚଷܴܱܲܦܷܥܶܤܷܰܦ + ߚସܰܫ ܦܫܥܣܶܰ + ߚହܦܱ ܵܨܴܧܳଶ+ ߚ଺ܦܱ ܵܨܴܧܳ. ܰܫ ܦܫܥܣܶܰ + ߳
The intercept is ߙ and the error term ( )߳ represents any unexplained variation in administration
costs.
ROUTEADMIN is a three-group categorical variable indicating whether a given biologic
drug is administered intravenously, subcutaneously or intramuscularly. This, in the sample
regression function, is implemented as two separate dummy (zero-one) variables:
ROUTEADMIN1 (which takes the value of one if a product is given subcutaneously and zero
otherwise) and ROUTEADMIN2 (which takes on the value of one if a product is administered
intramuscularly and zero otherwise). Intravenous administration is therefore the baseline,
benchmark or reference category for the variable ROUTEADMIN. I do this because for most
biologics, intravenous infusion is the default (conventional) drug delivery or formulation choice
given the fragility and poor oral bioavailability of macromolecular proteins. The second variable
DOSFREQ refers to the frequency (intensity) of dosing, which I define as the number of ‘unit
administrations’ in a given year. PRODUCTBUND is also a zero-one dummy variable
indicating whether a given biologic product is sold together with some of the equipment and
(9)
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consumables used in drug administration (1) or not (0). Similarly, INDICATN is a zero-one
dummy variable indicating whether a biologic drug is for the management of an acute illness (0)
or for a chronic illness (1). The interaction term DOSFREQ.INDICATN is intended to capture
the notion that treatments for acute illnesses tend to have less ‘complex’ dosing regimens
compared to those for chronic illnesses; and the quadratic term DOSFREQ2 is intended to
determine whether the marginal effects of dosing frequency are increasing or diminishing as the
frequency (intensity) of dosing increases.
I estimated the four nested models using linear ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. I
labelled the four nested models as A, B, C and D – all of which rely on different combinations of
the explanatory variables defined above. I designated C as the full unrestricted model as it
includes all the explanatory variables above. Model A only considers variables for subcutaneous
and intramuscular routes and dosing frequency. Model B adds variables for bundled products
and acute/chronic illness to the variables in model A whilst model D includes all the variables in
model C with the exception of the variables for subcutaneous and intramuscular routes. Model D
is designed to test the relationship between the variable for acute/chronic illness and the
variables for route of administration. I initially performed the log-OLS regressions in Excel
using the LINEST function. The main advantage of this approach is that, because one is working
from the same software platform, the analysis captures (minor) differences in expected mean
ADMINCOST for every 1000 simulations. That is, there is a direct dynamic connection between
the simulated dataset, the estimated parameters and predicted values from the log-OLS
regression.
4.2.5 Robustness and validation
A well-known problem with OLS regression using a log-transformed dependent variable
is that retransformation of estimates of the logged cost of drug administration, lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ,
to the raw untransformed scale gives the geometric mean for ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ (which is often close
to the median) rather than the arithmetic mean, the parameter of interest. (The hat on
ADMINCOST indicates an estimated or predicted value of drug administration costs.) The
problem is resolved by using what is called a smearing factor to minimize the prediction error.
The name is derived from the fact that the factor distributes (smears) the ‘excess’ or prediction
error in one observation to other observations proportionally when adjusting unlogged median
estimates to unlogged mean estimates. Generally, this takes the form: ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ = exp(Xߚመ௞
)•ɸ෡ , where ɸ෡ is the smearing factor. I considered three ways of deriving less-biased smearing
estimates on the raw untransformed scale.
84
The first method yields what is called ‘normal theory estimates’ that are derived under
the assumption that the error term for lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ is normally distributed, in which case the
smearing estimate of ADMINCOST = exp(ܺߚመ௞ + 0.5ߪොଶ) where ߪଶ෢ is the square of
SE(lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ) and ܺ refers to the value(s) for the explanatory variable(s). The smearing
factor ɸ෡ = exp(0.5ߪොଶ). If errors are not normally distributed but are homoscedastic (i.e., have
constant variance), then the second method, which uses non-parametric (sub-group specific)
smearing factors can be used to minimize prediction errors. The non-parametric smearing factor
is given by: ɸ෡ = ܰିଵ∑ exp( ప߳)෢ே௜ୀଵ , where N is the number of observations and ప߳ෝ is the log-
scale residuals from the regression. When the errors are heteroskedastic (i.e., non-constant
variance), or they depend on the explanatory variables, it is “better” to use a subgroup-specific
smearing factor for each intravenous, subcutaneous or intramuscular product
category[118],[119],[120]. The third method uses a regression-through-the-origin approach
suggested by Wooldridge[112]. This is as follows: obtain for each observation the naïve
estimates ݉ పෞ = exp(݈݊ ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ); then perform a regression of ADMINCOST on ݉ పෞ
through the origin and obtain the only coefficientߙ଴ෞ as the smearing factor.
Irrespective of the smearing factor used, its value in minimizing prediction error depends
crucially on the presence and nature of heteroskedasticity in the log scale residuals. For example,
the subgroup smearing factors assume that log scale heteroskedasticity varies across the
mutually-exclusive subgroups specified. If, however, heteroskedasticity varies according to one
or more (continuous, discrete or interacted) explanatory variables in the OLS regression, then we
will have smearing estimates of ADMINCOST that are still biased (prediction losses remain). It
is possible to run an auxiliary regression of the heteroskedastic variance as a function of one or
more of the explanatory variables, i.e., ɸ෡ =exp( ప߳)෢ = ρ(ܺ); but then this depends on how much
of the heteroskedastic variance is explained by the chosen set of explanatory variables.
Generally, this auxiliary-regression approach is thought to be cumbersome and there is no simple
fix if the form of heteroskedasticity is unknown.
An alternative estimator, however, exists in the form of generalized linear modelling
(GLM) to overcome the retransformation problem. GLM does this by directly and independently
specifying: (1) a link function between the raw scale ADMINCOST and the linear index (ܺߚመ௞),
and (2) a family of parametric distributions to reflect any heteroskedastic relationship between
the raw scale error variance and ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ; i.e., var(ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ) ≅ ߮ . [ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ]ఋ,
where ߜ is the over-dispersion parameter and ߮ is a constant[120],[121],[123]. Independent
specification of the link function (i.e., the scale of estimation) and family distributions (i.e., the
variance function) under GLM allows ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ to be estimated directly (or from the
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exponent of lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ )෣ without the need for smearing factors. In most applications, three
types of link functions are specified: “identity”, “log” and “power”. Here an identity link
specifies the following relationship: ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ = ܺߚ ;݇ the log link takes the form
ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ = exp(ܺߚ݇) whereas the power link takes the form ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ = (ܺߚ݇)߬where
߬is the power specified. The family distributions commonly investigated or used to model
heteroskedasticity are Gaussian if the parameterߜ= 0; Poisson if ߜ= 1, Gamma or
heteroskedastic normal if ߜ= 2 and inverse Gaussian if ߜ= 3. The appropriate family
distribution is often identified using the so-called modified Park test, that involves a log-gamma
GLM regression of var(ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ) on lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ . The coefficient on
lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ approximates ߜመ.
The main drawback of these estimation approaches is one loses the dynamic link with the
simulated data in Excel – having exported the average expected ADMINCOST over 1000
simulations for each product into STATA. I did not expect this to really make a ‘big’ difference
as we know from a simulation convergence test (see footnote 9 on page 81) that ADMINCOST
curve is virtually flat over two hundred 1,000 simulations.
Notwithstanding, GLM is known to suffer prediction losses if one has heavy tailed data
(kurtosis) even after log retransformation of the dependent variable. GLM prediction losses
(relative to the log-OLS estimator) increases with the coefficient of kurtosis of the log scale error
or when the true underlying model is a log normal with constant error variance (on the log
scale). For this reason, Manning and Mullahy[120] and Manning et al.[124] suggest, before
using GLM, to assess the form of the log-scale residuals of the OLS regression. If the log-scale
residuals are heavy-tailed: leptokurtotic (coefficient of kurtosis > 3) or the log-scale error
variance (which increases with skewness of the dependent variable) is greater than or equal to
one, then log OLS regression (with the appropriate retransformation for heteroskedastic
variance) may be preferable to GLM. If, however, the log-scale residuals are both leptokurtotic
and heteroskedastic, then the results from both log-OLS regression and GLM should be reported
and compared. If the probability density function (pdf) of the raw-scale residuals from one of the
GLM estimators with a log link are not bell-shaped or skewed bell-shaped, then OLS-models
may be less precise. If the pdf of the raw-scale residuals from GLM are monotonically declining
then the appropriate family distribution should be identified using a modified Park test.
Still another problem with GLM is that independent specification of the link and variance
functions could lead to bias and estimation inefficiency. Whilst the appropriate variance function
may be identified from the modified Park test, one obtains different regression coefficients and
inferences on incremental/marginal effects as the link function selected varies. I therefore
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considered an extended estimating equations (EEE) version of GLM (also referred to as power-
GLM or PGLM) that doesn’t require a priori specification of the link and variance functions.
The PGLM/EEE estimator utilizes a Box-Cox transformation for the link function (to minimize
skewness and to gain symmetry in the residual errors). This is defined as:
ܺߚ௞ = ቐ൫ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ఒ− 1൯ ߣ,⁄ ifߣ≠ 0ln(ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ), ifߣ= 0
Two broad family distributions can be specified: (1) a “power variance” family characterised by:
var(ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ;ߠଵ,ߠଶ) = ߠଵ(ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ )ఏమ and (2) a “quadratic variance” family
characterised by: var(ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ;ߠଵ,ߠଶ) = ߠଵ൫ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ൯+ ߠଶ(ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ )෣ ଶ, where
ߠଵ,ߠଶ together index the appropriate variance distribution for the dataset analysed. By
simultaneous specification of a family of link functions and variance functions, and joint
estimation of the parameters above, PGLM/EEE is a more flexible and robust estimator
especially when no specific link or variance function can be identified. For example, if ߜመin the
GLM estimation is a non-integer then choosing the closest family distribution could lead to
efficiency losses[125],[126].
Given the assumptions underlying my analysis and issues with the modelling
(estimation) approaches described above, I thought it prudent to validate my results – by
comparing the accuracy of the estimates derived from the algorithm to administration-cost
estimates reported in other studies.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Simulations
Figure 4.1 below shows the log-log plot of Pc versus PAc from outputs of the
simulations performed for the product sample. This provides further evidence of variation in
drug administration costs by the route of administration. The simulations also confirm my
expectations that the costs of administering biologics subcutaneously or intramuscularly are
mainly from the costs incurred before or after physical administration of a drug – although some
deviations (inconsistencies) are evident. Figure 4.1 also shows that for biologics administered
subcutaneously or intramuscularly, most of the simulations lie above the 45º line, which equates
Pc to PAc. That is to say, a greater proportion of the administration costs for these groups of
(10)
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biologics are attributable to the proximal costs incurred before or after drug administration. In
contrast, the simulations for intravenous biologics fall on either side of the 45º line with the
exception of two drugs: trastuzumab and basiliximab. For trastuzumab, most of the simulations
fall above the 45º line, which suggests that the associated proximal cost of administering this
drug is higher (relative to the physical administration costs). In the case of basiliximab, most the
simulations fall below the 45º line indicating that physical administration costs are higher for
that drug.
Although Figure 4.1 provides an idea of the general location of the simulated values for
Pc and PAc for each product category, the overlap of data points makes it difficult to tell the
pattern for each biologic product. The exact percentage of simulations with the ratio PAc/Pc ≥ 1 
can, however, be easily computed from the synthesized data. For the intravenous products, the
percentage of simulations with the ratio PAc/Pc ≥ 1 is as follows: basiliximab (95%), 
bevacizumab (35%), cetuximab (28%), infliximab (28%), oftamumab (49%), panitumumab
(46%), tocilizumab (49%) and trastuzumab (9%). For the subcutaneous products, this is as
follows: adalimumab (2%), canakinumab (7%), certolizumab pegol (1%), denosumab (22%),
etanercept (20%), golimumab (22%), omalizaumab (33%) and ustekinumab (1%). For the
intramuscular biologics, we have 17% for palivizumab and 25% for interferon beta-1a. In
general, we can say that a higher proportion of the administration costs of biologic drugs given
subcutaneously or intramuscularly come from the proximal costs incurred before or after drug
administration while for intravenous products, costs are incurred in both cost centres.
Figure 4.2 below confirms prior expectations that the costs of administering biologics
given subcutaneously or intramuscularly are lower than that of biologics given intravenously.
However, the numbers on top of each stacked bar in Figure 4.2 suggests that one has to be
cautious when using cost per unit administration to illustrate variations in biologic drug
administration costs. Tetteh and Morris[3], for instance, using a selected set of studies offering a
comparable scale of measurement for cost per unit administration, report that the administration
costs of intravenous biologics appear to be six to eight times that of biologics given
subcutaneously or intramuscularly. Differences observed (on the basis of cost per unit
administration) disappear, are attenuated or reversed when one considers drug administration
costs over a defined period of time. It seems that differences in dosing frequency is, at least, one
of the reasons why cost per unit administration may not be an appropriate indicator of the
variation in administration costs.
This unfortunately still leaves unanswered the question: by how much do administration
costs differ between biologics given intravenously, subcutaneously or intramuscularly?
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Figure 4.1: Simulation outputs
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Figure 4.2: Variation in drug administration costs
Notes: IM = intramuscular administration; SC = subcutaneous administration; IV = intravenous administration;
values on top of each stacked bar represents DOSFREQ: the number of unit administrations per year; the values
in brackets and pound currency refer to the cost per unit administration.
4.3.2 Administration cost algorithm
To answer the question above, I turn to the results shown in Table 4.2. Note that the
results are for lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ , not ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ . The regression coefficients, nevertheless,
carry the desired information as to the link between biologic administration costs and the
frequency or route of drug administration. As mentioned earlier, I estimated four nested
models A, B, C and D with C as the full unrestricted model. From Table 4.2, model C offers
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the best fit with the simulated dataset, having the highest adjusted R2, lowest sum of squared
residuals and the lowest prediction variance, i.e., the square of SE(lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ). To
ensure robustness, I explored alternative estimators for model C; the results of which are
shown in Table 4.3 below.
I found that the raw-scale residuals from a GLM with log-link and gamma family
distribution did not exhibit a monotonically declining pdf albeit the residuals were kurtotic
(coefficient of kurtosis = 4.3907). The residuals from a standard OLS regression on
ADMINCOST were also leptokurtotic (coefficient of kurtosis = 5.080), and remained
kurtotic even after of log transformation of ADMINCOST (coefficient = 3.1648). However,
whilst tests for normality of OLS residuals indicate non-normal data, one could not reject the
null of normal data for the residuals from the log-OLS regression (at the 5% significance
level). Variants of the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity of the log-OLS residuals
showed that, at the 5% significance level, one cannot reject the null of constant variance
(lowest p value = 0.078). Further, a standard Park test, i.e., an auxiliary regression of the form
exp( ప߳)෢ = ρ(ܺ) indicated that none of the explanatory variables are statistically significant
predictors of log-scale residuals. The log-error variance (i.e., the mean squared error from the
log-OLS model), however, was less than one – see model C in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Identifying the algorithm
Dependent variable: lnADMINCOST
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Independent variables ߚ௞෢ (SE) ߚ௞෢ (SE) ߚ௞෢ (SE) ߚ௞෢ (SE)
ROUTEADMIN1 -3.2858 (0.57)*** -2.6161 (1.106)** -3.2073 (0.902)*** ― 
ROUTEADMIN2 -2.4097 (0.90)** -2.2784 (1.219)* -5.1856 (1.335)*** ― 
DOSFREQ -0.0046 (0.011) -0.0025 (0.012) 0.4206 (0.18)** -0.1022 (0.179)
PRODUCTBUND ― -0.7395 (1.129) 0.4133 (0.928) -2.7416 (0.678)***
INDICATN ― -1.0527 (1.219) -0.2084 (1.467) -3.7195 (1.693)**
DOSFREQ2 ― ― -0.00105 (0.0003)*** -0.00075 (0.0004)*
DOSFREQ.INDICATN ― ― -0.3126 (0.172)* 0.17 (0.183)
Intercept 8.6223 (0.45)*** 9.6888 (1.274)*** 7.1058 (1.521)*** 11.305 (1.685)***
Regression statistics
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.7188 (0.6586) 0.7376 (0.627) 0.8881 (0.8098) 0.6957 (0.5689)
F-statistic (> c) 11.9313 (> 3.1122) 6.7151 (> 2.9961) 11.3369 (> 3.0717) 5.4864 (> 2.9961)
SSR (N) 17.8023 (18) 16.6714 (18) 7.0858 (18) 19.2688 (18)
SE(lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ) 1.1276 1.1787 0.8418 1.2672
F-ratio (> c) 3.781 (> 3.478) 6.764 (> 4.1028) ― 10.3161 (> 4.1028) 
Notes: ߚመ௞ = regression coefficients; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; SE = default standard error; F-statistic = F-test for overall significance of the regression; c = critical
value for F-test; SSR = residual sum of squares; N = number of observations; F-ratio = F-test for comparison with model C; c = critical value for the F-test; ROUTEADMIN1
= dummy variable for subcutaneous delivery; ROUTEADMIN2 = dummy variable for intramuscular administration; DOSFREQ = dosing frequency; PRODUCTBUND =
dummy indicating whether the drug product is sold as a bundled product with some of the equipment and consumables used in drug administration; INDICATN = dummy for
type of illness a product is clinically indicated for.
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Table 4.3: Alternative estimators for model C
Dependent variable: ADMINCOST or lnADMINCOST
GLM (log, Gamma) PGLM/EEE (QV) GLM (identity, Gaussian) NLLS
Independent variables ߚ௞෢ (SE) ߚ௞෢ (SE) ߚ௞෢ (SE) ߚ௞෢ (SE)
ROUTEADMIN1 -2.8255 (0.314)*** -2.6618 (0.369)*** -3.2026 (0.363)*** -3.2026 (0.474)***
ROUTEADMIN2 -5.0158 (0.393)*** -4.7495 (0.609)*** -5.2737 (0.509)*** -5.2737 (0.664)***
DOSFREQ 0.4015 (0.042)*** 0.3754 (0.059)*** 0.428 (0.054)*** 0.428 (0.07)***
PRODUCTBUND 0.2364 (0.198) 0.2336 (0.19) 0.404 (0.269) 0.404 (0.35)
INDICATN -0.2352 (0.145) -0.2592 (0.133)* -0.2896 (0.183) -0.2896 (0.283)
DOSFREQ2 -0.00102 (0.0002)*** -0.00093 (0.0001)*** -0.00106 (0.0002)*** -0.00106 (0.0003)***
DOSFREQ.INDICATN -0.3004 (0.021)*** -0.2775 (0.053)*** -0.3173 (0.028)*** -0.3173 (0.036)***
Intercept 7.3703 (0.257)*** -0.6008 (0.264) 7.1499 (0.349)*** 7.1499 (0.455)***
Regression statistics
Log pseudo-likelihood (AIC) -143.3921 (16.377) — -16.8641 (2.3182) —
OD parameter: ߜመ(95% CI) 1.589 (1.251, 1.921) — — —
Link parameter: ߣመ(95% CI) — 0.078 (-0.2361, 0.3921) — —
VF parameter: ߠଵ෢ (95% CI) — 0.0304 (-0.0038, 0.0646) — —
VF parameter: ߠଶ෢ (95% CI) — 0.0899 (-0.0038, 0.1836) — —
R2 (Adjusted R2) — — 0.8923 (0.8285) 0.8923 (0.8692)
Notes: ߚመ௞ = regression coefficients; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; SE = heteroskedastic-robust standard error; CI = confidence interval; ROUTEADMIN1 = dummy
variable for subcutaneous delivery; GLM = generalized linear modelling; PGLM = Power-GLM; EEE = extended estimating equations; QV = quadratic variance function;
NLLS = non-linear least squares; ROUTEADMIN2 = dummy variable for intramuscular administration; DOSFREQ = dosing frequency; PRODUCTBUND = dummy
indicating whether the drug product is sold as a bundled product with some of the equipment and consumables used in drug administration; INDICATN = dummy for type of
illness a product is clinically indicated for; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; OD = over-dispersion; VF = variance function.
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As noted by Manning and Mullahy[120] and Manning et al.[124], these statistics
affect the choice between log-OLS and GLM estimators. A modified Park test following the
log-gamma GLM suggests that we cannot reject a Gaussian, poisson, gamma or inverse
Gaussian distribution for the GLM variance function. But besides not being able to identify
the appropriate GLM link and variance functions, we also know GLM suffers precision losses
in the face of heavy-tailed residuals. A joint estimation of the link and variance functions by
PGLM/EEE (QV) rejected a gamma GLM with a log link10. Note that whilst the regression
coefficients from the log-gamma GLM and the PGLM/EEE (QV) are not entirely consistent,
the initial coefficient values used in the PGLM/EEE are derived from a gamma GLM with a
log-link. Based on the estimated values for ߣመand ߠଶ෢ , the PGLM/EEE (QV) model identifies
NLLS or a log-linear model with Gaussian variance function as the best model fit to the
synthesized dataset. I implemented the latter using the GLM equivalent of a log-OLS
regression as I found that GLM with log-link with a Gaussian variance function failed
Pregibon’s link test. I believe this is because the natural (canonical) link function for a
Gaussian family distribution, especially with small samples, is an identity one – not to
mention the precision losses from GLM in the face of heavy-tailed residuals.
Considering the (borderline) statistically-insignificant tests for skewness, kurtosis and
heteroskedasticity; the consistent coefficients from the NLLS and GLM equivalent of log-
OLS (plus the observation that none of the explanatory variables in model C are statistically-
significant predictors of heteroskedastic variance if it exists), I believe that the underlying
true model is closer to a log-normal with homoscedastic variance on the log-scale. I focussed
my attention therefore on the log-OLS version of model C (column 3 of Table 4.3). But
before proceeding, it is important first to remember that the reference category is formulating
biologic drugs for intravenous administration. The intercept from model C regression
represents lnADMINCOST for an intravenous biologic drug indicated for an acute illness and
not sold as a bundled product. This, however, carries no particularly meaningful information
as it requires dosing frequency to be zero. There is no point manufacturing and formulating a
biologic drug if it is not going to be used. Second, the regression coefficients are semi-
10 In contrast to Basu and Rathouz[125], I found that the PGLM/EEE with a power variance function failed to
converge. Misspecification tests for the PGLM/EEE (QV) suggested a good fit with the data: Pearson
correlation between the raw-scale residuals and predicted values was not significantly different from zero, and
there was no statistically-significant evidence of systematic patterns in the residuals plotted against predicted
values.
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elasticities: they represent the ceteris paribus percentage change in ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ given a unit
change in the explanatory variables[127],[128],[121]. Wooldridge[121] suggest that for
continuous variables, the marginal effects (percentage change in ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ) = 100•ߚ௞෢ for
a unit change in the explanatory variable ܺ. For dummy variables, the incremental effects
(percentage change in ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ) = 100•[exp(ߚ௞෢ ) – 1]. In this section, I follow
Kennedy’s[18] argument that for dummy variables in an OLS regression, the incremental
effect is given by: 100•[exp{(ߚ௞෢ ) – 0.5(SE(ߚ௞෢ )2} – 1]. This corrects for small sample bias.
The coefficient for the variable for subcutaneous products has the expected sign; it is
statistically significant and suggests that formulating a biologic drug candidate for
subcutaneous rather than intravenous delivery, holding all else constant, reduces
ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ by approximately 96.19% (= 100•[exp(-3.2026 – .5(.3632)) – 1]). The
coefficient on the variable for intramuscular products also has the expected sign, is
statistically significant and suggests that formulating a biologic drug candidate for
intramuscular rather than intravenous delivery will reduce ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ by approximately
99.55% (= 100•[exp(-5.2737 – .5(.5092)) – 1]) holding all else constant. These percentages do
not mean that intravenous products account for over 99% of the variation in administration
costs for my product sample – it only refers to isolated incremental effects of the route-of-
administration variables. Note also that the difference in the ceteris paribus effects of the
variables for subcutaneous and intramuscular products: ߚ଴෢ − ߚଵ෢ is statistically significant (p
value = 0.0035). That is, there is ‘strong’ evidence of a reduction in ADMINCOST in
switching from subcutaneous to intramuscular formulation at the 5% significance level. Note
also that in models A and B, the coefficients for the route-of-administration variables have
the expected signs; they are of the same order of magnitude as the coefficients for model C
but are not always statistically significant at the 5% level. I considered that route-of-
administration variables explain a lot of the variation in lnADMINCOST and ADMINCOST.
The coefficient for dosing frequency has the expected sign and it is statistically
significant; but it should not be interpreted in isolation given the quadratic term for dosing
frequency and its interaction term (DOSFREQ.INDICATN). The percentage change in
ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ with a unit change in dosing frequency is not 42.8% (= 100•.428). The
negative coefficient on the quadratic term for dosing frequency suggests that the marginal
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effect of dosing frequency on lnܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ diminishes with increases in dosing frequency:
the relationship between the two is curvilinear. We can write this relationship as follows:
(߲݈݊ ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ) ߲ܦܱ ܵܨܴܧܳ⁄ =ߚଶ෢ − 2ߚହ෢ ܦܱ ܵܨܴܧܳ −ߚ଺෢ ܰܫ ܦܫܥܣܶܰ
For an acute illness, INDICATN = 0 and the percentage change in ADMINCOST
from moving from once a year dosing to twice a year is 42.59% (= 100•[.428 –
2(.00106)(1)]). But moving from 100 to 101 unit administrations per year will only increase
ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ by 21.6% (= 100•[.428 – 2(.00106)(100)]). For a chronic illness (INDICATN
= 1), the corresponding percentage change in ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ of moving from one to two unit
administrations per year is 10.86% and -10.13% for moving from 100 to 101 unit
administrations per year. The latter result reflects the curvilinear relationship between
ADMINCOST and dosing frequency. Although the coefficient on dosing frequency suggests
that increases in dosing frequency should lead to increases in ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ , the coefficient
on its quadratic term means that beyond some positive value of DOSFREQ (a turning point),
increases in dosing frequency will be associated with lower drug administration costs.
For biologics indicated for acute illnesses, this turning point is achieved when dosing
frequency is approximately 202 (= .428 divided by 2[.00106]) unit administrations per year.
This is roughly a four times a week dosing regimen with perhaps a tapering off of dosing
frequency due to improved treatment response or concerns about adverse events. For the two
biologic drugs indicated for acute illness, their unit administrations per year are far from 202
so we can safely ignore what happens after the turning point. For biologics indicated for
chronic illnesses, this turning point is reached when dosing frequency is just over 52 (= [.428
– .3173] divided by 2[.00106]) unit administrations per year, i.e., roughly dosing once
weekly. Only one of the chronic biologic drugs within my sample (etanercept) has a dosing
frequency that greatly exceeds this turning point; so again one can ignore the turning point
knowing the source of this seemingly counterintuitive observation.
Indeed, a test for detecting influential (outlier) observations indicated that only one
product (etanercept) had an absolute DFITS value greater than twice the threshold of 1.333.
(DFITS is the scaled difference in predicted values of ADMINCOST with and without the jth
observation, in this case etanercept.) However, the curvilinear relationship between
ADMINCOST and dosing frequency raises an interesting scenario that, given the peculiar
(11)
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biophysical characteristics and pharmacokinetic profiles of a biologic drug candidate, it is
possible to have lower ADMINCOST when dosing frequency is higher relative to some
appropriately defined comparator drug.
For the variable indicating a bundled product, I found that whilst it did not reach
statistical significance, the regression coefficient has the unexpected sign. The size of the
coefficient suggests that, holding all else equal, bundling a biologic product with some of the
equipment and consumables used in drug administration increases ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ by
approximately 44.46% (= 100•[exp(.404 – .5(.26932)) – 1]). Since one cannot reject the
possibility that the coefficient of the variable for bundled products is zero, I sought to explore
the dataset to see why I observe this result. It turns out that the there is a non-trivial
correlation between the variable for bundled products and the variable for subcutaneous
products (correlation coefficient of .6325) and with ROUTEADMIN2 (correlation coefficient
of .25). Dropping the route-of-administration variables in model D (Table 2) produced the
expected sign for the variable for bundled products and it achieved statistical significance.
This suggests that bundling a biologic product with some of the equipment and consumables
used for drug administration reduces ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ by roughly 95% (= 100•[exp(-2.7416 –
.5(.678)2) – 1]) – similar to the ceteris paribus effects of the variables for subcutaneous and
intramuscular products. This makes sense as all the products in my sample administered
subcutaneously or intramuscularly are, by definition, bundled with some of the equipment
and consumables used for administering drugs. Model D, however, suffers from dropping the
route-of-administration variables: its adjusted R2 is the lowest (.5689).
The variable for chronic/acute illness, INDICATN, also shows up with the
unexpected sign but it doesn’t reach statistical significance in models B and C. This result
seems counterintuitive considering the persistence of healthcare resource consumption and
expenditures associated with chronic illnesses. In model D (Table 2), however, the variable
INDICATN reaches statistical significance. Again, I explored my simulated dataset to find
reasons why this might be the case. It turns out that the variable for chronic/acute illness,
INDICATN, is negatively correlated with the variable for intramuscular products (correlation
coefficient of -.4375) and positively correlated with the variable for subcutaneous products
(correlation coefficient of .3162). I speculate that the net outcome of these opposing effects is
the reason why INDICATN has the negative sign. In fact, for the subgroup of intramuscular
biologics in my sample, there is only one product for acute illness and the other for chronic
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illness. There are no subcutaneous biologics indicated for acute illnesses. The apparent
counterintuitive result simply reflects the nature of the product sample and simulated dataset.
It might not necessarily be observed with a different or updated product sample.
Note that although the variables for bundled products (PRODUCTBUND) and
chronic/acute illness (INDICATN) have unexpected signs and individually they may not
always reach statistical significance, they are jointly significant in the presence of the other
explanatory variables in model C. That is to say, a reduced form of the OLS regression model
C that excludes these statistically insignificant variables will carry a lot more of unexplained
variation in ADMINCOST. As indicated by the F-ratios for the comparisons of model A, B
and D with model C in Table 4.2, there is no justification for excluding these statistically-
insignificant variables.
4.3.3 Validation
As discussed in section 4.2.5, one must proceed with caution when using the
algorithm based on the log-OLS model C to predict the administration costs for a biologic
drug candidate. Specifically, one needs a smearing factor to minimize prediction errors. I
found that Duan’s smearing factor for all product categories was 1.204; and the subgroup-
specific smearing factors are as follows: 1.0792 for intravenous products, 1.3799 for
subcutaneous products and 1.00 for intramuscular products. The smearing factor from
Wooldridge’s approach was 1.0287. To identify which of the methods of deriving less biased
OLS estimates of ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ is best, I estimated the coefficient of determination (i.e., the
square of the correlation coefficient) between the smearing estimates and simulated values for
ADMINCOST. This was .822675 for the ‘normal theory estimates’, .822382 for estimates
derived using the subgroup-specific smearing factors and .822675 for the Wooldridge
approach. There is therefore not much to choose from the three alternatives but I prefer the
subgroup-specific smearing factors as it allows us one to make cost predictions tailored to
specific product formulations; and because the residuals from the log-OLS model C exhibit
statistically-insignificant heteroskedasticity that is not explained by any of the explanatory
variables.
To illustrate how the algorithm can be used to predict administration costs, consider
current attempts to reformulate trastuzumab for subcutaneous delivery. This has been made
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possible by the feasibility of manufacturing highly-concentrated solutions for monoclonal
antibodies and co-formulation with an excipient, recombinant human hyaluronidase that
dissolves subcutaneous tissues for rapid drug absorption[129]. Let’s assume health-outcome
neutrality between subcutaneous and intravenous delivery of trastuzumab, and the same
dosing frequency at three-weekly intervals. Recent phase I trials suggest that subcutaneous
and intravenous trastuzumab have indeed comparable efficacy and safety profiles [130]. Also
subcutaneous trastuzumab will, by definition, be available as a bundled product: it is mostly
likely to be sold together with an automated single-use injectable device in place of manual
administration with a syringe[129].
Given trastuzumab is indicated for a chronic illness (see Table 4.1), the annual
ADMINCOST can be predicted as follows:
݈݊ ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ூ௏෣
= 7.1499 − 3.2026(0) − 5.2737(0) + .428(17.33) + .404(0) − .2896(1)
− .00106(17.33ଶ) − .3173(17.33)(1)
ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ூ௏ = exp(8.4604) • ɸ෡(= 1.0792) = £5097.99
݈݊ ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ௌ஼෣
= 7.1499 − 3.2026(1) − 5.2737(0) + .428(17.33) + .404(1) − .2896(1)
− .00106(17.33ଶ) − .3173(17.33)(1)
ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ௌ஼෣ = exp(5.6618) • ɸ෡(= 1.3799) = £396.94
where 1.0792 and 1.3799 are the subgroup-specific smearing factors for intravenous and
subcutaneous products respectively. Assuming the same price per given dose, this represents
a healthcare delivery cost saving of, at least, £4700 per patient per year.
These results are consistent with Samanta et al.’s[131] report that a 100% switch of
200 patients in England receiving intravenous trastuzumab to its subcutaneous equivalent will
generate time and resource cost savings of £271,000 in the hospital setting; £1,200,000 in the
community setting and £1,500,000 if patients self-administer subcutaneous trastuzumab at
home. The savings arise mainly from reduction in pharmacy technicians’ time and nursing
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inputs and time spent in the “IV chair”, i.e., being hospitalised to receive an intravenous
infusion. The regression-based algorithm provides a conservative estimate of £940,210 if 200
patients fully switch from intravenous to self-administered subcutaneous trastuzumab. Also
De Cock et al.[23] report, from a multi-country, multi-centre time and motion study that
resources expended in administering intravenous trastuzumab is mainly in the form of
reconstitution in the pharmacy and in “infusion initiation” (no changes in number of patients’
visits, blood sampling and physician consultation were expected from the switch to
subcutaneous trastuzumab). My results are consistent with this finding; to be specific, the
ratio PAc/Pc is greater than or equal to one in only 9% of 1000 simulations for trastuzumab.
4.4 Discussion
The regression-based algorithm developed above allows one to highlight cases where
(1) administration costs for a given biologic medicine vary across different clinical
indications, by the route of administration and dosing regimens of a given biologic medicine,
and (2) how administration costs can be lowered via bundling medicinal products with some
of the equipment and consumables used in administering drugs. The essence of the algorithm
is better appreciated when one considers the argument by de la Horie[133] that the reason
why biologics are “so expensive” is because of complex and costly manufacturing, and the
need for frequent administration of high doses to be effective. This suggests that disease
management or healthcare delivery costs could be reduced by manufacturing process
innovations that reduce the cost-of-goods as well as reformulation steps that reduce the
frequency of dosing.
My results suggest that this is possible but then the curvilinear relationship between
ADMINCOST and dosing frequency means it is also possible for some biologic drugs (given
their peculiar biophysical characteristics and pharmacokinetic profiles) to have lower
administration costs even with a higher annual dosing frequency (relative to some other
biologic drug). However, for my product sample, an increase in dosing frequency in most
cases will be associated with an increase in ADMINCOST albeit at a diminishing marginal
rate. But we also know that variables for subcutaneous and intramuscular products are
associated with lower administration costs even when dosing frequency remains unchanged.
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One could therefore say the key decision factor is with regards to formulating a product for
subcutaneous or intramuscular administration relative to intravenous delivery. In line with the
argument by Eisenstein[134], a one-size-fits-all approach of formulating biologics for
intravenous delivery needs to be reconsidered.
This, however, should not be taken to mean that all biologics should be manufactured
for subcutaneous or intramuscular administration. Intravenous administration has other
attributes that make it the most appropriate route for administering a drug. This includes the
benefit of immediate injection of active drug moieties into the systemic circulation –
something that is desired when an immediate treatment or clinical response is needed, for
example, with management of epileptic seizures, acute asthmatic attacks or in severe sepsis
where peripheral shutdown hinders rapid drug distribution and absorption. Intravenous
delivery is also appropriate for products with narrow therapeutic indices as there is less
fluctuations of drug levels in blood plasma. Generally speaking, drugs that need ‘informed’
dosage adjustments (based on accurate measurements of some physiological or biochemical
metric) in order to ensure the products deliver positive health benefits (net of safety concerns
and risks) are best administered intravenously. Intravenous delivery is also appropriate when
a drug cannot be absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract or when a drug cannot be injected
into the muscle or other body tissues[135].
Putting aside these clinical reasons, there are manufacturing challenges (issues of
technological feasibility) that need to be addressed before the potential efficiency (cost)
savings can be realized. Biologics can be difficult to formulate for subcutaneous or
intramuscular delivery as this typically involves injection of small volumes of highly
concentrated drug solutions through needles with narrow apertures (needles used for
subcutaneous often have an aperture of 0.5 inches whilst needles with 1-2 inch gauges are
used for intramuscular delivery). The problem is amplified for biologics that need to be given
in high doses and/or have limited solubility. Subsequently, attempts to formulate biologic
drugs with fragile molecular structures in high concentrations and small volumes could lead
to protein aggregation, undesirable viscosity properties and generally ‘unstable’ drugs that do
not retain their biological or biophysical properties. A biologic drug that works well when
given in high volumes (because of solubility problems for example) as an intravenous
infusion may lose its clinical efficacy or product quality when formulated for subcutaneous or
intramuscular delivery in small volumes[136],[134].
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What is more if the small volumes of subcutaneous or intramuscular biologics needed
to be injected results in an increase in dosing frequency for a biologic product, the net impact
will be determined mainly by the opposing effects of the variables for subcutaneous or
intramuscular products and the variable for dosing frequency. Note that this effect from
frequent subcutaneous or intramuscular injections of small volumes is irrespective of whether
the biologic product in question has a longer half-life that, all things being equal, should lead
to a lower dosing frequency.
Another reason why subcutaneous or intramuscular formulation might be associated
with an increase in dosing frequency or higher doses is that biologics given intramuscularly
or subcutaneously will have to go through layers of skin or muscle tissues, and in the process
they may be rendered ineffective or fail to reach the desired target sites. That is, if X doses of
a drug are needed for the desired clinical outcome, some allowance (W) must be made for the
lost or trapped drug doses by administering X+W doses of the drug. In fact, this problem is
the reason behind the conduct of clinical trials on reformulated trastuzumab, rituximab and
immunoglobulin G with recombinant hyaluronidase to enhance drug absorption following
subcutaneous administration[136].
Assuming the net effect of the variables for subcutaneous and intramuscular products
and dosing frequency is a reduction in administration costs, this cost saving might be offset
by the fact for a given fixed price per dose, a higher dosing frequency increases the
acquisition costs for that biologic drug. Again, depending on the trade-off between
acquisition and administration costs, the overall impact might therefore not be a reduction in
disease management or total healthcare delivery costs. Likewise, for the same dosing
frequency, if it costs more to make the reformulated product then to maintain the same price-
cost margin, this will lead to a higher product price per dose assuming price demand elasticity
remains the same. That said, the regression-based algorithm in these situations should help
manufacturers quantify the net impact of the formulation of drug administration, which
together with considerations on the impact on acquisition costs will allow them to generate
credible estimates of the total healthcare delivery costs for their products and the likelihood
that these products will find favourable recommendations from healthcare payers or
providers.
It might be argued that the regression-based algorithm is tied to the product sample
selected; that different results may be obtained if a different biologic drug sample is used,
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perhaps one that has a lot more products that are administered intramuscularly. Besides the
observation that biologics are rarely formulated for intramuscular administration, that
argument is not specific to the findings here: it is applicable to almost any algorithm that has
been developed for one purpose or the other. The regression-based algorithm developed here
may not yield the desired predictions in all situations. That aside, there are non-monetary
aspects of drug administration that I haven’t considered here; for example, needle phobia and
patient discomfort; inconvenience, disruption of daily activities (from more frequent drug
dosing) and non-compliance issues that might negatively affect patients’ health-related
quality-of-life. I will argue that it is even possible to have an expanded algorithm that when
used to predict the impact on drug formulation choice on healthcare delivery considers both
the monetary and non-monetary aspects of drug administration. I suggest that further research
is undertaken to evaluate, if possible in monetary terms, the non-monetary attributes of drug
administration from both NHS and non-NHS perspectives.
Even then an unanswered question is whether biopharmaceutical manufacturers are
faced with adequate incentives to consider alternative drug delivery systems or alter their
formulation choices as early as possible. From the perspective of the rational or responsible
private biopharmaceutical manufacturer, researching and investing alternative drug delivery
systems is worth the time, effort and money if the net present value of that decision is
positive (see Chess[137]). That is to say, the discounted present value of the stream of
incremental quasi-rents (i.e., additional cash flow revenue minus the cost of goods) that a
reformulated biologic product or an alternative drug delivery system is expected to bring
should exceed the discounted present value of the incremental costs of developing the
alternative drug delivery system or reformulating a product. The discounted present value of
expected cash flows will be determined by the favourable recommendations given by
healthcare payers and how that allows a product to, at least, maintain its market share or
capture incremental demand volumes. The incremental costs involved will include those
related to reformulation and manufacturing; toxicology studies and/or clinical trials to
establish, at least, no differences in average clinical outcomes.
Within the UK NHS the use of CEA/HTA and current efforts to implement value-
based pricing (partly based on estimated cost-effectiveness) could and should provide some
incentive for manufacturers to consider the relationship between formulation choices and
healthcare delivery costs as early as possible in product development but here I cannot say
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anything about whether this, on its own, will get manufacturers to change their tact. I believe
this is also worth considering in future research.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has evaluated variations in the magnitude of administration costs of
biologic drugs, taking care to ensure consistent inclusion of all relevant cost resources. From
this, I developed a regression-based algorithm with which manufacturers could possibly
predict, during process development, how their choices on manufacturing and formulation
may impact on the healthcare delivery costs of their products. My results confirm the general
notion that the administration costs of intravenous products is higher than that of products
administered subcutaneously or intramuscularly. Based on the algorithm, I found that
formulating a biologic drug for subcutaneous or intramuscular delivery relative to
intravenous delivery is associated with lower administration costs that holding all else equal
should lead to lower total healthcare delivery costs. Increasing the frequency of drug dosing
generally will lead to an increase in administration costs but it is possible that this might not
always be the case.
There are, however, clinical considerations and manufacturing challenges that might
militate against the potential efficiency (cost) savings in administration costs from
reformulating biologic products or making use of alternative drug delivery systems. But
where and when issues of technological feasibility can be dealt with, (bio)pharmaceutical
manufacturers could use the algorithm to quantify the net impact on drug administration
costs, which together with considerations on the impact on acquisition costs will allow them
to generate credible estimates of the total healthcare delivery costs for their products and the
likelihood that these products will find favourable recommendations from healthcare payers.
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5 Discrete-choice Modelling of End-user Preferences for Modes of
Drug Administration
5.1 Introduction
The systematic review in Chapter 3 (see also Tetteh and Morris[112]) demonstrated the link
between manufacturing decisions and the direct monetary costs of drug administration. The
key message from this study was: administration of multiple drug doses over time requires
different types of medical resources and hence can have a non-trivial impact on the monetary
costs of healthcare delivery. This argument, however, does not consider the non-monetary
hedonic characteristics (attributes) of administering drugs that are linked to the preferences of
patients for different modes of drug administration. That is to say, a full accounting of the
societal costs and benefits of resources expended on drug administration should take into
account both the direct monetary and indirect non-monetary costs and benefits. This is
because a given mode of drug administration that incurs the lowest monetary cost to
healthcare payers or providers may incur hidden indirect costs in terms of a mismatch with
what is preferred by patients (otherwise healthy people) and healthcare professionals acting
on behalf of patients[137].
It is crucial therefore to understand and assess the trade-offs between the non-
monetary characteristics (attributes) of drug administration – such that better drugs can be
developed and manufactured tailored to patients’ preferences. The importance of this is
evident from a recent report published by the Knowledge Transfer Network (HealthTech and
Medicines) on “[t]he future of high value manufacturing [in the pharmaceutical,
biopharmaceutical and medical device sectors] in the UK”[138]. The report identified, among
a number of factors, the importance of: (1) early consideration of manufacturing needs, (2)
flexible production facilities; (3) reducing cost to the UK NHS and (4) the delivery of better
services and improved health outcomes to patients. The last, in particular, focussed on the
need for: (1) more stable, effective medicines, (2) novel ways of administering them, and (3)
smart [packaging] technologies to monitor usage by patients. A full understanding of the non-
monetary aspects of drug administration is necessary if the multiple objectives above are to
be achieved.
In this chapter, I aim to evaluate the non-monetary characteristics (attributes) of drug
administration, focusing on the preferences of (1) patients, or otherwise healthy people from
the UK general public, and (2) healthcare professionals[doctors and nurses] acting on behalf
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of patient populations in the US. I do this using discrete choice experiments (DCEs) that
belong to a set of methodologies designed for the valuation of goods and services that are not
traded on the market.
The key advantages of using a DCE over interviews, focus groups and other in-person
surveys are: first, that one can evaluate the strength of preference for different attributes and
how they are traded off against one another; and two, one could assign an indirect monetary
value to the non-monetary attributes of drug administration. By monetizing preferences for
the non-monetary attributes of drug administration, a DCE allows comparison with the direct
monetary costs of administering biologic drugs that can be predicted using the algorithm
presented in Chapter 4. See also Tetteh and Morris[139]. Incorporating these predicted-cost
outputs with preference valuations from the DCE conducted in this chapter into
(bio)manufacturing decision-making can be useful in the development and translation of
(biologic) drug candidates in R&D pipelines into patient-friendly medicines. Manufacturers
will be equipped with the evidence base to make patient-friendly medicines that do not
impose a heavy financial burden on healthcare providers and payers.
The application of a DCE here is in accordance with the economic literature on
product variety, notably Spence’s [140] arguments that the most natural way of evaluating the
welfare effects of product differentiation is in “attribute space”. That is, if the distribution of
end-user preferences for a common set of attributes of a class of goods or services is known
for a consuming population, then the (expected) demand for any set of existing or
hypothetical goods can be estimated. In contrast to working in “attribute space”, conventional
welfare analysis in “product space”, i.e., evaluating demands for products as a whole, do not
allow estimation of demands for hypothetical, non-existent or potential goods or services.
This application of a DCE also resonates with theoretical and empirical “logit models of
product differentiation” and “logit models of [monopolistic] competition”
[141],[142],[143],[144],[145].
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Drug administration as a non-marketed discrete good
The starting point is to consider drug administration as a non-marketed good or
service. Subject to a random shock to an individual’s health stock, drug administration forms
only one part of a series of healthcare and health interventions to restore health to pre-illness
107
levels. Preferences for different modes of drug administration are therefore not an end in
itself: they reflect a derived demand for the (incremental) health benefits offered by a given
drug. The mode of drug administration simply constitutes a vehicle via which these
incremental health benefits are delivered to a patient. Put differently, there is not a free
market trading in goods and services solely for the purpose of drug administration. Drug
administration, on its own, bears the features of a non-marketed good or service. And, DCEs
are one of several preference-elicitation methods by which the non-monetary aspects of
different modes of drug administration can be evaluated.
A DCE requires, in a survey, elicitation of stated preferences in the context of
hypothetical scenarios or ‘constructed markets’ that are meant to mimic what will happen had
a real market existed. Just as consumers pick their preferred products from a shelf in a retail
store, a DCE presents end-users (consumers) with a sequence of choice scenarios, sets or
situations in which they have to choose from among a number of competing mutually-
exclusive drugs that are identical apart from the way in which they are administered. In a
DCE however, consumers make choices over a collection of “discrete” goods: they choose
their preferred good from among a set of lumpy indivisible goods or, a unit or fixed quantity
of highly-divisible goods. Each discrete good is defined by a bundle, profile or treatment
combination of a common set of attributes that are in different proportions or ratios, i.e., the
levels or values for the attributes differ from one good to the other. The attributes and
attribute-levels should be those relevant to manufacturing decisions and/or consumer choices.
5.2.2 Product choice in attribute space
Consider the following simplified healthcare market made up of a finite number of
pharmaceutical manufacturers on the supply-side and a finite number of end-users
(consumers) on the demand-side. This could be patients and/or healthcare professionals,
acting on behalf of a given patient population. Each manufacturer supplies drug products that
are almost identical except for being differentiated according to their mode of administration
to patients. The decision to supply such differentiated drug products is subject to the
resources available for production, the state of underlying manufacturing science; each
manufacturer’s expectation of incremental quasi-rents from doing so (i.e., the additional
revenues net of manufacturing costs) and whether the expected volume of quasi-rents exceed
any fixed or sunk expenditures on R&D. Following characteristics theory [146; 147], or what
Baumol [148] describes as the “abstract product approach”, demand-side utility obtained
108
from consumption of a good or service is derived not from the good or service per se but
indirectly from the hedonic characteristics (attributes) embodied by that good or service. In
this market, therefore, demand for a drug product (which is in effect demand for modes of
drug administration) can be considered as a derived demand for a bundle of attributes of drug
administration.
Figure 5.1: Manufacturing challenges and product diversity
Source: Authors; Lancaster [146; 147].
Notes: The upward sloping nature of the rays from the origin reflects the complementary combination of
attributes and attribute-levels in defining a given product. C0C1 is a discontinuous product differentiation curve
determined by the resources available to manufacturers, the state of underlying manufacturing science and the
expected incremental quasi-rents from product differentiation.
Initially, in Figure 5.1 above, four manufacturers can possibly supply four classes of
highly-divisible drug products G1, G2, G3 and G4, each defined by two attributes X1 and X2
in a fixed proportion or ratio (the attribute-levels will be points on the y- and x-axis). Each
class contains drug products defined by various possible combinations of attributes X1 and X2,
and their levels. These “treatment combinations” of attributes and attribute-levels (or profiles
of the products) are, for simplicity, represented by the four rays from the origin. Each ray can
G2
C0
D
I1(S1)
F
E*
G5
G4
G3
C1
G1
X2
E5
E3
E4
E2
E1
0 X1
I2(S2)
I0(S0)
109
be thought of as the output of a transformation matrix that turns attributes into products, and
vice versa. Depending on the resources available to the end-user, i.e., the residual income or
financing available after expenditure on a composite of all other healthcare goods and
services, he or she will seek to maximize what is often assumed to be a quasi-concave
indirect utility function with respect to a vector of the attributes and attribute-levels of drug
administration. Given the prevailing prices of drug products in classes G1, G2, G3 and G4,
the line E1E2E3E4 defines the “attributes efficiency frontier”: the maximum possible
combination of attributes and attribute-levels (collection of drug products) that can be
afforded within healthcare professionals’ funding budget or patients’ income constraints. I
assume here that healthcare professionals acts as fund-holders (payers): they have financial
responsibility over the allocation and use of resources for healthcare provision.
The choice of any end-user then will be determined by the point where the highest
indifference curve achievable is tangential to the attributes frontier; for example, point E3 for
an end-user whose indifference curve is I0. The slope of the indifference curve at this point is
S0 and it represents the marginal rate of substitution between the attributes X1 and X2. This
captures the end-user’s willingness to trade off an additional unit of X1 for X2 in order to
maintain the same level of utility. This can be interpreted as the marginal-willingness-to-pay
(MWTP) for X1 relative to X2. An end-user whose highest possible indifference curve (I1) is
tangential to the attributes frontier at point F will prefer a drug product that is some
combination of the profiles in classes G3 and G4. However, there is no manufacturer
supplying products that contains the profile at point F. As a satisficing option, the end-user
may choose to consume at some times products with profile E3 and at other times products
with profile E4. The end-user, be it a patient or healthcare professional, switches between
products to minimize the gross welfare loss of not having what they want. Note that the
assumption of highly-divisible drug products is necessary for X1 and X2 to be thought of as
representing attributes per unit price of a good. In the more realistic case of indivisible goods
or services, price will have to be considered separately as an attribute.
In either case, substitution between attributes and attribute-levels will depend on the
end-user’s MWTP for attributes and how large price changes are. For example, if the price of
the product at E2 is to increase or preferences are to change such that the feasible
combination of attributes that the end-user can afford is E*, the new attribute frontier will be
E1E3E4. That is, some combination of the profiles of products in classes G1 and G3 now
dominates those in class G2. On the other hand, and assuming easily surmountable market
entry barriers, a new manufacturer introducing a new product belong to a new class G5 at
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point D will not, in all practical terms, alter the attribute frontier: combinations of the
attributes and attribute-levels in classes G1, G2, G3 and G4 will not dominate combinations
including class G5. If, however, the price of products in G5 is low enough, such that the
feasible combination of attributes is pushed outward to E5, then we have a new frontier
(E1E5E3E4) where products belonging to class G2 drop out of the preferred bundle
corresponding to the indifference curve I1. The introduction of G5 in this case leads to
cannibalization of quasi-rents enjoyed by the manufacturer of products in G2. Depending on
the distribution of end-user preferences, introduction of G5 may or may not capture quasi-
rents (market shares) enjoyed by products in G1, G3 and G4.
The above, however, assumes that production possibilities (in part determined by the
state of the underlying manufacturing science) allow manufacturers to supply drug products
in classes G1 to G5 at all levels of attributes X1 and X2. Now imagine the case of limited
production possibilities depicted by the discontinuous product differentiation curve (PDC)
labelled C0C1. The feasible class of products that can be supplied on the market will be those
that belong to classes G2, G3 and G5 but supplied at attribute-levels that fall below or on the
PDC. This state of affairs will be characterised by larger pockets of welfare loss to end-users.
What is clear here is: given limited resources available to manufacturers, and the need to
minimize gross consumer welfare losses, it is crucial that manufacturers have some
knowledge of the distribution of end-users’ preferences in order for them to supply the
classes of drug products (differentiated by their mode of administration) that matches closely
what the average representative end-user wants or prefers.
5.2.3 Attribute space to logit demand systems
The framework above accommodates: (1) cases where end-user choices are rational,
deterministic and derived from unrestricted (compensatory) substitution between attributes
and attribute-levels; and (2) cases where end-user preferences could be any weighted sum of
their beliefs about the (incremental) net benefits of a good, formed out of emotions or
application of rational or irrational, compensatory or non-compensatory/ lexicographic
decision rules11. This stochastic nature of choice preferences can be conveniently captured by
theorizing that the indirect utility (ܷ௦௝∗ ) an end-user, s, derives from choosing alternative j
from among a set of J products has: (1) a systematic, explainable or observable component,
11 Non-compensatory [lexicographic] choices are borne out of hierarchical preference ordering involving no
substitution between “dominant” and “dominated” attributes and attribute-levels.
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Vsj that is a function of the set of attributes and (2) a random unexplainable error term, ϵsj
[149]. We can thus write the following utility function that is linear in parameters and linear
in attribute levels:
Uୱ୨∗ = Vୱ୨൫઺୨୩܆୨୩൯+ ϵୱ୨
઺୨୩܆୨୩ = β୩
ᇱX୩ᇱ+ β୮C + ∑ ASC୨୎ି ଵ୨ୀଵ
where ࢄ௝௞ is a vector of attribute-levels decomposed into ௝ܺ௞ᇱ , a vector of non-monetary
attribute-levels and Cjp, the price/cost associated with each alternative product. ࢼ௝௞is a vector
of preference coefficients, decomposed into ߚ௝௞ᇱ , a vector of coefficients for the non-monetary
attributes and βjp, coefficient for the price/cost attribute. The random error term (ϵsj) refers to
the influence of unobserved or unmeasured factors whilst the alternative-specific-constant
ASCj captures any peculiar effects of each alternative product that is not reflected in the
attributes. (∑ ASC୨୎ି ଵ୨ୀଵ may be considered as the mean of ϵsj.)
The focus here, however, is consumption of a “discrete good” in fixed quantities. We
want to know whether drug products differentiated by their mode of administration will be
chosen or not. There is no question of how many or how much.
Given the interest in choices made on the extensive margin, the loci of preferred drug
products in attribute space (Figure 1) can be equivalently described by the distribution of
choice probabilities for different modes of drug administration. Conditional on knowing the
vector ࢼ௝௞, the probability (P) that product j1 will be chosen above the other J – 1 discrete
products, in each choice situation (n), can be estimated using the “mother” multinomial logit
(MNL) model [150] as follows:
Pଵ୬ୱ(yଵ = 1) = Pଵ୬ୱ൫ܷ ଵ∗ > ௝ܷ∗൯= exp(μ[઺ଵ୩܆ଵ୩])
∑ exp(μ[઺୨୩܆୨୩])୎୨ୀଵ
݂൫ϵୱ୨൯= exp൫−ϵୱ୨൯exp(−exp(μϵୱ୨)); F(ϵୱ) = ෑ exp(−exp(μϵୱ୨))୎
୨ୀଵ
where y denotes the choice data collected such that yଵ = 1 if product j1 is selected from
among J products or options; f(ϵsj) refers to a Gumbel probability density function for an
independent and identically distributed (IID) error term and F(ϵsj) is the corresponding
(13)
(12)
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cumulative density function. ߤ is a positive scale parameter that is inversely related to the
error variance (ߪఢଶ) and, for Gumbel-distributed errors, ߪఢଶ = ߨଶ/6ߤଶ.
Note that the error terms are specific to each choice dataset, and for that reason μ in
the “mother” MNL model is usually normalized to one. The normalized IID error terms
together with fixed preference coefficients yields the so-called independence from
[ir]relevant alternatives (IIA) assumption – which suggests the ratio of choice probabilities
are independent of the inclusion or omission of other products.
The slope of the indifference curve at the locus of product choice in attribute space,
for a given end-user, can be described by their MWTP. This is estimated as the ratio of
attribute-coefficients and the price/cost coefficient:
MWTP௦= − ∂൫Vୱ୨หX୨୩൯ ∂X୨୩൘
∂൫Vୱ୨หC୨୮൯
∂C୨୮
൘
= −
β୨୩
β୨୮
൘
Following the setup in Figure 1, one could, in a survey or some referendum, elicit and
collect repeated preferences for a collection of products (profiles of attributes and attribute-
levels) over a sequence of choice situations – so as to maximize the pool of information that
can be collected from a single end-user. Given a sample population of end-users (S), and a
number of choice situations or sets (N) faced by each end-user, the parameters of equations
(13) and (14) can be identified by maximizing the sample log-likelihood function (LLS) with
respect to the estimable coefficients. In the case of the “mother” MNL, the likelihood that the
choices collected in a DCE survey are explained by the model is given by:
maximizing LLୗ
ࢼ෩
= ෍ ෍ ෍ y୨୬ୱ log P୨୬ୱ(઺෩,܆)୎
୨ୀଵ
୒
୬ୀଵ
ୗ
ୱୀଵ
where ࢼ෩ refers to prior (expected) coefficient values and all other terms are as previously
defined. In what follows, I work with two separate sample populations of end-users: people
from the UK general public and healthcare professionals in the US.
5.3. Data and methods
(14)
(15)
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5.3.1 Specification of the attribute space
5.3.1.1 Sample UK general public
In conducting the DCE, I first set out to identify a common set of relevant attributes
and attribute-levels for different modes of drug administration. Table 5.1 on page 114 shows
the selected set of attributes, definitions of these attributes and their levels for the sample of
people from the UK general public. This generic set of attributes and attribute-levels were
based on a selective review of literature on preferences for modes of drug
administration[151],[152],[153],[154],[155]. They were also informed by two systematic
reviews that reported that, excluding wrong-timing errors, there is a higher rate of medication
administration errors for intravenous drugs (53.3%) compared to all other routes of drug
administration (20.1%). On its own, intravenous drug therapy is associated with a 0.73
overall (Bayesian) probability of making at least one error (95% credible interval [CrI]: 0.54
– 0.90). This was thought to be largely due to errors made at the drug reconstitution stage;
hence the use of pre-prepared injections could reduce administration error probability to 0.17
(95% CrI: 0.09 – 0.27)[156],[157].
Ideally, one would want to supplement this literature review with interviews and/or
focus group discussions involving end-users. Given the time and resources available for this
research, it was not possible to apply these qualitative methods – which are of most value
where there is a lack or dearth of existing (grey) literature. I therefore make no claim here
that the selected set of attributes and attribute-levels are “exhaustive” of all characteristics of
all possible modes of drug administration. I believe, however, that the selected attributes and
attribute-levels in Table 5.1 are relevant and suited for investigating the gross welfare
benefits (consumer surplus) from manufacturing patient-friendly medicines.
5.3.1.2 Sample US healthcare professionals
Table 5.2 on page 115 shows the generic set of attributes used for evaluating the
preferences of US healthcare professionals for different modes of drug administration. The
attribute “risk of non-compliance” can be thought of as a composite measure of how a given
mode of drug delivery disrupts patients’ daily activities; the incidence of adverse events
specific to the mode of drug delivery (and separate from that of the drug molecule itself) as
well as any other factors that might negatively affect treatment compliance, for instance,
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disutility of pain at the site of drug administration, time and travel costs of accessing
healthcare or the absence of insurance cover for medical expenses.
In the econometric analyses (see section 5.3.5), I changed the attribute “dosing
frequency” into a continuous variable that describes the number of unit administrations of a
drug. This was to allow more flexibility in estimating the gross consumer welfare benefits
derived from the decisions and actions taken by healthcare professionals on behalf of
patients. For the same reason, I translated the cost attribute into a continuous variable, setting
an upper limit of $20,000. This is not an arbitrary figure: the levels selected for the cost
attribute was meant to mimic the distribution of drug administration costs in Chapter 4,
Figure 4.2 on page 89. See also Tetteh and Morris [139]. The maximum cost limit is
consistent with Farroni et al. [158] who report that clinical charges for using a room and
administering azacitidine in the office (i.e., a clinical setting) ranges from $300-$500 per
injection and these costs/charges per patient per year for a full treatment course of six cycles
ranges from $12,600-$21,000. I chose $20,000 as the upper limit since charges do not always
match costs.
5.3.2 Survey development
Considering the mode of administration is simply a vehicle for delivering the health
benefits offered by a drug to patients, I opted to specify the alternative goods as drugs that are
identical in every aspect apart from the manner in which they are administered to patients. I
used a “forced-choice” format of presenting survey respondents with two unlabelled drugs A
and B. I did not include a “none” or “opt-out” alternative as I found it difficult to imagine that
people or healthcare professionals will choose not to have a clinically-beneficial drug simply
because the way in which the drug is administered is not what they prefer.
Having identified the most relevant attributes and attribute-levels, I proceeded to
develop “efficiency choice” experimental designs for the development of the DCE survey
questionnaires. The experimental design is basically an arrangement of J alternative products
and a sequence of N choice sets, where each alternative product is defined by a profile or
treatment combination of attributes and attribute-levels. The experimental design embodies
the transformation matrix for turning products into bundles of attributes and bundles of
attributes into products – such that the speculative choice preferences depicted in Figure 5.1
can be estimated empirically.
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Table 5.1: Attributes, definitions and attribute-levels
Notes: * This refers to the situation where people, if properly trained, could self-administer the drug in a non-clinical setting; or otherwise, their medications will have to be
delivered to them under the supervision of qualified healthcare professional, for example, a community or district nurse. Given this set of attributes and attribute-levels, we
have a full factorial of 2,304 (= 4432) possible profiles or treatment combinations.
Attributes Definitions Levels
Method of drug administration This attribute refers to the route by which therapeutically-active drug products are
physically administered into a patient. The attribute-levels include all other “needle-
free” methods of drug administration to capture the preferences of patients who
desire oral drug delivery and/or have a fear of needles.
1. Intravenous delivery
2. Subcutaneous delivery
3. Intramuscular delivery
4. Needle-free delivery
Dosing frequency This attribute refers to the frequency of administering a drug for a single full course
of treatment. Dosing frequency associated with repeated treatments should not be
considered.
1. Once every six months
2. Once every month
3. Once every week
4. Once every day
Setting This attribute refers to place (clinical and non-clinical settings) where a given drug
is administered. Clinical settings include, for example, hospitals, outpatient clinics,
care homes, offices of general practitioners/physicians etc. Non-clinical settings
include home, schools and other public places.
1. Clinical
2. Non-clinical + self-administration*
3. Non-clinical + supervision*
Disruption to daily activities This attribute refers to how a given method of drug administration or dosing
frequency disrupts the daily activities of patients. Disruptions could be due to, for
example, repeated venepuncture and, in the extreme, immobility (hospitalization for
the sole purpose of drug administration).
1. None
2. Moderate but manageable
3. Moderate but I can’t cope
4. Severe
Risk of adverse events This attribute refers to features of drug administration that might cause discomfort
or injury to patients or health-staff administering drugs. This could be local or
generalized adverse events such as indurations; damage to nerves and blood vessels;
abscess formation around the sites of injection etc. This is separate from side-effects
of the drug molecule itself.
1. None
2. Moderate
3. Severe
Price/Cost This attribute refers to the additional time and travel costs borne out-of-pocket by
the patient each time they have to take or their medicines or it has to be given to
them by health workers.
1. £0
2. £10
3. £50
4. £100
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Table 5.2: Attributes, definitions and attribute-levels
Notes: * This refers to the situation where people, if properly trained, could self-administer the drug in a non-clinical setting; or otherwise, their medications will have to be
delivered to them under the supervision of qualified health worker, for example, a community or district nurse. For this set of attributes and attribute-levels, we have a full
factorial of 1,728 (= 4333) possible profiles or treatment combinations.
Attributes Definitions Levels
Method of drug administration This attribute refers to the route by which therapeutically-active drug products are
physically administered into a patient. The attribute-levels include “all other needle-
free” methods of drug administration to capture the preferences of patients who
desire oral drug delivery and/or have a fear of needles.
1. Intravenous delivery
2. Subcutaneous delivery
3. Intramuscular delivery
4. Needle-free delivery
Dosing frequency This attribute refers to the frequency of administering a drug for a single full course
of treatment. Dosing frequency associated with repeated treatments should not be
considered.
1. Once every six months
2. Once every month
3. Once every week
4. Once every day
Setting This attribute refers to place (clinical and non-clinical settings) where a given drug
is administered. Clinical settings include, for example, hospitals, outpatient clinics,
care homes, offices of general practitioners/physicians etc. Non-clinical settings
include home, schools and other public places.
1. Clinical
2. Non-clinical + self-administration*
3. Non-clinical + supervision*
Risk of non-compliance This attribute refers to any potential threats to medication compliance or adherence
due to a given mode or method of drug administration and/or recommended dosing
regimen. This is separate from non-compliance due to the safety profile of the drug
molecule.
1. None
2. Moderate
3. Severe
Risk of medication errors This attribute refers to the incidence of common errors of drug administration such
as drug preparation and dosing errors; substitution errors (i.e., giving the wrong
drug to the wrong patient); violation of sterile conditions when drawing up a drug;
cuts in glass ampoules and injection of minute shards of glass with the drug etc.
1. None
2. Moderate
3. Severe
Price/Cost This attribute refers to the additional resource costs (per patient per full treatment
course) incurred in administering drugs to patients.
1. $200
2. $1000
3. $3000
4. Over $3000
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5.3.2.1 Choosing an experimental design
For any DCE, one wants to choose experimental designs that offer some guarantee of
finding statistically reliable estimates of ࢼ at which the first-order Jacobian derivatives of the
log-likelihood function of the econometric model specified (to analyse the choice data yet to
be collected) is equal to zero. With appropriate coding, these experimental designs can be
described by what is called a Fisher information matrix (IM), which is equivalent to the
expected negative Hessian matrix of the second-order derivatives of the log-likelihood
function of the model chosen for estimation. The inverse of the Fisher IM gives the
asymptotic variance-covariance (AVC) matrix denoted by ષ . The off-diagonal elements of
the AVC matrix give the parameter covariances, cov(ࢼ෩). The diagonals contain the expected
parameter variance, var(ࢼ෩) – the square roots of which give the expected standard errors,
se(ࢼ෩).
If all survey respondents observe the same sequence of choice sets, the Fisher IM and
AVC matrix can be compactly defined as follows:
IMୗ(઺,܆) = −EቆS ∙ ∂ଶLLଵ(઺,܆,ܡ)∂β∂βᇱ ቇ= ܆ᇱ۾܆
ષ = −[IMୗ(઺,܆)]ିଵ = −1S ቈ∂ଶLLଵ(઺,܆,ܡ)∂β ∂βᇱ ቉ିଵ
where X is the experimental-design matrix of attributes and attribute-levels12; X' is the
transpose of X; P is a matrix containing the expected choice probabilities; and LL1 is the log-
likelihood for a single average respondent. A design is said to be statistically more efficient
than a competing design if: (1) its AVC matrix yields lower expected standard errors, se(ࢼ෩);
and/or (2) with the same choice data, it yields lower estimates of standard errors, se(ࢼ෡). The
former is often assessed by a D-efficiency criterion, which can be expressed in absolute or
relative terms. Relative D-efficiency of a design is computed as the ratio of the determinant
of its AVC matrix design to that of the AVC matrix of some optimal hypothetical design with
the largest possible determinant. Identifying a truly efficient experimental design therefore
requires prior knowledge of the unknown β parameters. So for analytical convenience, most
12 The experimental design X is constructed to have any number of rows (“runs”) but this should be greater than
or equal to the number of parameters; and the number of columns in X should be equal to the total number of
attribute-levels. The maximum number for runs is given by the product of the number of alternatives and the
number of choice sets.
(16)
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researchers assume a vector of expected coefficients ࢼ෩ comprising of zeroes13
[159],[160],[161].
The experimental designs I used for my DCEs were created from fractional-factorial
designs for estimating only main effects of the attribute-levels. This was done in SAS v. 9.3,
using a set of macros and programming codes written by Kuhfeld[162],[163] as follows. I
first used the macro “MktRuns” to gain some insights as to the appropriate number of runs,
i.e., the sizes of candidate set-designs I could use. The “MktRuns” macro suggested (among
others) the following sizes: 48 runs (= 24 choice sets), 72 runs (= 36 choice sets) and 144
runs (= 72 choice sets). I then used the macro “MkTex” to create corresponding candidate
set-designs in 48, 72 and 144 runs. Using the macro “ChoicEff”, I identified and evaluated
the statistical efficiency of the “best” experimental design containing 24 choice sets and
drawn from these candidate set-designs. To test the integrity of the experimental designs
above (since I had no prior information on theࢼ vector), I merged them with simulated
discrete-choices using the macro “MktMerge”. Given the artificial dataset created, I
estimated a “mother” MNL model using the macro “phChoice” and SAS PHREG procedure.
However, there is a trade-off here: an experimental design with the highest possible
D-efficiency may impose greater cognitive burden (task complexity) on survey respondents.
One has to balance a desire for near-optimal designs with the possibility of collecting
irrational or inconsistent choices. I therefore, using the macro “MktBlock”, partitioned the
chosen experimental design into two versions – such that each block version contained a
sequence of 12 randomly allocated choice tasks.
5.3.2.2 Sample UK general public
I found a 24 choice-set experimental design, drawn from a fractional-factorial
candidate set-design with 48 runs. This design had a relative D-efficiency of 67.54% prior to
excluding choice sets with “dominated alternatives”. Excluding these choice sets yielded a
relative D-efficiency of approximately 65%. The relative D-efficiency of another 24 choice-
set design, this time drawn from a candidate set-design with 72 runs was 57.35%. This design
13 The assumption effectively transforms the experimental design from one intended to estimate a non-linear
model into one intended for a linear econometric model. These are also referred to as utility-neutral designs as
they test a null hypothesis of no difference in the effects of attribute-levels on choice probabilities. A possible
improvement will (perhaps in a Bayesian framework) specify a vector of fixed (random) priors close to ࢼ෩. The
benefit from this is a reduced need for larger sample sizes of respondents. On the other hand, specifying the
wrong fixed priors (or wrong distributions for the random priors) could lead to significant losses in statistical
efficiency. Hence, most researchers take the “less risky strategy” of assuming ࢼ෩ = 0.
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had no choice sets with “dominated alternatives”. I also found a 24 choice-set experimental
design drawn from candidate set-design with 144 runs. This design had a relative D-
efficiency of 52.67% prior to excluding choice sets with “dominated alternatives”. Excluding
these dominated choice sets yielded a relative D-efficiency of 52.42%.
Compared with the other competing 24 choice-set designs developed from candidate
set-designs with 72 and 144 runs, the design developed from the candidate with 48 runs,
produced the lowest estimates of standard errors over all attribute-coefficients for the same
simulated choice data. It also had the highest number of statistically-significant attribute-
coefficients14. I therefore chose this design for the UK survey questionnaire.
5.3.2.3 Sample US healthcare professionals
For the questionnaire(s) aimed at US healthcare professionals, I found a 24 choice-set
experimental design drawn from a candidate set-design with 48 runs. This design had a
relative D-efficiency of 69.04% and did not appear to contain choice sets with “dominated
alternatives”. Another 24 choice-set experimental design, this time drawn from a candidate
set-design with 72 runs had a relative D-efficiency of 59.59% and contained no choice sets
with “dominated alternatives”. A similar 24 choice-set design drawn from a candidate set-
design with 144 runs had a relative D-efficiency of 52.37%. Excluding choice sets with
“dominated alternatives” yielded a relative D-efficiency of 52.24%.
I found that the 24 choice-set design drawn from a candidate set-design with 144 runs,
and having the lowest relative D-efficiency (52.24%), produced the lowest se(ࢼ෡) over all the
parameters with the same simulated choice data. However, the number of statistically-
significant parameter estimates (ࢼ෡) was the same as that of the design drawn from the
candidate set-design with 48 runs. On balance, I chose the design drawn from the candidate
set-design with 144 runs for the US survey questionnaire.
5.3.3 Survey administration
From the blocked experimental designs above, I developed two draft versions of the
survey questionnaire. Each questionnaire was split into three sections. The first section
14 Note that the simulated discrete-choices were not derived from known utility functions or a known ࢼ vector.
My interests therefore are in the robustness of the attribute-coefficients (ࢼ෡) and not how ࢼ෡ closely approximates
prior or “true” values of ࢼ. The lower standard errors and high number of statistically-significant coefficients,
obtained from the same MNL model estimated with the same simulated dataset, confirms the efficiency gain
from the chosen experimental design.
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provided a preamble with information about the purpose of the study and the hypothetical
“constructed” context in which respondents had to make their choices. It also provided
descriptions of the attributes and attribute-levels as well as an example of a completed choice
set as a guide for the survey respondents (see Figure 5.2 on page 121). The second section
contained the actual sequence of 12 choice questions or sets; and the third section collected
anonymized information on individual respondents’ characteristics. The anonymized format
of the questionnaires meant no ethical approval was required prior to administering the
surveys.
Before sending the questionnaires out, I carried out a small-scale informal pilot of the
draft versions of the questionnaires with no more than 5 people from the UK general public
(given the time and resources available for this study). The recipients of these questionnaires
were asked to check the wording of the questionnaire; to ensure that the instructions were
clear and to identify what might be perceived as implausible combination of attributes and
attribute-levels. The respondents found all combinations of attributes and attribute-levels
plausible, although some combinations may not be technologically feasible (given the current
state of manufacturing or formulation science). It took, on average, 15-20 minutes to
complete each block version of the questionnaire. Following the pilot phase, I made small
wording changes to the questionnaire to improve clarity. With the help of a commercial
vendor (Survey Monkey), the questionnaires were administered online to the intended sample
populations (i.e., people in the UK general public and healthcare professionals [doctors and
nurses] in the US selected from Survey Monkey’s database). It took roughly two weeks for
the vendor to complete the web-based surveys.
5.3.4 Sample size
According to McFadden[164], “…sample sizes which yield less than thirty responses
per alternative [good] produce estimators which cannot be analysed reliably by asymptotic
methods”. This suggested a minimum sample size of, at least, 60 respondents for each UK
and US DCE. Similarly, Lancasar et al.[165] suggest that 30 respondents per block version of
the DCE questionnaire should be adequate though post hoc analyses will require more. On
the other hand, applying Orme’s[166] formula meant, for example, a minimum of 84
respondents would be needed for the UK target population.
There are, of course, more statistically sound ways of determining the sample size for
the DCEs but these methods either (1) assume each choice task is independent of all other
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Figure 5.2: Example choice set for the UK DCE
SUBCUTANEOUS
ONCE EVERY MONTH
CLINICAL
NONE
NONE
£100
NEEDLE-FREE
ONCE EVERY DAY
NON-CLINICAL + SUPERVISION
SEVERE
MODERATE
£50
METHOD OF DRUG ADMINISTRATION
DOSING FREQUENCY
SETTING
DISRUPTION TO DAILY ACTIVITIES
RISK OF ADVERSE EVENTS
COST TO YOU
Please tick one box and move to the
next choice question √
Drug A Drug B
Please compare the drugs A and B, and indicate which one you would prefer
This person prefers drug B. This means he or she thought it better to have their medicines given to them at home under the
supervision of a health worker using a method that doesn’t involve needles – even though this means taking their medicines
more frequently. They do not seem to be concerned about disruption to their daily activities and the moderate risk of adverse
events. This is worth the cost to them. Your own preferences, of course, may be completely different from this.
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choice tasks or (2) require some prior knowledge of ࢼ to calculate either expected choice
probabilities or expected standard errors – see Rose and Bleimer[167]. I did not consider
these statistical approaches here but determined (given the resources available for this
research) that, for each UK and US survey, a sample of, at least, 200 respondents (equivalent
to 100 responses for each block version of the questionnaire) should be adequate for
meaningful statistical analyses. This sample size is consistent with recommendations made by
the ISPOR Good Research Practices for Conjoint Analysis Task Force[168].
5.3.5 Econometric modelling
On completion of the DCE survey, I checked the data collected for incomplete
sequence(s) of choices so as to avoid estimation biases due to discontinuous preferences
(“noise”) created by information overload, boredom, unfamiliarity with or lack of interest in
the survey. For the UK DCE, I found that each survey respondent completed all 12 choice
tasks. The UK dataset thus provided 10608 usable choice responses from 442 respondents. I
make no argument that this sample is representative of the UK population. A summary of the
demographic characteristics of the sample is supplied in Appendix 5A. For the US DCE, I
also found that each survey respondent completed the sequence of 12 choices. However, for
three respondents, there were missing data on some of their characteristics whilst for one
respondent I had no information on all characteristics. The US dataset thus provided 5040
usable choice responses from 210 survey respondents. As before, I make no claim that this
sample is representative of all healthcare professionals in the US. Demographic
characteristics of the estimation sample are shown in Appendix 5B. For the UK and US
surveys, I had no information on the number of people the vendor approached in order to
achieve the minimum number of respondents. It is not possible therefore to compute response
rates for the surveys although the choice data was collected from more than the minimum
number of respondents specified.
To explore plausible explanations (unobserved heterogeneity, variation in preferences,
respondent fatigue etc.) for the observed sequence of choices in the UK and US datasets, I
estimated a number of econometric models. As my starting point, I estimated a “mother”
MNL model. The IID/IIA assumption underlying this model (with normalization of the scale
parameter to one), however, is equivalent to saying that all survey respondents have the same
preferences and/or that unobserved variation around these preferences are similar. For this
reason, some researchers will argue that all estimates derived from the “mother” MNL model
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are biased. I therefore considered alternative econometric models that relax the IID/IIA
restriction.
I first considered a heteroskedastic multinomial (HMNL) model, where the scale
parameter is no longer normalized to one but considered a variable that must be estimated.
The error terms are therefore no longer IID distributed, and a typical approach is to express
the scale parameter as a function of a vector of respondents’ characteristics (Z). The
probability of an individual choosing alternative good j from among a set of competing
goods, in a given choice situation, is then given by:
P୨୬ୱ൫y୨= 1൯= exp(exp(α܈ୱ)β୨୩܆୨୩)
∑ exp(exp(α܈ୱ)β୨୩܆୨୩)୎୨ୀଵ
where α is a vector of coefficients reflecting the influence of respondents’ characteristics on
the error variance. If ߙොis not statistically different from zero, we revert back to or close to the
“mother” MNL model. If ߙොis statistically-significant different from zero, then it is possible
to exogenously determine subpopulations with somewhat identical preferences[169].
A variant of the HMNL model is the entropy multinomial (EMNL) model in which
the scale parameter is a function of entropy (E): a measure of the information content or
uncertainty represented in the probability distribution of a discrete random variable, in this
case the choice variable y. In DCE literature, entropy summarizes the impact of task
complexity or respondent fatigue due to the number of choice alternatives; the number and
correlation between attributes and attribute-levels; and similarity between the alternatives.
The relationship between the scale parameter and entropy of each choice situation can be
expressed as:
μ୬ୱ= exp(θଵE୬ୱ+ θଶE୬ୱଶ )E୬ୱ= −∑ P఩୬ୱ෢୎୨ୀଵ log൫P఩୬ୱ෢ ൯
where ఫܲ௡௦෢ is the estimated choice probability from the “mother” MNL model; ߠଵ,ߠଶ are
parameters associated with entropy. The linear term ߠଵ෢ measures deviation from maximum
entropy, i.e., completely random choices; whilst the quadratic term ߠଶ෢ identifies non-linearity
in the relationship above. The case of ߠଵ෢ > 0 indicates entropy is either offset by exertion of
more effort and/or (independent of effort) respondents’ under-estimation of the differences
(17)
(18)
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between choice alternatives. Researchers often treat the case of ߠଵ෢ < 0 and ߠଶ෢ > 0 as
indicative of respondent fatigue (declining effort) as a survey respondent works through a
sequence of choice sets[170],[171].
I also considered the mixed multinomial (MMNL) model in which ࢼ varies randomly
across individual respondents. Typically, these random coefficients are drawn from a mixture
of continuous parametric distributions denoted by (݂ߚ|ߜ), where δ refers to parameters of
that mixture distribution. Here I assumed the individual-specific non-price coefficients, that
had no statistically-significant effects in the “mother” MNL model, are normally distributed
and correlated with a price coefficient that is log-normal distributed and constrained to be
negative. This combination of random attribute-coefficients and extreme-value (Gumbel)
distributed error terms, however, means that the MMNL model cannot be solved analytically,
but approximated via Monte Carlo simulations. The choice probability for alternative good j
(out of all J goods) is then given by:
P୨୬ୱ൫y୨= 1൯= න ൥ exp(βୱ୨୩܆୨୩)
∑ exp(βୱ୨୩܆୨୩)୎୨ୀଵ ൩ୖ୰ୀଵ . f(β|δ) ∂βୱ୨୩
where R is the number of Halton replications; and ߚ௦௝௞is the rth draw from (݂ߚ|ߜ)[172].
Finally, I considered a latent-class multinomial (LCMNL) model that assumes
attribute-coefficients are drawn from a mixture of non-parametric discrete distributions,
representing C latent classes of homogenous subpopulations. It is not known a priori which
latent class an individual belongs to – so rather than assume fixed class membership, the
probability of class membership (ߨ) can be estimated as:
πୡୱ(γ) = exp(ߥ௖+ γୡ܈ୱ)1 + ∑ exp(ߥ௖+ γୡ܈ୱ)େିଵୡୀଵ
where ∑ ߨ௖஼௖ୀଵ = 1, the vector ߛ(= ߛଵ,ߛଶ, … ,ߛ஼) refers to the effect of individuals’
characteristics on class membership, and ߥ௖ is a vector of class-specific constants[173].
Unconditional on class membership, the probability (P*) of observing the sequence of N
choices that an individual respondent makes is given by:
P∗(y୒ୱ = 1) = ෍ πୡୱෑ ෑ ൭ exp(βୡ୨୩܆୨୩)
∑ exp(βୡ୨୩܆୨୩)୎୨ୀଵ ൱୷౩
୎
୨ୀଵ
୒
୬ୀଵ
େ∗
ୡୀଵ
(19)
(20)
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where the “optimal” number of latent classes C* is determined by: (1) estimating a series of
LCMNL models with different numbers of latent classes; (2) choosing the preferred model
using the lowest consistent Akaike Information Criterion [cAIC] and/or Bayes Information
Criterion [BIC]; and (3) making judgements on the trade-off between improved log-
likelihoods and increase in standard errors (loss in precision) of the attribute-coefficients as
the number of latent-classes gets large.
I estimated the models in STATA v. 11 using the attribute-based (X) and respondent-
characteristics (Z) variables in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 below. The respondent-characteristics
variables are those in the shaded regions of Tables 5.3 and 5.4. Following Bech and Gyrd-
Hansen[174], the values of the explanatory variables reflect “effects coding” rather than 0-1
dummies.
(21)
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Table 5.3: Explanatory variables for the UK sample
Variables Definitions (Effects coding)
INTRAVENOUS = 1 if a drug is administered intravenously (1, 0, 0, -1)
SUBCUTANEOUS = 1 if a drug is administered subcutaneously (0, 1, 0, -1)
INTRAMUSCULAR = 1 if a drug is administered intramuscularly (0, 0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) is administration via needle-free routes
DOSFREQ Continuous variable referring to the number of unit administrations over a one year period.
NONCLINICAL_SELF = 1 if a drug is self-administered in non-clinical settings (1, 0, -1)
NONCLINICAL_SUPV = 1 if a drug is administered in non-clinical settings under the supervision of a qualified healthcare professional (0, 1, -1). The reference
category (-1) is drug administration in clinical settings
DDA_MODERATE1 = 1 if a given mode of administration is associated with moderate but manageable disruption to respondents’ daily activities (1, 0, 0, -1)
DDA_MODERATE2 = 1 if a given mode of drug administration is associated with moderate disruptions to daily activities that a respondent cannot cope with
(0, 1, 0, -1)
DDA_SEVERE = 1 if a given mode of drug administration is associated with severe disruption to the respondent’s daily activities (0, 0, 1, -1). The
reference category (-1) is a mode of administration that carries no risk of disruption to patients’ daily activities
RAE_MODERATE = 1 if the risk of adverse events associated with a given mode of drug administration is moderate (1, 0, -1)
RAE_SEVERE = 1 if the risk of adverse events associated with a given mode of drug administration is severe (0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) is
drug delivery that is associated with no risk of adverse events
PRICE (COST) Continuous variable indicating the time and travel costs borne by patients per unit administration
A Alternative-specific constant = 1 for drug option A (1, -1). The reference point, drug option B = -1
FEMALE = 1 if survey respondent is female (1, -1). The reference category (-1) are males
RESPONDENTAGE Continuous variable indicating the age of a survey respondent
VOCATIONAL = 1 if the highest level of education attained by a respondent is vocational training (1, 0, -1)
GCSEs_O+A = 1 if the highest level of education attained by a respondent is GCSEs O’ and A’ levels (0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) are
respondents with “higher education”
EMPLOYED = 1 if respondent is employed (1, -1). The reference category (-1) are those who are currently unemployed
INCOME_1 = 1 if respondent’s annual household income is under £15,000 (1, 0, 0, 0, -1)
INCOME_2 = 1 if respondent’s annual household income is between £15,000 and £29,999 (0, 1, 0, 0, -1)
INCOME_3 = 1 if respondent’s annual household income is between £30,000 and £49,999 (0, 0, 1, 0, -1)
INCOME_4 = 1 if respondent’s annual household income is between £50,000 and £75,000 (0, 0, 0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) are
respondents with annual household income in excess of £75,000
PRIOR_ ILLNESS = 1 if a survey respondent had received medical treatment under the advice or guidance of a qualified health worker over the past year
(1, -1). The reference category (-1) are those who remained healthy over the past year
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Table 5.4: Explanatory variables for the US sample
Variables Definitions (Effects coding)
INTRAVENOUS = 1 if a drug is administered intravenously (1,0, 0, -1)
SUBCUTANEOUS = 1 if a drug is administered subcutaneously (0, 1, 0, -1)
INTRAMUSCULAR = 1 if a drug is administered intramuscularly (0, 0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) is administration via needle-free routes
DOSFREQ Continuous variable referring to the number of unit administrations over a one year period.
NONCLINICAL_SELF = 1 if a drug is self-administered in non-clinical settings (1, 0, -1)
NONCLINICAL_SUPV = 1 if a drug is administered in non-clinical settings under the supervision of a qualified healthcare professional (0, 1, -1). The
reference category (-1) is drug administration in clinical settings
NONCOMP_MODERATE = 1 if the risk of patient non-compliance associated with a given mode of drug administration is moderate (1, 0, -1)
NONCOMP_SEVERE = 1 if the risk of patient non-compliance associated with a given mode or method of drug administration is severe (0, 1, -1).
The reference category (-1) is drug delivery that is associated with no risk of non-compliance
RME_MODERATE = 1 if the risk of medication errors made by health staff or by patients self-administering is moderate (1, 0, -1)
RME_SEVERE = 1 if the risk of medication errors made by health staff or by patients self-administering is severe (0, 1, -1). The reference
category (-1) is drug delivery that is associated with no risk of medication errors
PRICE (COST) This refers to the cost of resources expended on drug administration per patient per single full treatment course over a year. It
excludes drug acquisition costs
A Alternative-specific constant (intercept) = 1 for the drug A option. The reference point, drug option B = -1
FEMALE = 1 if survey respondent is female. The reference category (-1) are males
RESPONDENTAGE Continuous variable indicating the age of a survey respondent
SOLO = 1 if a respondent works in a solo medical practice (1, 0, 0, 0, -1)
GOVERNMENT = 1 if a respondent works in a government-run healthcare institution (0, 1, 0, 0 , -1)
PRIVATE-FOR-PROFIT = 1 if a respondent works in a private-for-profit healthcare institution (0, 0, 1, 0, -1)
NON-FOR-PROFIT = 1 if a respondent works in a non-for-profit healthcare institution (0, 0, 0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) are respondents
who work in all other healthcare institutions not mentioned above
INPATIENTS = 1 if a respondent caters for inpatients (1, 0, 0, -1)
OUTPATIENTS = 1 if a respondent caters for out-patients (0, 1, 0, -1)
EMERGENCY = 1 if a respondent caters for patients in accident and emergency departments (0, 0, 1, -1). The reference category (-1) are
respondents who cater for all other kinds of patients
ENC = 1 if a respondent’s healthcare institution is located in the East North Central census region (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1)
ESC = 1 if a respondent’s healthcare institution is located in the East South Central census region (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1)
MA = 1 if a respondent’s healthcare institution is located in the Middle Atlantic census region (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1)
Mo = 1 if a respondent’s healthcare institution is located in the Mountain census region (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1)
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NE = 1 if a respondent’s healthcare institution is located in the New England census region (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, -1)
PA = 1 if a respondent’s healthcare institution is located in the Pacific census region (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, -1)
WNC = 1 if a respondent’s healthcare institution is located in the West North Central census region (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, -1)
WSC = 1 if a respondent’s healthcare institution is located in the West South Central census region (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, -1). The
reference category (-1) are respondents who work in healthcare institutions located in the South Atlantic census region
Notes: I control for the location of respondents’ healthcare institution to address the possibility that the level and rise in healthcare expenditures (and for that matter resources
spent on drug administration) may differ across US census regions.
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5.3.6 Measuring patient benefits
The outputs of the models above allow us to compute, first, the marginal willingness-
to-pay (MWTP) for a given change in an attribute (level) or a bundle of attributes. MWTP is
the marginal rate of substitution between the non-monetary attributes (singly or in a bundle)
and the price/cost attribute – assuming there is only one good available that will be chosen
with a 100% certainty. The MWTP෣ for a single non-monetary attribute = −β୩෢ β୮෢ൗ . Classical
confidence intervals were generated using 100 bootstrap replicates of MWTP෣ . Admittedly, a
higher number of replicates is needed for more precise estimation but I prefer this procedure
as: (1) it is computationally less demanding; (2) it uses actual data from respondents without
making parametric assumptions about the distribution of MWTP෣ [175]; and (3) it is
compatible with all STATA estimators for the HMNL, EMNL, MMNL and LCMNL models.
Second, I estimated the incremental welfare gain or loss from switching (changing)
from one good to another using the expected compensating variation (ECV). This is a more
valid measure of welfare benefits when there is uncertainty about which good will be chosen.
For discrete-choice probabilities estimated using an MNL-type model, ECV is formally
computed as follows:
ECV෢ = −1
λ෠
቎ln෍ exp(V఩଴෢ )୎
୨ୀଵ
− ln෍ exp(V఩ଵ෢ )୎
୨ୀଵ
቏
where λ is the marginal utility of income proxied by the negative coefficient of the price/cost 
attribute; and the superscripts 0 and 1 denote the conditions before and after the change
(switch). The log-sum expressions or “inclusive values” in the brackets effectively weight the
systematic utilities by the probability that an alternative good will be chosen in each state.
Analogous to a change in consumer surplus, ECV measures the amount of money that will
have to be extracted from an individual for them to remain indifferent between the initial (0)
and final (1) states[176],[177],[178].
For an example of valuing “product innovations” using this ECV metric, see
Trajtenberg’s [179] work on computed axial tomography scanners. Here the “product
innovation” is different modes of drug administration – and the reported ECV estimates
provide a single-period monetary value of what might be considered “intangible benefits” of
giving end-users what they want in terms of the mode of drug delivery. I did not consider
intertemporal flows of benefits: my ECV estimates are not expressed in discounted present
(22)
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values. But from Chapter 4 and previous work[139], we know there are potential savings in
administration costs from reformulating or reverse-engineering a drug product. To ascertain
whether these “intangible” benefits are of any significant importance, I compared the ECV
estimates with predicted administration cost savings of switching from one mode of drug
delivery to another.
5.4. Results
5.4.1 Sample UK general public
5.4.1.1 Choice probability
Table 5.5 shows the results from the econometric modelling. Given that I employed a
forced-choice format for the survey with only two alternatives, I could not perform a
Hausman-McFadden[180] statistical test for the IID/IIA assumption underlying the MNL
model. However, the different results obtained from HMNL, EMNL15, MMNL and LCMNL
models suggest that the IID/IIA assumption would have been violated. The HMNL and
EMNL models indicate non-constant error terms, whilst the MMNL and LCMNL models
indicate variation in observed preferences across the survey respondents. Based on the log-
likelihoods and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the LCMNL model with two latent
classes16 offers the best model fit to the UK choice data. That is to say, preference variation
in the dataset can be conveniently represented by two homogenous subgroups of respondents.
The chances that any individual belongs to the first subgroup (latent-class 1) is determined by
age, gender, and educational attainment.
That said, the other models provide useful insights on the choice behaviour of
respondents. For example, a Lagrangian Multiplier test for heteroskedastic errors in the
15 Because the measure of entropy is derived from choice probabilities predicted from the MNL model, it is in
effect an “endogenous” explanatory variable that might bias the coefficients of the EMNL model. In Table 5.5,
one observes that, even if these coefficients are biased, they are consistent with that of the MNL and HMNL
models. What is more, the primary purpose of the EMNL model is to assess respondents’ (fatigued) reactions to
the choice tasks, i.e., we are interested mostly in equation (18) and not equation (17).
16 In determining C*, I estimated a number of LCMNL models with 2-10 latent-classes. To increase the speed of
computation, I estimated these models without the Z variables in the class-membership function, i.e., equation
(20). I found the closest competitor to the LCMNL with two-classes (cAIC = 5522.461, BIC = 5495.461) was an
LCMNL with four classes (cAIC = 5528.196, BIC = 5473.196). I chose the two-class LCMNL model on the
basis of precision loss in the estimated coefficients: the fourth latent-class of the LCMNL model with four-
classes had no statistically-significant coefficients.
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HMNL model showed statistically-significant unobserved variation that is explained mostly
by gender and education status17. This is not surprising as these respondent characteristics are
well-known determinants of how (imperfectly) informed people are. Likewise, a Lagrangian
Multiplier test for heteroskedastic errors in the EMNL model showed statistically-significant
unobserved variation. However, the statistically-insignificant entropy parameters (θଵ෢ , θଶ෢ ) of
the EMNL model, with θଵ෢ > 0, suggested that respondent fatigue (perhaps offset by
“learning effects”) could be ignored as plausible explanations for the sequence of choices
observed.
Focusing on the results of the LCMNL model, I observed that, conditional on
membership of latent-class 1, the average or representative survey respondent is indifferent to
needle-free modes of drug administration when compared with intravenous or subcutaneous
routes conditional on the other attributes. Respondents are indifferent in the sense that the
coefficients for variables for intravenous and subcutaneous modes of administration were not
statistically different from zero. I interpret this to mean respondents are informed enough to
know that, in some disease states, needle-free routes may not be the best or a feasible method
of drug administration. On the other hand, respondents, on average, show a negative
preference for intramuscular modes of drug delivery when compared with needle-free routes,
perhaps because of the pain involved. Similarly, I observed a negative preference for drug
administration modes that involve higher dosing frequency albeit the magnitude of the effect
was “small” and close to zero. I observed also a positive preference for self-administration
within a non-clinical setting and a negative statistically-insignificant preference for drug
administration in non-clinical settings under supervision. A probable explanation for this
result is that if administering a drug requires supervision by a qualified healthcare
professional, then one might be better off having the drug administered in a clinical setting.
17 Not reported in Table 5.5, for brevity reasons, is that coefficient for age = 0.010 (p value < 0.001) and that for
employment status = -0.091 (p value < 0.05) are statistically-significant contributors to unobserved
heterogeneity in choices. Other respondents’ characteristics: prior illness within the past year and household-
income were only statistically-significant at the 10% level.
132
Table 5.5: Econometric results
Dependent variable: CHOICE PROBABILITY
MNL model HMNL model EMNL model MMNL model LCMNL model
Variables/ Coefficients: β෠(SE) β෠(SE) β෠(SE) βୱ෢ (SE) β෠ଵ(SE) β෠ଶ(SE)
INTRAVENOUS -0.011 (0.091) 0.005 (0.057) 0.017 (0.042) -0.026 (0.110) -0.119 (0.439) 0.021 (0.123)
SUBCUTANEOUS 0.021 (0.043) 0.016 (0.027) 0.002 (0.019) -0.016 (0.049) -0.073 (0.130) 0.070 (0.060)
INTRAMUSCULAR -0.136 (0.049)** -0.090 (0.031)** -0.111 (0.037)** -0.123 (0.053)* -0.560 (0.210)** -0.219 (0.064)***
DOSFREQ -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.0005 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)** -0.001 (0.000)*** -0.003 (0.001)*** -0.001 (0.000)**
NONCLINICAL_SELF 0.167 (0.037)*** 0.108 (0.025)*** 0.112 (0.038)** 0.210 (0.039)*** 0.424 (0.128)*** 0.146 (0.045)**
NONCLINICAL_SUPV -0.122 (0.028)*** -0.078 (0.019)*** -0.067 (0.025)** -0.120 (0.030)*** -0.124 (0.093) -0.098 (0.037)**
DDA_MODERATE1 0.391 (0.033)*** 0.239 (0.033)*** 0.214 (0.074)** 0.437 (0.038)*** 1.210 (0.150)*** 0.264 (0.050)***
DDA_MODERATE2 -0.267 (0.042)*** -0.171 (0.032)*** -0.167 (0.059)** -0.300 (0.046)*** -1.058 (0.141)*** -0.075 (0.061)
DDA_SEVERE -0.525 (0.039)*** -0.336 (0.044)*** -0.308 (0.103)** -0.588 (0.044)*** -1.376 (0.184)*** -0.324 (0.057)***
RAE_MODERATE 0.169 (0.034)*** 0.108 (0.024)*** 0.111 (0.041)** 0.212 (0.038)*** 0.522 (0.141)*** 0.067 (0.043)
RAE_SEVERE -0.743 (0.039)*** -0.461 (0.056)*** -0.406 (0.138)** -0.869 (0.044)*** -2.342 (0.215)*** -0.204 (0.059)***
PRICE (COST) -0.008 (0.001)*** -0.005 (0.001)*** -0.004 (0.001)** -0.0118 (0.040)*** -0.012 (0.002)*** -0.008 (0.001)***
A -0.054 (0.054) -0.033 (0.034) 0.002 (0.025) -0.037 (0.066) 0.370 (0.274) -0.122 (0.073)!
Entropy(θଵ෢ , θଶ෢ ) ― ― (1.026, 0.717) ― ―  
ߙො଴(FEMALE) ― 0.170 (0.035)*** ― ― ―  
ߙොଵ(VOCATIONAL) ― -0.230 (0.085)** ― ― ―  
ߙොଶ(GCSEs_O+A) ― -0.199 (0.054)*** ― ― ―  
ߨො௖ ― ― ― ― 0.492 0.508 
ߛො௖(VOCATIONAL) ― ― ― ― -0.892 (0.324)** —
ߛො௖(GCSEs_O+A) ― ― ― ― 0.577 (0.203)** —
ߛො௖(FEMALE) — — — — 0.285 (0.122)* —
ߛො௖(RESPONDENTAGE) 0.024 (0.009)**
Model statistics
Log-likelihood (AIC) -2855.3566
(5736.713)
-2812.1903
(5670.381)
-2837.9705
(5670.381)
-2782.5096
(5611.019)
-2652.879
(5379.757)
Notes: SE = standard error. For the HMNL and LCMNL models, I report selected effects of individuals’ characteristics on the scale-parameter and latent-class membership. MMNL
model was estimated using 500 Halton draws with correlated normally-distributed coefficients for the variables A, INTRAVENOUS and SUBCUTANEOUS and a log-normal
distribution for the price coefficient. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 ! p < 0.10. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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The results show a positive preference for “moderate but manageable” disruptions to
daily activities and a negative preference for “severe” or “moderate but unmanageable”
disruptions to daily activities. This suggests that respondents did take into account the
hypothetical nature of the choice tasks: although possible (in the future), a mode of drug
administration that is associated with zero disruption to daily activities may not be currently
available or technologically feasible. Similarly, I observed a positive preference for modes of
drug administration associated with a “moderate” risk of adverse events and a negative
preference for modes of drug administration associated with “severe” risk of adverse events.
Again, I observed, on average, some kind of mental accounting of the fact that a mode of
drug delivery that has a zero risk of adverse events may not be available or technologically
feasible. For individuals belonging to latent-class 1, the coefficient for the alternative-
specific-constant A is not statistically significant albeit the magnitude of the coefficient
suggests a skewed preference for drug option A (holding all other attributes and attribute-
levels the same).
Conditional on membership of latent-class 2, I observed similar choice patterns with
the following exceptions: the coefficients of the variables for moderate disruptions-to-daily-
activities and moderate risks of adverse events are not statistically significant. That
respondents belonging to latent-class 2 are indifferent to the reference category for these
attribute-levels, provides further support to the argument that respondents may have, in their
decision choices, considered that drug delivery modes with zero disruptions to their daily
activities and/or zero risk of adverse events are perhaps unavailable even though they are
desirable. The magnitudes of the coefficients of the variables for intravenous and
subcutaneous administration indicate a positive preference for these modes of drug
administration relative to needle-free routes of administration. But since these effects are not
statistically different from zero, I maintain the argument that respondents are generally
indifferent to the choice between needle-free and intravenous/subcutaneous routes of drug
administration. Also the negative sign for the alternative-specific constant A suggests a
tendency to choose alternative drug option B (holding all other attributes and attribute-levels
the same). The effect is, however, only significant at the 10% level.
For both latent-classes, I observed a small but statistically-significant coefficient for
the price/ cost attribute. This suggests that UK survey respondents have price inelastic
“demands” for the attributes of drug administration investigated in response to any (out-of-
pocket) costs of accessing healthcare. This probably reflects two things. One, the fact that the
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UK NHS provides tax-funded insurance protection against the financial risks of ill health;
and two, that the costs in question are by and large ‘unavoidable’: without spending resources
on some form of a vehicle for administering a drug, patients will be unable to realize the
(incremental) health benefits offered by that drug.
5.4.1.2 Patient benefits
Table 5.6 shows estimates of the MWTP for each of the non-price attributes studied
and the associated confidence intervals around these estimates. A positive MWTP෣ indicates a
preference for an attribute taking into account the associated price/cost, whilst a
negative MWTP෣ indicates a dispreference for an attribute net of the associated price/cost. As
observed in Table 5.6, there are subtle differences in the MWTP estimates obtained from the
different econometric models. I focussed on estimates from the LCMNL model as this
provided the best fit with the choice data collected. This shows a statistically significant and
substantial willingness-to-pay for drug delivery modes that are associated with “moderate”
disruption to daily activities and “moderate” risk of adverse events. There is also a
statistically-significant and substantial willingness-to-pay to avoid drug delivery modes that
are associated with “moderate but unmanageable” or “severe” disruptions to daily activities.
Similarly, there is a statistically significant and substantial willingness-to-pay to avoid drug
delivery modes that are associated with “moderate” risk of adverse events. Further, there is a
statistically-significant and substantial willingness-to-pay to avoid the intramuscular route.
To evaluate the welfare change, i.e., the “intangible benefits” from manufacturing
drugs in a patient-friendly manner, I considered the following. A given biologic drug C can
be manufactured in two ways (C1 and C2). Assume, as in the survey, that both versions of the
drug have the same molecule, efficacy and safety profile. In option C1, the drug can be
manufactured for intravenous administration in clinical settings, and this mode of drug
delivery is associated with “severe” risk of adverse events and “severe” disruptions to
patients’ daily activities. Option C2 is where a drug is manufactured for subcutaneous self-
administration in non-clinical settings and this mode of drug delivery is associated with
“moderate” risk of adverse events and “moderate” disruptions to patients’ daily activities. In
this case, one can compute the expected compensating variation (ECV෢ ) using equation (22).
Since household-income categories had no statistically-significant effect on class
membership in the preferred LCMNL model, I do not differentiate ECV෢ by household-income
category.
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Table 5.6: Marginal willingness-to-pay estimates
Notes: The 95% CIs above are “standard or classical confidence intervals” calculated using 100 bootstrapped replicates of MWTP. This is because accurate, less-erratic and reliable
“bootstrap confidence intervals” require replications in the order of 1000, which would have been computationally demanding and time consuming [181]. The confidence intervals reported
are therefore not exact.
MNL model HMNL model EMNL model MMNL model LCMNL model
Variables: MWTP෣ (95% CI) MWTP෣ (95% CI) MWTP෣ (95% CI) MWTP෣ (95% CI) MWTP෣ (95% CI)
INTRAVENOUS -2.123 (-4.089, -0.156) 1.169 (-0.742, 3.080) 3.433 (1.726, 5.139) 2.311 (-2.864, 7.485) 5.848 (-50.374, 62.070)
SUBCUTANEOUS 2.347 (1.374, 3.320) 2.600 (1.576, 3.625) 0.226 (-0.516, 1.027) -8.325 (-10.307, -6.343) 2.417 (-7.759, 12.593)
INTRAMUSCULAR -17.433 (-18.645, -16.222) -19.192 (-20.413, -17.971) -26.079 (-27.152, -25.006) -9.385 (-10.997, -7.773) -40.634 (-72.472, -8.796)
DOSFREQ -0.082 (-0.086, -0.078) -0.090 (-0.094, -0.085) -0.123 (-0.127, -0.119) -0.098 (-0.104, -0.092) -0.234 (-0.296, -0.172)
NONCLINICAL_SELF 21.448 (20.508, 22.389) 22.412 (21.478, 23.345) 26.354 (25.548, 27.160) 31.005 (29.869, 32.141) 28.569 (21.401, 35.738)
NONCLINICAL_SUPV -15.446 (-16.061, -14.830) -15.738 (-16.362, -15.114) -15.456 (-15.950, -14.961) -19.828 (-20.639, -19.016) -15.532 (-26.038, -5.025)
DDA_MODERATE1 50.090 (48.912, 51.267) 49.397 (48.147, 50.647) 50.144 (49.015, 51.273) 58.883 (57.652, 60.114) 84.705 (67.590, 101.819)
DDA_MODERATE2 -33.997 9-35.148, -32.847) -35.239 (-36.507, -33.970) -38.860 (-39.891, -37.829) -43.131 (-44.347, -41.915) -58.841 (-72.278, -45.404)
DDA_SEVERE -66.363 (-67.738, -64.987) -68.641 (-70.141, -67.141) -71.549 (-72.795, -70.303) -73.642 (-75.149, -72.136) -94.502 (-117.906, -71.097)
RAE_MODERATE 22.060 (21.196, 22.923) 22.636 (21.744, 23.529) 26.368 (25.594, 27.142) 30.318 (29.226, 31.410) 23.492 (17.286, 29.699)
RAE_SEVERE -66.363 (-67.738, -64.987) -68.641 (-70.141, 67.141) -71.549 (-72.795, -70.303) -73.642 (-75.149, -72.136) -94.502 (-117.906, -71.097)
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Based on the MNL model, switching from option C1 to C2 yields a welfare gain (ECV෢
per patient per unit administration) of -£296 (95 % CI: -£302 to -£289). Based on the MMNL
model, ECV෢ is: -£364 (95% CI: -£370 to -£358)18. Based on the LCMNL model with two
latent-classes, and unconditional on class membership, I obtained ECV෢ of -£435 (95% CI: -
£524 to -£349). The negative sign reflects the fact that ECV is the amount of money that has
to be taken from the state of having option C2 so that the average respondent will be
indifferent to option C1. Also, with the UK choice data, failing to control for preference
heterogeneity in the MNL model leads to an underestimation of welfare change. The
difference in ECV෢ from the MMNL and LCMNL models most likely reflects differences in
the assumed distributions for preference heterogeneity.
Figure 5.3: Sample distribution of ECV estimates
Notes: ECV෢ refers to the welfare change of switching from drug option C1 to C2. The plots are based on 100
bootstrapped estimates of ECV. Large positive and negative ECV෢ outliers from the LCMNL model have been
trimmed out to visually enhance comparability with the other models.
18 The price/cost coefficient reported in Table 5.5 for the MMNL model (β୮෢ ) was derived from ln൫β୮෢ ൯using the
following retransformation: β୮෢ = exp(ln൫β୮෢ ൯+ 0.5SEଶ). This, however, assumes the individual ln൫β୮෢ ൯
recovered from the UK dataset are normally-distributed with a constant variance. If this assumption doesn’t
hold, one obtains a biased and less consistent retransformed price coefficient, as reported in Table 5.5.
Therefore, in computing C1→C2 welfare change, I used the price coefficient from an unreported MMNL model 
(log-likelihood = -2827.52) with a normally-distributed price coefficient (β୮෢ = 0.0085) as this figure is
comparable with the price coefficients from the other models.
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Figure 5.3 shows the kernel density plots of the distribution of ECV෢ from 100
bootstrap replications using the results from the MNL, MMNL and LCMNL models. The
distribution plots for the models overlap. This is reassuring as the models make different
assumptions: homogenous preferences in the case of the MNL model and individual
preference heterogeneity in the case of the MMNL and LCMNL models. The wider spread of
the kernel density plot of ECV෢ derived from the LCMNL model (relative to the MNL or
MMNL models) is perhaps because the LCMNL estimates are based on the average
coefficients over the two-latent classes (with weights given by the probability of latent-class
membership). Hence if the probabilities of class-membership do not remain constant or fixed
for each of the 100 bootstrap samples, one would obtain a lot more variation in ECV෢ than if
(fortuitously) each bootstrap sample has the same class-membership probabilities as reported
in Table 5.5. That is, if the proportion of individuals belonging to each of the latent classes
does not vary from one bootstrap sample to the other.
5.4.1.3 Patient benefits versus cost savings to the NHS
How do the ECV estimates compare with the direct monetary savings on drug
administration costs? To answer this question, one needs to compute savings on the direct
administration costs of switching from drug C1 to C2 using the regression-based algorithm
described in Chapter 4. See also Tetteh and Morris[139]. I made the following additional
assumptions: (1) both drugs C1 and C2 are indicated for management of a chronic illness; (2)
product C2 is sold bundled with some of the equipment and consumables used in drug
administration; and (3) a single full treatment course of C1 over a year requires 10 unit
administrations whilst a single full treatment course of C2 requires 5 unit administrations
over a year.
The comparison can be made as follows:
݈݊ ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ஼ଵ෣
= 7.1499 − 3.2026(0) − 5.2737(0) + .428(10) + .404(0) − .2896(1)
− .00106(10ଶ) − .3173(10)(1)
ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ෣ ஼ଵ = exp(7.8613) • ɸ෡(= 1.0792) = £2800.41
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݈݊ ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ஼ଶ෣
= 7.1499 − 3.2026(1) − 5.2737(0) + .428(5) + .404(1) − .2896(1)
− .00106(5ଶ) − .3173(5)(1)
ܣܦܯ ܰܫ ܥܱܵܶ ஼ଶ෣ = exp(4.6099) • ɸ෡(= 1.3799) = £138.64
where ɸ෡ = 1.0792 and 1.3799 are the subgroup-specific smearing factors for intravenous and
subcutaneous products respectively.
Assuming the same price per given dose, this yields a cost saving of roughly £2662
per patient per year or an average cost saving of £532 per patient per unit administration of
C2 (relative to C1). This is comparable to the absolute value of ECV෢ : £435 derived from the
LCMNL model.
5.4.2 Sample US healthcare professionals
5.4.2.1 Choice probability
Table 5.7 above shows the results from my econometric analyses. Given the forced
choice format with two alternative options, I could not conduct a Hausman-McFadden [180]
test for the IID/IIA assumption underlying the MNL model. However, I found that the bias
introduced by the IID/IIA assumption is not the great (see below). Based on the log-
likelihoods and AIC, the LCMNL model (with C* = 2) offers the best fit to the US choice
data. Further support for the LCMNL model is provided by similarity with results for the
MMNL model.
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Table 5.7: Model outputs
Dependent variable: CHOICE PROBABILITY
MNL model HMNL model EMNL model MMNL model LCMNL model
Variables/ Coefficients: β෠(SE) β෠(SE) β෠(SE) βୱ෢ (SE) β෠ଵ(SE) β෠ଶ(SE)
INTRAVENOUS 0.261 (0.291) 0.146 (0.217) 0.129 (0.151) 0.149 (0.351) 0.343 (0.386) 1.612 (1.046)
SUBCUTANEOUS 0.519 (0.103)*** 0.401 (0.103)*** 0.222 (0.244) 0.453 (0.120)*** 0.740 (0.141)*** 0.125 (0.354)
INTRAMUSCULAR -0.111 (0.105) -0.063 (0.079) -0.053 (0.059) -0.200 (0.124) -0.259 (0.145)! -0.231 (0.376)
DOSFREQ -0.003 (0.000)*** -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.000)*** -0.004 (0.000)*** -0.002 (0.001)
NONCLINICAL_SELF 0.442 (0.056)*** 0.322 (0.073)*** 0.197 (0.183) 0.481 (0.060)*** 0.513 (0.067)*** 0.429 (0.189)*
NONCLINICAL_SUPV -0.097 (0.050)! -0.059 (0.039) -0.043 (0.045) -0.127 (0.056)* -0.060 (0.063) -0.439 (0.170)**
NONCOMP_MODERATE -0.070 (0.050) -0.044 (0.039) -0.021 (0.037) -0.143 (0.064)* -0.077 (0.067) -0.111 (0.131)
NONCOMP_SEVERE -0.200 (0.045)*** -0.149 (0.043)*** -0.083 (0.091) -0.120 (0.052)* -0.337 (0.065)*** 0.205 (0.143)
RME_MODERATE 0.006 (0.052) -0.003 (0.040) 0.006 (0.022) 0.042 (0.071) -0.170 (0.072)* 0.521 (0.143)***
RME_SEVERE -0.339 (0.041)*** -0.260 (0.061)*** -0.145 (0.155) -0.445 (0.046)*** -0.075 (0.052) -1.528 (0.206)***
PRICE (COST) -0.00006 (0.000)*** -0.00004 (0.000)*** -0.00002 (0.000) -0.0006 (0.0028)* -0.00006 (0.000)*** -0.00005 (0.000)***
A -0.329 (0.092)*** -0.236 (0.080)** -0.146 (0.145) -0.323 (0.108)** -0.418 (0.124)*** -0.696 (0.322)*
Entropy(θଵ෢ , θଶ෢ ) ― ― (3.748, -3.781) ― ―  
ߙො଴(PRIVATE-FOR-PROFIT) ― 0.210 (0.098)* ― ― ―  
ߙොଵ(NON-FOR-PROFIT) ― 0.269 (0.100)** ― ― ―  
ߙොଶ(INPATIENTS) ― -0.191 (0.092)* ― ― ―  
ߙොଷ(MA) ― 0.254 (0.125)* ― ― ―  
ߨො௖ ― ― ― ― 0.718 0.282 
ߛො௖(INPATIENTS) ― ― ― ― 0.820 (0.360)*
Model statistics
Log-likelihood (AIC) -1446.647
(2917.293)
-1416.264
(2888.527)
-1445.726†
(2919.453)
-1399.013
(2852.026)
-1325.1643
(2732.328)
Notes: SE = standard error. For the HMNL and LCMNL models, I report selected results of the effects of individuals’ characteristics on the scale-parameter and latent-class
membership. MMNL model was estimated using 500 Halton draws with correlated normally-distributed coefficients for the variables: INTRAVENOUS, INTRAMUSCULAR,
NONCOMP_MODERATE and RME_MODERATE; and a log-normal distribution for the price coefficient. *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 ! p < 0.10. AIC = Akaike Information
Criterion. MA = Middle-Atlantic census region. †Chi-square test for the log-likelihood ratio (for a comparison with the MNL model as the null) failed to reach statistical significance.
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That said the HMNL and EMNL models provide additional insights as to the nature of
the choices observed. First, note that the coefficients of the HMNL model are quite similar to
that of the MNL model, whilst a Lagrangian Multiplier test for heteroskedasticity indicated
statistically insignificant unobserved heterogeneity (p value = 0.1064). This preference
certainty or minimal residual unobserved variance appears to be explained by whether US
healthcare professionals work in private-for-profit or not-for-profit healthcare institutions,
and whether they cater for inpatient healthcare demands. It also appears to be explained by
whether a given healthcare professional works in the Middle-Atlantic census region as
opposed to the South-Atlantic census region (which is the reference category).
Second, note the loss of statistical significance of the attribute-coefficients obtained
from the EMNL model. A possible reason is the statistically-insignificant heteroskedasticity
identified from the HMNL model. We know from equation (4) that the EMNL model
estimates a quadratic relationship between the scale parameter and a measure of entropy
(which indicates the degree of randomness or “unlikeliness” of the choice dataset). It appears
that, in the presence of statistically-insignificant unobserved heterogeneity, the EMNL model
fails to identify appreciable entropy within the US choice data. Consequently, the EMNL
model does not significantly fit the data better than the MNL model: a chi-square test for the
log-likelihood ratio failed to reach statistical significance (p value = 0.3984) – although all
parameters of the EMNL model are identified. In addition, a Lagrangian Multiplier test for
error heteroskedasticity in the EMNL model indicated statistically-insignificant unobserved
heterogeneity. These findings, plus the statistically insignificant entropy parameters (θଵ෢ , θଶ෢ ),
mean we can safely ignore any appreciable respondent-fatigue effects.
Put together, the HMNL and EMNL models suggest almost deterministic (more
consistent) choices are made by US healthcare professionals, which is perhaps not surprising
considering they are meant to act as informed, near-perfect agents on behalf of their patient
populations.
Focusing on the LCMNL model, I observed that, conditional on membership of
latent-class 1, the average or representative respondent was indifferent to the choice between
intravenous and needle-free modes of drug administration. (Holding all else equal, the
coefficient of the variables for intravenous administration was not statistically significant.)
The results suggested a positive preference for subcutaneous modes of drug administration
and a negative preference for intramuscular drug delivery – albeit the latter is only
statistically significant at the 10% level. I observed a negative preference for drug delivery
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modes that involve high dosing frequency although the magnitude of this effect is small. Note
also the positive preference for self-administration by patients in non-clinical settings. On the
other hand, the average respondent was indifferent to drug administration in non-clinical
settings under the supervision of a qualified healthcare professional. This offers further
support to the notion that if administering a drug in a non-clinical setting requires supervision
by a qualified healthcare professional, then one might be better off administering that drug in
a clinical setting. The average respondent was willing to accommodate drug delivery methods
that are associated with a “moderate” risk of treatment non-compliance (in that the coefficient
of the variable for moderate risks of treatment non-compliance was not statistically
significant) but exhibited a negative preference for drug delivery modes that carry a “severe”
risk of patient non-compliance.
That I observed a negative preference for even “moderate” risks of medication errors
possibly reflects concerns about patient safety, professional reputation and medical
malpractice suits. Note also the negative coefficient of the variable for severe risks of
medication error, although this effect is not statistically significant. As expected, members of
latent-class 1 exhibit price-inelastic “demands” for the attributes studied; and the statistically-
significant alternative-specific-constant A suggests some kind of lexicographic preference for
alternative option B (listed on the right side of each choice set in the survey) when compared
to option A (which was listed on the left).
The results for latent-class 2 differ in the following ways: the variables for
subcutaneous and intramuscular modes of administration and dosing frequency all have
statistically-insignificant effects. The coefficient of the variable for severe risk of treatment
non-compliance also had no statistically-significant effects. I observed, however, a
statistically-significant negative preference for drug administration in non-clinical settings
under the supervision of a qualified healthcare professional. The results indicate a positive
(less risk-averse) preference for modes of drug delivery that are associated with “moderate”
risk of medication errors but a negative preference for those that carry a “severe” risk of
medication errors.
It is worth mentioning that latent-class membership is dictated by whether US
healthcare professionals cater for inpatient healthcare demands: the variable INPATIENTS
was the only statistically-significant predictor of latent-class membership. Another point to
bear in mind is: the MNL model is equivalent to an LCMNL model with one homogenous
latent class. Hence, given the LCMNL model with two classes show there is an over 70%
probability of a respondent belonging to latent-class 1, we should expect close similarity
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between the MNL and LCMNL models. Indeed, the Bayesian Information Criterion for the
MNL model (2995.595) is slightly lower than that for the LCMNL model (2999.467) –
although the latter offers a substantial improvement in the log-likelihoods. Considering the
statistically-insignificant unobserved heterogeneity identified by the HMNL and EMNL
models, we can say the US choice data is one instance where estimating an MNL model
without consideration of alternative models might not lead to grossly misleading conclusions.
5.4.2.2 End-user benefits
Table 5.8 shows estimates of the MWTP for the non-price attributes studied and the
associated 95% confidence intervals. As expected, one observes differences in the sign and
magnitude of MWTP෣ from the different econometric models. Focusing on the LCMNL
model, these figures indicate a high MWTP෣ for intravenous and subcutaneous modes of drug
delivery compared to needle-free routes of drug administration – plus a high MWTP෣ to avoid
intramuscular modes of drug administration. Observe also the high MWTP෣ for self-
administration in non-clinical settings and a high MWTP෣ to avoid drug delivery modes that
are associated with a “severe” risk of treatment non-compliance and/or “severe” risk of
medication errors.
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Table 5.8: Marginal willingness-to-pay estimates (in $1000)
MNL model HMNL model EMNL model MMNL model LCMNL model
Variables: MWTP෣ (95% CI) MWTP෣ (95% CI) MWTP෣ (95% CI) MWTP෣ (95% CI) MWTP෣ (95% CI)
INTRAVENOUS 4.564 (3.688, 5.441) 2.525 (1.580, 3.470) 6.336 (5.037, 7.634) 2.167 (0.954, 3.380) 10.674 (8.533, 12.815)
SUBCUTANEOUS 9.327 (8.923, 9.730) 9.904 (9.552, 10.265) 9.443 (8.975, 9.910) 7.290 (6.833, 7.748) 10.612 (0.713, 11.512)
INTRAMUSCULAR -1.910 (-2.257, -1.562) -1.143 (-1.486, -0.081) -2.492 (-2.990, -1.994) -4.708 (-5.203, -4.212) -4.132 (-4.996, -3.269)
DOSFREQ -0.049 (-0.051, -0.048) -0.051 (-0.053, -0.501) -0.051 (-0.052, -0.049) -0.048 (-0.050, -0.047) -0.058 (-0.062, -0.055)
NONCLINICAL_SELF 7.815 (7.587, 8.043) 7.802 (7.605, 7.999) 9.015 (8.595, 9.435) 9.075 (8.875, 9.292) 8.211 (7.656, 8.766)
NONCLINICAL_SUPV -1.597 (-1.761, -1.433) -1.343 (-1.497, -1.189) -1.678 (-1.882, -1.473) -2.700 (-2.878, -2.522) -1.906 (-2.208, -1.605)
NONCOMP_MODERATE -1.271 (-1.433, -1.110) -0.999 (-1.172, -0.825) -0.664 (-0.886, -0.442) -3.529 (-3.781, -3.278) -1.712 (-2.032, -1.394)
NONCOMP_SEVERE -3.578 (-3.716, -3.439) -3.526 (-3.659, -3.392) -3.545 (-3.728, -3.362) -1.423 (-1.614, -1.232) -3.741 (-4.039, -3.444)
RME_MODERATE 0.044 (-0.106, 0.193) -0.207 (-0.380, -0.033) 0.502 (0.274, 0.731) 1.054 (0.665, 1.444) -0.160 (-0.469, 0.150)
RME_SEVERE -5.980 (-6.243, -5.717) -6.218 (-6.453, -5.982) -6.104 (-6.427, -5.781) -8.346 (8.597, -8.095) -7.585 (-8.143, -7.028)
Notes: The 95% CIs above are “standard or classical confidence intervals” calculated using 100 bootstrapped estimates of MWTP. This is because accurate, less-erratic and reliable
“bootstrap confidence intervals” require replications in the order of 1000, which would have been computationally demanding and time consuming [181]. The confidence intervals reported
are therefore not exact.
144
As with the UK sample, I evaluated the welfare change from reverse engineering a
given formulation of drug C to a more patient-friendly version D. I assumed that both
versions of the drug have the same molecule, efficacy and safety profile. Drug C is
manufactured for intravenous administration in clinical settings, and this mode of drug
delivery is associated with “severe” risk of treatment non-compliance and “severe” risk of
medication errors. Drug D is manufactured for subcutaneous self-administration in non-
clinical settings and this mode of drug delivery is associated with “moderate” risk of
treatment non-compliance and “moderate” risk of medication errors.
Based on the MNL model, switching from drug C to D yields an ECV෢ (per patient per
single full treatment course over a year) of -$22,790 (95% CI: -$23,562 to -$22,018). Based
on the MMNL model, the ECV෢ is -$31,601 (95% CI: -$32,374 to -$30,828)19. Based on the
LCMNL model with two latent classes, and unconditional on class membership, ECV෢ is -
$24,932 (95% CI: -$26,653 to -$23,212).
19 The price/cost coefficient reported in Table 5.7 for the MMNL model (β୮෢ ) was derived from ln൫β୮෢ ൯using the
following retransformation: β୮෢ = exp(ln൫β୮෢ ൯+ 0.5SEଶ). This, however, assumes the individual ln൫β୮෢ ൯
recovered from the US dataset are normally-distributed with a constant variance. If this assumption doesn’t
hold, one obtains a biased and less consistent retransformed price coefficient, as reported in Table 5.7.
Therefore, in computing drug C → drug D welfare change, I used the price coefficient from an unreported
MMNL model with a normally-distributed price coefficient (β୮෢ = 0.000066) as this figure is comparable with the
price coefficient from the other models.
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Figure 5.4: Sample distribution of ECV estimates
Notes: ECV෢ refers to the welfare change of switching from drug option C to D. The plots are based
on 100 bootstrapped estimates of ECV. This is because estimation of more accurate confidence
intervals (that require replications in the order of 1000), would have been computationally
demanding and time consuming.
Figure 5.4 shows the kernel density plots of the distribution of ECV෢ derived from the
MNL, MMNL and LCMNL models. The overlap of the kernel density plots for the MMNL,
LCMNL and MNL models provides some reassurance as to the accuracy of the estimates
obtained. The difference between the plots for the LCMNL and MMNL models probably
reflects the different assumptions about preference heterogeneity. That the plot for the MNL
model overlaps more with that of the LCMNL model confirms that the estimates based on the
MNL model are less biased when the IIA assumption holds to an appreciable extent.
I believe that the reason why we see a wider spread of the kernel density plot of ECV෢
derived from the LCMNL model (relative to the MNL or MMNL models) is: because the
LCMNL estimates are based on the average coefficients over the two-latent classes (with
weights given by the probability of latent-class membership). Hence if the probabilities of
class-membership do not remain constant or fixed for each of the 100 bootstrap samples, one
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would obtain a lot more variation in ECV෢ than if (fortuitously) the proportion of individuals
belonging to each of the latent classes does not vary from one bootstrap sample to the other.
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 UK Sample
The non-zero MWTP and ECV estimates reported above provide a monetary measure
of the “clinical usability” of a drug – where clinical usability has to do with the mode of drug
administration as separate from considerations of efficacy, safety and/or value-for-money.
Some might consider MWTP and ECV as old-fashioned, redundant metrics of welfare
change – arguing that it is better to evaluate predicted choice probabilities for a selected
group of products (bundles of attributes). However, such “discrete demand” analyses will not
allow us to compare the monetary value of the intangible benefits from making patient-
friendly medicines with the monetary savings in drug administration costs. From my
analyses, I found that the monetary value of the intangible benefits (from satisfied patients’
preferences) is, at least, in the same order of magnitude as savings on the direct monetary
costs of resources healthcare providers spend on drug administration.
In addition, the results indicate a strong positive preference for modes of drug
administration that are associated with some but not significant risks of adverse events and/or
disruptions to patients’ daily activities. They also show a positive preference for self-
administration of drugs in non-clinical settings – and a negative preference for drug
administration in clinical settings or non-clinical settings under the supervision of a qualified
healthcare professional. Advances in biopharmaceutical manufacturing such as pre-filled
syringes, auto-injectors and pen injectors and other innovations that reduce the risk of adverse
events and/or disruptions to daily activities clearly hit with these observations.
This argument, however, assumes that the state of biopharmaceutical manufacturing
and formulation science is mature enough to support the desired innovations in making
patient-friendly medicines and/or that the profit signals are strong enough to get
manufacturers to consider end-user preferences. There might be, of course, practical
manufacturing challenges that militate against reverse engineering product option C1 to C2.
Nevertheless, the estimates indicate there are substantial benefits from developing patient-
friendly drug delivery systems if the underlying formulation and manufacturing science
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makes it possible to do so. If these societal benefits are considered important by policy
makers, then there is a case for public interventions to encourage manufacturing research in
an attempt to achieve the desired goal of producing “clinically usable” medicines and
devices.
With the right pricing and reimbursement environment, an additional incentive for
manufacturers to consider the preferences of end-users may come from attempts to
differentiate products in order to maintain or increase market shares. For any given cohort of
patients (consumers), a drug product that closely matches the preferences of the average
representative consumer should enjoy higher demand volumes (keeping prices unchanged).
Product differentiation along the lines of satisfying end-user preferences for the mode of drug
administration may indeed create “brand loyalty” without manufacturers engaging in
academic detailing or direct-to-consumer advertising. One would also expect additional
demand inducement where manufacturing a drug product in a patient-friendly manner,
amplifies the (incremental) health benefits derived from that drug (for example, through
reduced risk of adverse events and/or disruptions to patients’ daily activities). This is
particularly important considering healthcare payers and providers’ requirements for
estimates of cost-effectiveness from manufacturers to demonstrate product value.
If healthcare payers and providers are willing to pay for the value of the drug delivery
mode, and the discounted present value of private producer surplus of developing patient-
friendly drug delivery systems (relative to other investment opportunities) is positive, then
manufacturers should consider the switch from C1 to C2.
5.5.2 US Sample
For the US sample, my ECV estimates, which provide a monetary value of the
welfare gain from making patient-friendly medicines (1) are in the same order of magnitude
as the annual acquisition costs ($17,017 to $41,888) for some biologic drugs [182]; and (2)
exceed the annual direct monetary costs of administering most drugs (for a single full
treatment course). They are likely to fall in the “high end” of the distribution of the direct
monetary costs of drug administration reported in Chapter 4, Figure 4.2 on page 88. The
results suggest a strong positive preference for modes of drug administration that are
associated with some but not significant risks of treatment non-compliance and/ or
medication errors. Relative to needle-free routes, there is either a positive preference or
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indifference to intravenous and subcutaneous drug delivery; plus a somewhat negative
preference for or indifference to intramuscular modes of administration. My results also show
a consistent preference for self-administration of drugs in non-clinical settings – and a
consistent negative preference for drug administration in clinical settings or non-clinical
settings under the supervision of a qualified healthcare professional. For this reason, advances
in pharmaceutical manufacturing such as “closed vial access devices” or “closed-system
transfer devices” that allow healthcare professionals to safely reconstitute and administer
what might be considered hazardous drugs should be encouraged and supported20.
It might be argued that the sign and magnitude of MWTP෣ from the LCMNL model for
the intravenous and subcutaneous modes of administration is counterintuitive as one would
typically expect a positive preference for less-invasive needle-free routes. However, there are
sound clinical reasons for a positive MWTP෣ for intravenous and subcutaneous delivery,
relative to needle-free routes (even if the effect is not always statistically significant). Not all
drugs, especially in emergency situations, can be given via needle-free routes; and the
pharmacokinetic profile of some drugs (for example, those that have a narrow therapeutic
index) may be such that intravenous administration is the only or most appropriate route of
drug delivery. The positive coefficients of the variables for intravenous and subcutaneous
modes of administration are not as surprising as it first seems, considering the coefficient for
healthcare professionals who cater for inpatients is the only statistically-significant predictor
of latent-class membership (all other Z variables had no statistically significant effects on ߨ௖
[equation 20]). In fact, this is consistent with a DCE of French physicians’ preferences for
intravenous and oral cancer chemotherapy that showed a positive preference for intravenous
administration in curative settings as opposed to a positive preference for oral (needle-free)
administration in palliative (non-curative) settings[151].
5.5.3 Research limitations
20 Admittedly, imperfect agency means the choices of healthcare professionals may not necessarily match what
patients want or prefer. My DCE results, however, do not require healthcare professionals to act as perfect
agents on behalf of patients. The negative coefficients on the attributes “severe risk of medication error” and
“severe risk of treatment non-compliance” clearly indicate that patients’ health benefits do enter into the utility
functions of the sample of healthcare professionals. Patients, especially less-informed passive ones, indirectly
obtain the gross welfare benefits measured here via the decisions and actions taken by healthcare professionals.
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As with all research, a number of limitations apply to the conclusions and arguments
above. First, if preferences change over time, then my reported estimates may no longer be
valid albeit one will not expect any dramatic differences from what I have reported in this
thesis. A possible avenue for future research is to repeat the analysis here using a panel data
of discrete choices collected over time. Second, it might be argued that the reported ECV
estimates depend on the price/cost levels chosen. However, Hanley et al.[183] have shown
that using different levels for the price attribute may not result in statistically-significant
differences in estimates of welfare change albeit there is a possibility that such differences
might be significant when the ECV estimates are employed in cost-benefit analyses, for
example. See also Slothuus et al.[184]. Considering the near zero price coefficients, I will
argue that price/cost levels beyond that chosen for the UK and US DCEs, and any non-
linearity in the price-attribute effects, are unlikely to change the arguments above.
Third, some might argue that ECV෢ derived from the LCMNL model suffers from
ecological fallacy – as they are based on the average weighted coefficients over two latent-
classes. For that matter (erroneous) conclusions that apply at the aggregate level may not
apply at the latent-class level. However, we do not know a priori which latent-class a given
respondent belongs to – and we cannot assume fixed class membership. Hence the reportedECV෢ , which is unconditional on class membership, is a valid measure of welfare change.
Fourth, the hypothetical choice scenarios presented to US healthcare professionals
required that they act as fund-holders taking on payer responsibilities. It might then be argued
that the choice data collected may be different from what might have been elicited from
actual healthcare payers (who are also agents acting on behalf of patients). On the other hand,
payers in their managerial accounting roles rarely administer drugs to patients themselves:
they are less familiar with the day-to-day clinical needs of patients. Also, payers are more
likely to concern themselves with the direct costs and direct health benefits a drug offers
rather than the attributes of drug administration and the associated intangible benefits. On
balance, I believe asking healthcare professionals to make discrete drug choices assuming
they had financial control of healthcare resources is a better approach compared to a sample
population of payers – not to mention the practical problems of identifying such a sample.
Note, however, that the US choice data collected was not in a form that allows subgroup
analyses of the preferences of doctors and nurses. That the preferences of doctors differ from
that of nurses might be worth pursuing in a future DCE study designed to investigate this
issue.
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Finally, the preference orderings and end-user benefits (ECV) estimated for the US
sample of healthcare professionals may not be generalizable to doctors and nurses in the UK
because of differences in country-contexts; for example, the role of NICE in determining the
mix of drug products in the single-payer UK healthcare system versus the multi-payer
environment in the US. Variation in clinical practice styles and other unmeasured or
unobserved factors that influence drug choices may also play a role. Nevertheless, the
evidence does provide some indication of what attributes healthcare professionals prefer –
and the corresponding monetary valuations of the intangible benefits associated with different
modes of administering drugs. Recall that time and resource constraints are the reasons why I
used a sample of healthcare professionals in the US rather than those in the UK: it was
cheaper and quicker for the vendor to conduct the US survey. The more general question of
whether preferences for modes of drug administration differ from country to country is an
empirical matter that is outside the scope of this thesis. It will require an extensive
multicountry DCE to establish whether these differences exist or not.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I attempted to estimate the monetary value of end-user preferences for
a generic set of attributes of different modes of drug administration. For the UK sample of
people from the general public, I found a non-trivial marginal willingness-to-pay for drug
delivery systems associated with zero or moderate risk of adverse events and/or disruption to
patients’ daily activities. I also found a high marginal willingness-to-pay for self-
administration of drugs in non-clinical settings. In addition, I estimated that the monetary
value of making patient-friendly medicines could be as large as the savings on direct
monetary costs of drug administration to healthcare payers and providers. For the US sample
of healthcare professionals, I found a non-trivial marginal willingness-to-pay for drug
delivery systems that are associated with zero or moderate risk of medication errors and/or
treatment non-compliance. I also found a high marginal willingness-to-pay for self-
administration of drugs in non-clinical settings. In addition, I estimated that the monetary
value of making patient-friendly medicines is as large as the annual acquisition costs of some
biologic drugs and/or are likely to fall in the “high-end” of the distribution of the direct
monetary costs of drug administration.
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I will argue that as long as there is recognition of the value of the drug delivery mode
(besides the value of drug molecules in improving health outcomes); and the underlying
manufacturing science is capable, a patient-centred approach to producing beneficial drugs
and drug delivery systems should be encouraged and pursued.
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6 Putting the Pieces Together
In this thesis, I sought to investigate the relationship between advances in
pharmaceutical manufacturing and the costs of delivering healthcare interventions utilizing
pharmaceuticals to patients. In the preceding sections of this thesis, I focused on two possible
routes by which manufacturing improvements could have an impact on the cost of resources
used in delivering healthcare, namely (1) the costs of administering drugs to patients in the
event that they fall sick; and (2) costs of acquiring or purchasing drugs that offer positive
health benefits net of any concerns about safety and health risks. In line with the objectives
listed in Chapter 1, I have been able to: (1) generate, in Chapter 2, empirical evidence on the
nature of the relationship between pharmaceutical manufacturing and drug pricing; (2)
conduct, in Chapter 3, a systematic review of literature that report estimates of drug
administration costs for biologic drugs; (3) develop, in Chapter 4, an algorithm for predicting
savings in administration costs from drug reformulation efforts; and (4) conduct, in Chapter
5, a discrete-choice modelling of end-user preferences for difference modes of drug
administration.
Put together, the outputs of this thesis indicate there are significant societal benefits
from investing in pharmaceutical manufacturing research with the aim of producing new or
reformulated drugs that, at least, offer the same stream of health benefits but consume less in
terms of healthcare resources. I elucidate on this point in detail below.
6.1 Impact on drug administration costs
Starting with a systematic review of UK literature (that report empirical estimates of
the costs of administering biologics), I found that researchers adopted different rules or
criteria in deciding what resources costs should be included or excluded in computing
estimates of drug administration costs. Consequently, I observed inconsistencies in the
magnitude of some of the cost estimates reported in the literature reviewed. To correct these
inconsistencies, I first developed a framework to standardize what resource costs should be
included in estimates of drug administration costs. This framework makes a distinction
between the “physical costs of drug administration”, which refers to the cost of resources
spent on physically administering a drug into a patient via one of the body’s orifices; and the
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“proximal costs of drug administration”, which refers to the resources expended before and
after physical administration of a drug to a patient.
Given the observed inconsistencies in what was included or excluded from estimates
of drug administration costs, and limitations of my systematic review, I thought it prudent to
conduct a de novo analysis of the costs of administering a sample of eighteen biologic drugs
(none of which are given orally) using the framework mentioned above to careful identify
and select what resource costs should be included in my estimates of drug administration
costs. From this work, I found that biologics administered subcutaneously or intramuscularly
had lower costs of administration than that of biologics administered intravenously. This
variation in administration costs appear to be explained by the fact that, whilst most of the
resource costs associated with subcutaneous and intramuscular biologics came in the form of
proximal costs, intravenous biologics consumed resources in both cost centres. That is, I
observed the incidence of both proximal and physical administration costs with intravenous
drug delivery. I then explored further the nature of this variation in drug administration costs
by running a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with a log-transformed
dependent variable, i.e., the natural log of administration costs for the sample of biologic
drugs chosen. The output from this OLS regression was consistent with alternative regression
models that are designed to account for heteroskedasticity, skewness or kurtosis in estimates
of drug administration costs or the error residuals from these regressions.
I found that the key parameters driving administration costs were the route of
administration (i.e., subcutaneous or intramuscular delivery as opposed to intravenous
administration) and the frequency of dosing. From the outputs of my regressions, I was able
to develop an algorithm with which one could predict (within reasonable margins of error)
the administration costs of biologic drug candidates that are still under development and yet
to be launched on the market. The algorithm could be used to estimate savings in the
monetary costs of drug administration that could be obtained from reformulating or reverse-
engineering an existing drug product or for one that is still under development.
An issue with the research described above is the focus on the monetary costs of drug
administration. Whist this is arguably the most important statistic from the perspective of a
healthcare payer or provider, one cannot ignore the fact that there are intangible benefits or
costs (depending on how one choses to look at it) associated with a given mode of drug
administration. For example, a mode of drug administration that incurs the lowest monetary
resource costs could carry higher overall societal costs in terms of a mismatch with what
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patients (the ultimate end-users) want or prefer. It is useful therefore to estimate in monetary
terms what value patients might place on different modes of drug administration using a
discrete-choice experiment. Using choice preferences elicited and collected from a sample of
people from the general public in the UK, and a sample of healthcare professionals in the US,
I estimated a number of discrete-choice regressions that either controlled for unobserved
heterogeneity in the choice data collected (assuming homogenous preference structures) or
which controlled for heterogeneity in preferences (assuming no heterogeneity in the
collective influence of unobserved or unmeasured factors).
Based on the output of the discrete-choice regression (that offered the best fit to the
choice data collected), I found the average UK sample respondent preferred modes of drug
administration that are associated with some but not a significant risk of adverse events
(specific to the mode of administration and separate from those attributable to the drug
molecule itself). The average respondent also preferred (1) modes of drug administration that
caused less disruptions to patients’ daily activities (i.e., those that are more convenient to the
patient); and (2) self-administering a drug in non-clinical settings such as the home or
appropriate public places when compared with drug administration in clinical settings or self-
administration under the supervision of a qualified healthcare professional. I also found that
the average US sample respondent preferred self-administration in non-clinical settings as
well as modes of drug administration associated with zero or moderate risk of medication
errors and/or treatment non-compliance. These preference orderings, however, may not be
generalizable to the UK because of variations in clinical practice styles and other institutional
or context differences; and the possibility that preferences of actual healthcare payers in the
US may be different from that of the healthcare professionals who were asked in the DCE to
assume they had financial control over healthcare resources.
Having identified the average preference orderings for the attributes of drug
administration, I estimated in monetary terms the gross end-user benefits from reformulating
or manufacturing a drug product in a more patient-friendly manner. I found that the
magnitude of the gross end-user benefits are in the same order of magnitude as the savings on
the direct monetary costs of drug administration, predicted using the algorithm developed in
Chapter 4. For the same reasons above, the magnitude of welfare benefits estimated using the
US sample of doctors and nurses may not be applicable to the UK setting.
In sum, my research on the impact of manufacturing on drug administration costs
suggest that, from either a pure healthcare payer or societal perspective, there are significant
157
benefits from reformulating drugs in a manner that reduces how much is consumed in terms
of healthcare resources and in a manner that matches the preferences of patients (ex ante
healthy people) expressed directly or indirectly via the decisions and actions taken by
healthcare professionals.
6.2 Impact on drug acquisition costs
Under this research stream, I aimed to evaluate empirically any links between
pharmaceutical manufacturing innovations and the dynamics in drug markets that have a
bearing on affordability of medicines and security of medicine supply. I first developed a
theoretical framework that suggests that, depending on the stage of economic lifecycle of
drugs, savings from reducing manufacturing costs may be passed on to consumers (via their
healthcare payers) in the form of lower prices and/or availability of more drug products to
cater for heterogeneous clinical needs.
Using data obtained from the UK NHS over the years 1991-2012, I found evidence to
support the notion that, holding all else equal, the number of products (what I referred to as
product density) is higher for products that are cheaper and easier-to-make relative to
products that are expensive and more difficult-to-make. My findings, however, did not
indicate any statistically significant differences in the hazard of exit (i.e., the chances that
products are no longer available on the NHS market) for products made with cost-reducing
process innovations versus those made with cost-increasing process innovations. The
implications of this is: governments could potentially hedge against the risk of medicine
shortages by investing in pharmaceutical manufacturing research that seeks to find
(increasingly) cheaper ways of making drugs. But this is not all the benefits to be derived
from such investments. I also found that variations in drug prices is related to the nature of
the underlying manufacturing process. To be precise, the average drop in prices of drugs that
are cheaper to make, over time, is roughly twice that of products that are expensive to make –
holding all else equal.
The evidence together supports the argument that there are significant societal
benefits from improving processes used in drug manufacturing – in terms of lower drug
prices, more products available for clinical use, lower drug administration costs and satisfied
end-user preferences for the mode of drug administration. Investments in pharmaceutical
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manufacturing research should help ensure a more secure supply of affordable, clinically-
usable and patient-friendly medicines.
6.3 Contribution
As indicated in Chapter 1, the topic of changes or advances in pharmaceutical
manufacturing is often ignored in health-economic literature. I believe therefore that this
thesis makes a significant contribution to the existing theoretical and empirical evidence by
generating new insights into the societal benefits of improvements in pharmaceutical
manufacturing as well as the implications for manufacturability of biologic drug candidates
currently in development. The analyses and evidence presented in this thesis, of course, can
be updated and expanded on in line with new developments and issues that arise with regards
to improving the efficiency of pharmaceutical manufacturing. Granted, this thesis presents a
useful starting platform for future work.
This should, however, consider a number of methodological limitations (see below)
and estimation issues I identified. First is: the importance of comparing and contrasting the
outputs of alternative econometric models derived from the same datasets. This allows one to
check the consistency of estimates obtained and identify plausible explanations of deviations
from prior expectations. Second, the STATA modules or ado files used for estimating the
econometric models selected by a researcher may be problematic with small samples or large
datasets. For instance, I found that the STATA modules used for estimating discrete-time
cloglog survival models had problems of generating reliable coefficient estimates (on
convergence) with a panel data on biologic products spanning the period 1991-2012. On the
other hand, the STATA estimator for PGLM/EEE with a power variance function failed to
converge with the small sample of 18 biologic drugs I used in developing the administration-
cost algorithm. Researchers must take care to identify and consider such (perhaps case-
specific) estimation issues when conducting future related work.
6.4 Limitations and future research
A number of limitations apply to the works presented in this thesis. First is: the time
period of analysis. This is true especially for the DCE on patients and health-professionals’
preferences for different modes of drug administration. Since preferences are not fixed and
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may change over time, I will argue that, at least, the two DCEs presented in this thesis are
repeated over time. Collecting a panel data on preferences for different modes of drug
administration over different time periods may then provide more insights as to the most
stable preferred attributes of drug administration.
The second is: the nature of the product sample used in my analyses. For instance, the
work on establishing a link between pharmaceutical manufacturing and market conduct used
a sample that was skewed by the inclusion of semi-synthetic biologics and the exclusion of
existing and emerging cohorts of biologic/ macromolecular therapies. More generalizable
evidence can be generated by using more balanced samples of existing and emergent biologic
products that are manufactured using pure bioprocessing methods and have reached the later
stages of their lifecycles. In the case of developing an administration-cost algorithm, I used a
simulated dataset for a sample of 18 biologic drugs, none of which are administered orally.
Again, more generalizable evidence can be obtained from expanding the sample (beyond the
18 biologics selected in Chapter 4 to include future oral biologics); and perhaps conducting
time-and-motion studies in clinical settings. The latter will yield real-life empirical
distributions of the resources costs of administering biologic therapies.
Third is: my thesis did not consider the link between advances in pharmaceutical
manufacturing and estimates of cost-effectiveness as measured by NICE and other relevant
HTA agencies. The two broad parts of my thesis have clearly demonstrated that advances in
drug manufacturing could alter how much of healthcare resources is spent on drug acquisition
and administration. This opens up the possibility that advances in drug manufacturing could
also have some bearing on cost-effectiveness. The link is as follows. In a typical assessment
of the value-for-money offered by drug products, one computes a measure of cost-
effectiveness by comparing the discounted present value of lifetime costs associated with a
drug with the discounted presented values of health benefits offered by the drug, often
measured in terms of quality-adjusted life years. The discounted present value of lifetime
costs will be computed as the sum of discounted present values of drug acquisition costs,
drug administration costs and the aggregated future healthcare-related costs that are in part
determined by the stream of health benefits offered by a drug. Holding all else equal,
advances in manufacturing could have a bearing on estimates of cost-effectiveness via the
impact on, at least, drug acquisition and drug administration costs.
This means that if the cost-effectiveness of a drug is appraised at different time points
along its economic lifecycle, this should bear some relationship to the underlying
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manufacturing process employed in making the drug and the alternative treatment
comparators to that drug if, over the same time points, changes are made to the underlying
manufacturing processes. In fact, one could envisage the possibility of reversals in cost-
effectiveness estimates if manufacturing changes contribute to appreciable changes in drug
acquisition and drug administration costs.
6.5 Conclusions
Increasing healthcare expenditures have got healthcare payers and providers to consider a
number of measures that could help strike a healthy balance between improvements in
population health and the amount of resources expended on the provision of good quality
medical care. This thesis highlights a less noted tool available to decision makers:
investments in pharmaceutical manufacturing research. The value of such investments lies
with the links between public health and innovations in pharmaceutical manufacturing –
namely lower drug prices, lower resources consumed in administering drugs, ensuring
security of supply (to hedge against the risk of medicine shortages) and giving patients, the
ultimate end-users, what they want or prefer in terms of the mode of drug administration.
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Appendices
Appendix 2A: Some useful background information
The influenza vaccines highlight the fact that, for efficacy or safety reasons, one might
observe a shift from cost-increasing to cost-reducing process innovation (and vice versa). The
traditional production for making influenza vaccines relies on an adequate supply of chicken
eggs (apparently one to two eggs is needed to make one dose of the vaccine). Although this
egg-based process has benefited from decades of industrial experience and a good safety
profile; it lacks flexibility for manufacturing scale-up. The process is labour intensive,
requires complex automation with relatively long production times – approximately 6-9
months. This has generated a growing interest in a cell-based culture processes for
manufacturing influenza vaccines as this shortens production time by about 10 weeks
[35;36;40]. It is worth mentioning that a new influenza vaccine Flublok®, currently only
licensed for use in the US, is made in baculovirus-insect cell system using recombinant DNA
technology to bypass the reliance on adequate supply of chicken eggs or availability of the
influenza virus [41],[42]. This leverage from speedy scale-up of manufacturing, in
(mammalian) cell culture, of vaccines offering broad protection against heterovariant virus
strains is considered an important solution to the mismatch of influenza vaccine efficacy with
circulating viruses due to antigenic drift (the development of variants of a given virus strain)
and antigenic shift (emergence of new viruses that had never been in human circulation or last
affected humans decades ago) [43;44].
Poliomyelitis (polio) vaccines provide an example of how market structure and
conduct can be altered by the interplay between manufacturing process innovations and
shifting public policy and regulations. Notably, the 1990’s saw an increase in public-health
calls for a switch from OPV to an improved or enhanced IPV for safety reasons related to the
rare but present risk of vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) and vaccine-derived
polioviruses (VDPV). These calls had to contend with the fact that OPV provides external
community benefits whilst IPV only offers private protection for the immunized individual.
The exclusive concentration and shift of demand from OPV to (enhanced) IPV in the UK in
2004 can thus be seen as a trade-off between the associated risk of VAPP or VDPV and the
marginal external community benefits as the incidence and/or prevalence of polio in the UK
fell close to zero. Indeed, of 28 confirmed cases of polio in the UK between 1985 and 1994,
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19 were VAPP, six were acquired abroad and the rest were of unknown origin [45]. In the
case of a disease epidemic, however, OPV is the preferred option as the marginal external
community benefits then outweigh the rare risks of VAPP or VDPV.
Measles-Mumps-Rubella (MMR) vaccines provide an example of how manufacturing
challenges interplay with random historical events to affect market structure and conduct. For
these vaccines, the usual risks and complexities of manufacturing combination vaccines
apply: any change to the manufacturing process of any one of the component vaccines (for
example, the move towards preservative-free vaccines to reduce the risk of autism and other
neurodevelopment disorders) would affect how the whole combination product is
manufactured [46]. But beyond these risks, the period after the MMR vaccines were
introduced into the UK market (in 1988) can be characterised by refinements of the
production process to reduce COG and demand uncertainty created by the outbreak of the
MMR controversy, in 1998, about the possible risk of autism with MMR vaccines – the so-
called “Wakefield Hoax”. This led to a dramatic fall in uptake of MMR vaccines, which
reached a low in 2004. MMR vaccine uptake only began to rise after this period, and
continued after the controversy reached its conclusion in 2010 [47;48]. I consider the demand
uncertainty created by the MMR controversy as a random ‘historical’ event that did not
average out. But before the Wakefield Hoax, there were proven safety concerns that MMR
vaccines containing the Urabe strain of the mumps virus was associated with a risk of aseptic
meningitis. This led to the withdrawal of Urabe-containing MMR vaccines from use in the
UK in 1992. The MMR vaccines currently in use are those containing the Jeryl-Lynn strain of
the mumps virus, which after many years of worldwide experience is not thought to be
associated with aseptic meningitis [49; 50].
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Appendix 2B: Graphical analyses
Figure B1: Product prices, density and number of firms – Penicillins
Figure B2: Product prices, density and number of firms – Hepatitis B vaccines
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Figure B3: Product prices, density and number of firms – Influenza vaccines
Figure B4: Product prices, density and number of firms – Polio vaccines
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Figure B5: Product prices, density and number of firms – MMR vaccines
Descriptive
Figures B1 to B5 above depict for product class (therapeutic market) over the years
1991-2012: (1) the number of products, what I call product density; (2) firm density, i.e., the
number of manufacturers whose identity are recorded in the HSCIC dataset; and (3) the
average of standardized product prices, indicated by a star (*).
The penicillins (Figure B1) exhibit a skewed inverted U-shaped distribution in product
density over time with a similar trend observed for firm density. The initial time period is
characterised by entry of products and firms which is then followed by a shakeout period
where there is a steady decline in the number of products and firms. Average product price for
the penicillins also follows a similar trend albeit there are some erratic (up and down)
movements in average product price – due to: (1) the absence of data in the year 1991
followed by data availability in 1992 for some of the more expensive antipseudomonal
penicillins; and (2) changes in product mix from exits of old products and introduction of new
products that carry a price premium. The general downward trend in average product prices,
184
firm density and product density, nevertheless, suggests that competitive pressures are fairly
functional and effective within the penicillin market.
For the hepatitis B and influenza vaccines (Figures B2 and B3 respectively), we do not
observe an inverted U-shaped distribution for product density or firm density over time. In the
case of hepatitis B vaccines, I observed a virtually flat firm-density curve whilst the number
of products (single-component hepatitis B vaccines or in combination with hepatitis A) rises
steadily. One observes a downward trend in prices albeit there are price hikes over some time
periods due to the introduction of different formulations and dose strengths of hepatitis-B-
containing vaccines that carry a price premium. In the case of influenza vaccines, firm density
follows the upward trend in product density, which at the same time is associated with a
downward trend in average product prices. The sudden hike and dip in prices from 1991 to
1993 is, however, not due to vaccine supply shortage but changes in product mix (the
introduction of an expensive version of Influvac® that exited the market in 1993). I consider
that the downward trend in average product price for the hepatitis B and influenza vaccines is
not just reflective of functional competitive pressures at play but also consistent with
predictions that overcrowded therapeutic markets with a higher number of products and firms
under declining prices cannot be sustained without efforts to lower COG.
For the polio and MMR vaccines (Figures B4 and B5), one observes more erratic
trends in average product prices, product density and firm density. In the case of polio
vaccines, I observed the emergence of a “single-product single-supplier” equilibrium, which
can be attributed to public health calls for a switch from OPV to IPV and subsequently the
exclusive concentration of NHS demand on IPV. The trend in product and firm density
observed for the MMR vaccines is consistent with the withdrawal of (or more accurately the
recommendation not to purchase) vaccines containing the Urabe strain of the mumps virus in
1992 and the emergence/outbreak of the Wakefield Hoax in 1998 and its resolution in 2010.
Note, in particular, that the drastic dip in firm and product density around year 2000, which
persists until after the year 2004. Likewise average product price (under the uncertain demand
created) falls steadily over that time period. It is only after 2010 that a ‘stable equilibrium’ of
three products, two suppliers emerges. Note that the sharp hike in average product price for
the MMR vaccines between 1991 and 1992 is due to a change in product mix, specifically the
introduction of an imported product carrying a price premium. Also, while the dip in average
product price and fall in product or firm density may appear inconsistent with the opportunity
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created for oligopolistic pricing, it is consistent with firm behaviour under uncertain demand
[51;52].
I speculate that a ‘riskless’ demand curve for MMR vaccines existed before the
Wakefield Hoax and this demand curve was largely price-inelastic at prices above marginal/
incremental production costs. The MMR controversy expanded the price-elastic segments in
what became a ‘risky’ demand curve, leading to a fall in the profit-maximizing price or more
accurately a fall in the price-cost margin. Indeed, given uncertain demand and fixed costly
investments in capacity, a rational manufacturer will offer ‘low’ short-run prices that are, at
least, higher than the average variable costs of production or supply – with the expectation
that products will sell with a higher probability. The fact that prices begun to rise after year
2010 (when the controversy was resolved) lends some support to this conjecture.
Caveats
The “prices” used were derived from drug acquisition costs measured by the net-
ingredient cost of prescription items dispensed within the NHS. A prescription item refers to a
single provision of a medicine on a prescription form or script, i.e., if a prescription form
includes three medicines, the number of items is three. Using the net-ingredient-cost (NIC)
per item as a price proxy is thus confounded by heterogeneity in pack sizes, dosage forms,
dose strengths and duration of treatment.
I believe, this heterogeneity bias will cancel out if the two imprecise measures of price
and volume are used together but in isolation, NIC-per-item will inflate product prices whilst
the number of items on prescription scripts will underestimate demand volumes. A possible
more-homogenous unit of analysis is defined daily doses (DDDs) but then there are no DDDs
for vaccines. Therefore, in Figures B1-B5, product prices are based on the dimensionless
average of standardized NIC-per-item to minimize any heterogeneity bias.
Note also that with the exception of polio vaccines, firm density is computed as the number of
manufacturers or suppliers whose identity is known or recorded in the HSCIC dataset. It
excludes manufacturers or suppliers of products described as “imported”. Using only the
number of recorded manufacturers, however, meant that the firm-density curve for polio
vaccines in some time periods centred on zero. Notably, the shift towards a “single-product
single-supplier” equilibrium would have been associated with zero number of firms in Figure
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B4. Since somebody will have to supply the vaccines, I corrected this by adding one to the
number of recorded firms supplying polio vaccines in each year.
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Appendix 2C: Regression analysis on product density
Dependent variable: ln(N_PRODUCTS)
Model specified: Fixed-effects model Random-effects model Population-averaged model Mixed-effects linear model
Coefficients: β෠୊୉(SE) β෠ୖ ୉(SE) β෠୔୅(SE) β෠୑ ୉(SE)a,c β෠୑ ୉(SE)b,c
COSTREDINNOV 1.1672 (0.421)* 0.9324 (0.258)*** 1.1418 (0.396)** 1.1522 (0.059)*** 0.2952 (0.086)**
YRSINDEXP 0.0093 (0.003)* 0.0211 (0.005)*** 0.0105 (0.003)** 0.0100 (0.001)*** 0.0008 (0.001)
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP -0.0303 (0.008)** -0.0261 (0.007)*** -0.0298 (0.008)*** -0.0300 (0.001)*** -0.0049 (0.002)**
PRODUCTAGE -0.0008 (0.001) -0.0011 (0.001) -0.0008 (0.001) -0.0008 (0.001) 0.0002 (0.001)
PRODUCTAGE2 0.00001 (0.0004) 0.00004 (0.0004) 0.00001 (0.0004) 0.00001 (0.0004) -0.00002 (0.0004)
ln(N_FIRMS) 0.7514 (0.058)*** 0.7722 (0.050)*** 0.7539 (0.056)*** 0.7529 (0.013)*** 0.6593 (0.014)***
IMPORTS 0.0523 (0.018)** 0.0529 (0.018)** 0.0524 (0.018)** 0.0524 (0.010)*** 0.0552 (0.0093)***
ln(DEMANDVOL) 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.0003)
ln(PRODUCTPRICE) -0.0003 (0.0005) -0.0006 (0.0004) -0.0003 (0.0004) -0.0003 (0.001) 0.0001 (0.001)
A 2.0655 (0.240)*** 1.7805 (0.222)*** 2.0350 (0.234)*** 2.0474 (0.063)*** 2.0735 (0.060)***
B 1.2527 (0.106)*** 1.4297 (0.106)*** 1.2702 (0.103)*** 1.2631 (0.021)*** 1.1549 (0.020)***
C 0.5422 (0.089)*** 0.5653 (0.087)*** 0.5440 (0.088)*** 0.5433 (0.019)*** 0.6123 (0.018)***
D 0.7832 (0.101)*** 0.7664 (0.093)*** 0.7818 (0.100)*** 0.7824 (0.021)*** 0.6693 (0.020)***
Intercept: β଴෢ (SE) 0.1238 (0.122) -0.2177 (0.144) 0.1169 (0.117) 0.1323 (0.049)** 0.4635 (0.066)***(σஜ଴ෞ ,σ஫ෞ ;σஜଵෞ ) (0.177, 0.078) (0.027, 0.078) − (0.167, 0.078) (0.265, 0.070; 0.252) 
Covar(μ଴୲ෞ , μଵ୲ෞ ), corr(β෠଴,β෠ଵ୲) − − − − -0.0648, -0.9701 
Variance partition coefficient 0.8362 0.1052 −  0.8213 0.4596 
Overall R-squared 0.9769 0.9884 − − − 
Corr(܆୧୲,μ଴୲ෞ ) -0.4833 − − − − 
Log-likelihood (AIC) 4221.6 (-8417.1) −  −  4137.3 (-8242.6) 4510.4 (-8984.8) 
Notes: SE = heteroskedastic-robust standard errors; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; !p < 0.10; a Without a random-slope for COSTREDINNOV; b With a random-slope
for COSTREDINNOV; c Log-likelihood ratio (LR) test for a comparison with the equivalent single-level model was statistically significant. LR test for a comparison of (a)
and (b) indicates statistically-significant evidence that the effect of COSTREDINNOV is not fixed: it varies across different time periods; AIC = Akaike Information
Criterion.
188
Appendix 2D: Regression analysis on hazard of product exit – without unobserved heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Product exit
Model specified: Cox-PH model Weibull model Gompertz model Cloglog PH model
Coefficients: β෠ଵ(SE) HR β෠ଵ(SE) HR β෠ଵ(SE) HR β෠ଵ(SE) HR
COSTREDINNOV -3.8372 (3.693) 0.0216 -3.4433 (4.001) 0.0320 -3.0878 (3.930) 0.0456 0.4095 (3.302) 1.5061
YRSINDEXP 0.0732 (.059) 1.0759 0.0828 (0.064) 1.0863 0.0801 (0.063) 1.0834 0.0120 (0.037) 1.0121
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP 0.0629 (0.084) 1.0650 0.0532 (0.091) 1.0547 0.0503 (0.090) 1.0515 0.0454 (0.070) 1.0465
PRODUCTAGE -0.0745 (0.018)*** 0.9282 -0.0916 (0.019)*** 0.9124 -0.0861 (0.019)*** 0.9175 0.2363 (0.030)*** 1.2665
ln(N_FIRMS) 2.9547 (0.624) *** 19.1953 3.1111 (0.652)*** 22.4459 3.0898 (0.638)*** 21.9736 1.2796 (0.755)! 3.5951
ln(N_GE) -0.2104 (0.066)** 0.8103 -0.2218 (0.070)** 0.80110 -0.2154 (0.068)** 0.8063 -0.0759 (0.073) 0.9270
ln(N_TS) -1.6047 (0.523)** 0.2009 -1.8181 (0.580)** 0.1623 -1.8964 (0.571)** 0.1501 -2.1717 (0.668)** 0.1140
IMPORTS -0.4840 (0.444) 0.6163 -0.5315 (0.450) 0.5877 -0.4881 (0.443) 0.6138 -0.3051 (0.444) 0.7371
ln(DEMANDVOL) -0.5966 (0.042)*** 0.5507 -0.6116 (0.042)*** 0.5425 -0.6081 (0.042)*** 0.5444 -0.5177 (0.058)*** 0.5959
ln(PRODUCTPRICE) -0.2322 (0.050)*** 0.7928 -0.2680 (0.051)*** 0.7649 -0.2572 (0.051)*** 0.7732 -0.0631 (0.052) 0.9389
A -3.4056 (2.393) 0.0332 -3.2243 (2.491) 0.0398 -3.1291 (2.449) 0.0438 -0.2805 (2.827) 0.7554
B 1.8223 (1.546) 6.1865 2.1866 (1.6464) 8.9045 2.2052 (1.644) 9.0722 1.8047 (1.067) ! 6.0781
C -2.2483 (1.216) ! 0.1056 -2.3171 (1.232)! 0.0986 -2.2800 (1.217)! 0.1023 -0.2721 (1.352) 0.7618
D 4.0592 (0.842) *** 57.9291 4.2768 (0.884)*** 72.0131 -4.1767 (0.854)*** 65.1528 1.8534 (0.893)* 6.3816
(0,t0] − − − − − − -2.2455 (1.516) 0.1059  
(t0,t1] − − − − − − -2.8780 (1.528)! 0.0562
(t1,t2] − − − − − − -3.7825 (1.541)* 0.0228
(t2,t3] − − − − − − -5.0872 (1.516)*** 0.0062
(t3,t4] − − − − − − -6.1063 (1.456)*** 0.0022
(t4,t5] − − − − − − -6.7779 (1.522)*** 0.0011
(t5,t6] − − − − − − -9.6622 (1.634)*** 0.0001
Intercept: β଴(෢ SE) −  -8.4685 (2.259)*** -7.6572 (2.213)***  −   
Ancillary parameter: ρ, γ (SE) −  1.4842 (0.071)*** 0.0575 (0.012)***  −   
Log-likelihood (AIC) -1522.4 (3072.7) -689.7 (1411.3) -702.4 (1436.8) -406.7 (855.4)
Notes: PH = proportional hazard; HR = hazard ratio = exp(β෠ଵ); SE = heteroskedastic-robust standard errors; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; !p < 0.10; (0,t0]…(t5,t6] =
discrete-time-interval dummies; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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Appendix 2E: Regression analysis on product exit – controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Product exit
Model specified: Cox-PH model Weibull model Gompertz model Cloglog PH model
Coefficients: β෠ଵ(SE) β෠ଵ(SE) β෠ଵ(SE) β෠ଵ(SE)a β෠ଵ(SE)b β෠ଵ(SE)c
COSTREDINNOV -3.7536 (3.943) -3.5224 (4.044) -3.1976 (4.026) 0.8106 (4.181) -4.1846 (15.469) -0.2204 (9.619)
YRSINDEXP 0.0763 (0.057) 0.0861 (0.059) 0.0832 (0.058) 0.0181 (0.051) -0.1040 (0.184) -0.0826 (0.097)
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP 0.0589 (0.088) 0.0515 (0.091) 0.0494 (0.090) 0.0353 (0.088) 0.2026 (0.287) 0.1134 (0.152)
PRODUCTAGE -0.0760 (0.020)*** -0.0760 (0.020)*** -0.0878 (0.019)*** 0.2428 (0.872)*** 0.3519 (0.169)* 0.2935 (0.111)**
ln(N_FIRMS) 2.6887 (0.684)*** 2.7630 (0.772)*** 2.7635 (0.766)*** 0.7982 (0.872) 1.6941 (2.041) 3.1174 (1.391)*
ln(N_GE) -0.2172 (0.065)** -0.2301 (0.065)*** -0.2336 (0.065)** -0.0780 (0.074) 0.5323 (0.356) -0.0892 (0.208)
ln(N_TS) -1.3372 (0.647)* -1.4200 (0.761)! -1.5120 (0.757)* -1.7565 (0.867)* -3.1983 (2.693) -4.4599 (1.601)**
IMPORTS -0.4836 (0.406) -0.5309 (0.405) -0.4876 (0.405) -0.3838 (0.466) -3.1459 (2.118) -0.5967 (1.271)
ln(DEMANDVOL) -0.5981 (0.039)*** -0.6139 (0.039)*** -0.6103 (0.039)*** -0.5124 (0.046)*** -0.6625 (0.155)*** -0.6968 (0.134)***
ln(PRODUCTPRICE) -0.2361 (0.045)*** -0.2738 (0.044)*** -.26282 (.0439)*** -0.0546 (0.049) 0.2008 (0.160) 0.1354 (0.117)
A -3.2584 (2.969) -3.1438 (3.048) -3.0854 (3.031) -0.0135 (3.464) 0.6808 (10.187) -0.3587 (9.247)
B 1.9218 (1.245) 2.2799 (1.276)! 2.2899 (1.275)! 1.9285 (1.100)! 1.7787 (4.201) 2.5370 (2.568)
C -1.9199 (1.174) -1.8953 (1.242) -1.8859 (1.234) 0.3162 (1.324) -3.7886 (6.908) -3.8139 (4.566)
D 3.8401 (0.971)*** 3.9973 (1.023)*** 3.9129 (1.017)*** 1.3599 (1.105) 4.2836 (3.842) 2.9925 (2.437)
(0,t0] − − − -2.1886 (1.850) -0.3516 (6.662)           -0.3862 (3.606)
(t0,t1] − − − -2.8375 (1.858) -3.3197 (6.372)           -1.8735 (3.572)
(t1,t2] − − − -3.8628 (1.854)* -5.3721 (6.234) -4.1532 (3.498)
(t2,t3] − − − -5.1196 (1.855)** -7.7794 (6.174) -5.9550 (3.536)!
(t3,t4] − − − -6.1796 (1.830)*** -8.9142 (6.127) -8.2742 (3.638)*
(t4,t5] -6.9102 (1.869)*** -8.7032 (6.427) -7.6864 (3.688)*
(t5,t6] -9.7878 (1.935)*** -12.8906 (6.426)* -12.2111 (5.634)*
Intercept: β଴෢ (SE) − -8.3810 (1.982)*** -7.5667 (1.963)*** − −                                   − 
Log-likelihood (AIC) -1521.8 (3071.5) -688.7 (1411.4) -701.5 (1437.0) -405.1 (854.1) -184.6 (413.1) -162.2 (370.3)
σஜ
ଶ (Chi-square for H଴: μ୧= 0) 0.0376 (1.18) 0.0534 (1.91)! 0.05018 (1.75)! 0.0747 (3.21)* 6.5750 (444.2)***         −                 
Notes: SE = heteroskedastic-robust standard errors; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; !p < 0.10; a Normal-distributed unobserved heterogeneity (μ୧); b Gamma-distributed
unobserved heterogeneity; c Finite-mixture unobserved heterogeneity; (0,t0]…(t5,t6] = discrete-time-interval dummies; H଴ = null hypothesis; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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Appendix 2F: Regression analysis on price variation (using individual product prices)
Dependent variable: ln(PRODUCTPRICE)
Model specified: Fixed-effects model Random-effects model Population-averaged model Mixed-effects linear model
Coefficients: β෠୊୉(SE) β෠ୖ ୉(SE) β෠୔୅(SE) β෠୑ ୉(SE)a,c β෠୑ ୉(SE)b,c
COSTREDINNOV -3.1883 (1.131)* -3.3181 (0.739)*** -3.3538 (0.740)*** -3.3181 (0.740)*** -3.3181 (0.740)***
YRSINDEXP 0.0119 (0.010) -0.0212 (0.009)* -0.0217 (0.009)* -0.0212 (0.009)* -0.0212 (0.009)*
COSTREDINNOV*YRSINDEXP 0.0373 (0.019)! 0.0465 (0.017)** 0.0475 (0.017)** 0.0465 (0.015)** 0.0465 (0.015)**
PRODUCTAGE -0.0112 (0.018) -0.0106 (0.016) -0.0103 (0.016) -0.0106 (0.012) -0.0106 (0.012)
PRODUCTAGE2 -0.0003 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001) -0.0004 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001)
ln(N_FIRMS) 0.2174 (0.128) 0.2718 (0.132)* 0.2705 (0.132)* 0.2718 (0.137)* 0.2718 (0.137)*
ln(N_GE) -0.4769 (0.025)*** -0.4748 (0.025)*** -0.4745 (0.025)*** -0.4748 (0.021)*** -0.4748 (0.021)***
ln(N_TS) -0.1342 (0.098) -0.0065 (0.108) 0.0067 (0.112) -0.0065 (0.154) -0.0065 (0.154)
IMPORTS 0.9624 (0.159)*** 0.9423 (0.158)*** 0.9405 (0.158)*** 0.9423 (0.162)*** 0.9423 (0.162)***
ln(DEMANDVOL) -0.0579 (0.006)*** -0.0581 (0.006)*** -0.0582 (0.006)*** -0.0581 (0.005)*** -0.0581 (0.005)***
A 1.4620 (0.591)* 1.2916 (0.612)* 1.2539 (0.624)* 1.2916 (0.731)* 1.2916 (0.731)*
B 1.4906 (0.202)*** 0.8582 (0.226)*** 0.8417 (0.225)*** 0.8582 (0.239)*** 0.8582 (0.239)***
C 0.4099 (0.196)* 0.1958 (0.202) 0.1915 (0.200) 0.1958 (0.327) 0.1958 (0.327)
D 0.3277 (0.196) 0.2970 (0.193) 0.2798 (0.196) 0.2970 (0.327) 0.2970 (0.327)
Intercept β଴෢ (SE) 3.0685 (0.354)*** 4.0042 (0.231)*** 4.0220 (0.230)*** 4.0042 (0.327)*** 4.0042 (0.327)***(σஜ଴ෞ ,σ஫ෞ ;σஜଵෞ ) (0.249, 1.224) (0, 1.224) − (4.97E-9, 1.222) (1.06E-8, 1.222; 9.59E-9) 
Covar(μ଴୲ෞ , μଵ୲ෞ ), corr(β෠଴,β෠ଵ୲) − − − − < 0.0000001, 0.9088 
Variance partition coefficient 0.0398 0 − < 0.0005 < 0.0000001 
Overall R-squared 0.2140 0.2366 − − − 
Corr(܆୧୲,μ଴୲ෞ ) -0.2691 − − − − 
Log-likelihood (AIC) -6013.1 (12054.2) − − -6025.9 (12085.7) -6025.9 (12081.7) 
Notes: SE = heteroskedastic-robust standard errors; ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; !p < 0.10; a Without a random-slope for COSTREDINNOV; b With a random-slope for
COSTREDINNOV; c Log-likelihood ratio test for a comparison with the equivalent single-level model was not statistically significant. LR test for a comparison of (a) and (b)
indicates no statistically-significant evidence that the effect of COSTREDINNOV is not fixed: it does not vary across different time periods; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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Appendix 3A: Database searches
CRD databases Hits
Search date: 16th April 2013
Results: 1066
1. MeSH DESCRIPTOR economics EXPLODE ALL TREES
2. ((drug* or route* or frequenc* or administr* or deliver* or form* or dos*))
3. (cost* or cost analysis*)
4. #2 AND #3
5. ((biologic* or biopharmaceu* or protein* or macromolecul*))
6. ((fab* or mab* or immunoglobul* or antibod* or fragment* or monoclonal*) or
protein* or macromolecul*))
7. #4 AND #5 AND #6
8. #1 AND #7
9. (cost* adj2 (administr* or form* or delivery* or route*))
10. #8 OR #9
13233
30648
19664
12616
3197
3778
628
459
644
1066
EMBASE Classic + EMBASE (1947 to 2013 Week 15) Hits
Search date: 15th April 2013
Results: 692
1. (cost* adj5 (drug* or administ* or route* or delivery* or form* or dos*)).ti,ab.
2. (cost* or administ* or form* or delivery* or route*).mp.
3. (drug* or route* or frequenc* or administ* or delivery* or form* or dos*).mp.
4. (biologic* or biopharmaceu* or protein* or macromolecul*).mp.
5. (fab* or mab* or immunoglobul* or antibod* or fragment* or monoclonal* or
protein* or macromolecul*).mp.
6. #2 and #3 and #4 and #5
7. exp health economics/
8. #6 and #7
9. #1 and #8
26575
5886547
10157799
4555850
5066634
1057218
581523
11870
692
MEDLINE (OvidSP) Hits
Search date: 15th April 2013
Results: 2448
1 economics/
2 exp Economics, Pharmaceutical/
3 Economics, Medical/
4 Economics, Hospital/
5 Economics, Nursing/
6 (cost* adj5 (drug* or administ* or route* or delivery* or form* or dos*)).ti,ab.
7 (cost* or administ* or form* or delivery* or route*).mp.
8 (drug* or route* or frequenc* or administ* or delivery* or form* or dos*).mp.
9 (biologic* or biopharmaceu* or protein* or macromolecul*).mp.
10 (fab* or mab* or immunoglobul* or antibod* or fragment* or monoclonal* or
protein* or macromolecul*).mp.
11 #7 and #8 and #9 and #10
12 #6 and #11
13 #9 or #10
14 #7 or #8
15 #6 and #13 and #14
26558
2416
8493
9715
3870
18370
3931359
5871197
4042919
4129502
849792
1268
4879209
6130325
2448
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Econlit (EBSCO Host) Hits
Search date: 15th April 2013
Results: 138
S1 (cost* or administ* or form* or delivery* or route*)
S2 (drug* or route* or frequenc* or administ* or delivery* or form* or dos*)
S3 (biologic* or biopharmaceu* or protein* or macromolecul*)
S4 ((fab* or mab* or immunoglobul* or antibod* or fragment* or monoclonal*)
or protein* or macromolecul*)
S5 (S1 or S2)
S6 (S3 and S4)
S7 (S5 and S6)
259618
166151
2808
11777
272272
443
138
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Appendix 3B: Summary of studies reviewedi
Study Description Components of administration costs Type of cost Cost of administration
Bravo et al.[75] CEA/CUA of two TNF antagonists (s.c.
etanercept and i.v. infliximab) and
palliative care in people with PsA who
have failed on DMARDs.
Staff nurse time (£40.50 per patient-related
hour); first attendance (£131) and follow-up
(£94) attendance in outpatient rheumatology;
and day-case rheumatology (£614).
Both, i.e., PAc plus Pc Over an initial 3-month period,
administration cost of
etanercept = £293; £920 for
infliximab infusion.ii
Cassidy et al.[69] CEA/CUA comparing oral capecitabine
(Xeloda®) with bolus i.v. 5-FU/LV in
people with Duke’s C (stage III) colon
cancer and have undergone resection of
the primary tumour.
Physician consultation (unit cost of £68) and
costs of infusion per visit (intravenous
administration = £201) over a 24 week period.
Both £499 = administration costs for
oral capecitabine; £6136 =
administration costs for 5-
FU/LV.
Chen et al.[60] CEA/CUA of s.c. etanercept, i.v.
infliximab or s.c. adalimumab against
DMARDs in adults with RA who are not
well controlled by conventional
DMARDs.
Infusion cost for infliximab. Administration
costs for etanercept and adalimumab were not
reported.
PAc £148 = costs per infliximab
infusion.
Cummins et al.[62] CEA/CUA of treatment sequencing
strategy of TNF antagonist followed non-
biologic DMARDs versus palliative care
without TNF inhibitors followed by non-
biologic DMARDs in people with active
and progressive PsA.
Intravenous infusion cost for infliximab.
Subcutaneous formulations adalimumab and
etanercept require initial consultant outpatient
visit followed by two nursing visits to educate
patients on self-administration.
Both £128 = infliximab costs per
infusion; £408 = self-
administration costs for
adalimumab and etanercept for
first cycle.
Dretzke et al.[99] CEA/CUA of induction and maintenance
therapy with s.c. adalimumab and i.v.
infliximab (relative to standard care) in the
management of people with moderate to
severe active CD.
Cost of having an infliximab infusion in a
hospital covering the cost of a health
professional during the 2 hours of infusion and
for the period of time afterwards.
PAc £285 = infliximab infusion
costs per treatment. No
administration cost was
assigned to adalimumab.
Drummond et al.[58] Cost consequence analysis comparing two
anticoagulant therapies, standard
(unfractionated) heparin and enoxaparin
for the prophylaxis of postoperative deep
For both i.v. standard heparin and s.c.
enoxaparin, this includes the costs of
consumables (needles and syringes) and 10
minutes of nursing time per injection.
PAc £104 per standard heparin
injection; £26 per enoxaparin
injection.
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vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism
in people undergoing elective hip surgery.
Holmes et al.[70] CEA/CUA of docetaxel as second-line
treatment versus BSC in people with
NSCLC who have received prior treatment
with a platinum (cisplatin or carboplatin)
containing chemotherapy but had not been
previously treated with taxanes.
30 minutes of nurse time (costed at £45 per
hour) for a one-hour i.v. infusion of docetaxel.
PAc £23 = cost per docetaxel
infusion.
Hoyle et al.[71] CEA/CUA comparing i.v. temsirolimus to
s.c. interferon alfa-2a for first line
treatment of people with stage IV or
recurrent renal cell carcinoma who have
not received any prior systemic therapy.
District nurse visit and NHS HRG code:
“Deliver subsequent elements of a
chemotherapy cycle.”
Both £26 = administration costs of
interferon alfa (cost of
community or district nurse
visit). £203 = administration
cost of temsirolimus per i.v. in
the hospital.
Iveson et al.[100] CEA/CUA of replacing i.v. 5-FU either as
a single agent (Lokich regimen [B2]) or in
combination with folinic acid (de Gramont
regimen [B1] or AIO regimen [B3]) with
i.v. irinotecan as second-line therapy for
metastatic colorectal cancer.
Staff time; hospitalization for chemotherapy
administration; insertion of a tunnelled central
line catheter; use of disposable pumps for each
treatment cycle.
Both £495 = per patient
administration costs for 6
cycles of irinotecan. £2154 =
per patient administration costs
of 6.8 cycles of B1 regimen (=
1 catheter insertion and 6.8
disposable pumps).
£2748 = per patient
administration costs of B2
regimen (= 13.3 weeks of
hospital day attendance, 1
catheter insertion and 13.3
disposable pumps). £3460 =
average of per patient
administration costs for B3
regimen (requiring inpatient
care or hospital day
attendance)iii.
Jobanputra et al.[61] CEA/CUA of introducing TNF
antagonists into the treatment strategy for
adults with RA who are not well
Infliximab i.v. infusion. PAc £175 = cost per infliximab
infusion.
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controlled by conventional DMARDs.
Kielhorn et al.[66] CEA/CUA of i.v. rituximab in people with
RA who have not responded adequately to
at least two non-biologic DMARDs and
one or more TNF antagonists.
Cost of i.v. infusions or injections. For
infliximab, this was 3 hours of infusion time
including cost of post-infusion observation.
For rituximab, 5 hours of infusion was
assumed plus costs of premedication.
Both Average annual administration
cost per patient: £369 for
rituximab; £788.50 for
infliximab; £54 for
adalimumab. Administration
costs for the non-biologic
DMARDs assumed to be zero.
Knight et al.[67] CEA/CUA of adding i.v. rituximab to
CHOP versus CHOP alone for adults with
DLBCL.
Pharmacy cost of dispensing and doctor/nurse
visits.
Both £140 = administration costs of
CHOP (= pharmacy dispensing
cost per cycle [£36] + doctor/
nurse costs per cycle [£104]).
£125 = cost of administering
rituximab (= pharmacy
dispensing cost per cycle [£12]
+ doctor/ nurse costs per cycle
[£113]).
Le et al.[59] CMA of oral and intravenous
chemotherapies for first line treatment of
people with advanced NSCLC. These
include different doses of oral and i.v.
VNB and i.v. chemotherapies containing
gemcitabine, paclitaxel and docetaxel.
Day-time hospitalization (£422) and medical
oncology outpatient visit (£143). For self-
administration of an oral agent at home, a cost
for pre-therapy counselling with hospital nurse
(£18) is incurred plus the cost of a local GP
(£24) to carry out blood tests.
Both Annual administration costs:
60mg oral VNB = £845 (=
outpatient visit [£505] + home
care [£340]); 80mg oral VNB
= £1054 (= outpatient visit
[£610] + home care [£444]).
25mg i.v. VNB = £1115 (=
inpatient stay [£697] +
outpatient visit [£418]); 30mg
i.v. VNB = £1189 (= inpatient
stay [£734] + outpatient visit
[£455]).
1000mg i.v. gemcitabine =
£1463 (= inpatient stay [£871]
+ outpatient visit [£592]);
1250mg i.v. gemcitabine =
£1618 (= inpatient stay [£948]
+ outpatient visit [£670]).
100mg i.v. docetaxel = £3922
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(= inpatient stay [£2100] +
outpatient visit [£1822]).
175mg i.v. paclitaxel = £3438
(= inpatient stay [£1858] +
outpatient visits [£1580]);
200mg i.v. paclitaxel = £4033
(= inpatient stay [£2156] +
outpatient visit [£1876]).
Lewis et al.[72] CEA/CUA comparing oral erlotinib with
i.v. docetaxel in the second line treatment
of people with previously treated stage
IIIb-IV NSCLC.
NHS HRG code: “Deliver simple parenteral
chemotherapy at first attendance” = £209
Both £209 = docetaxel
administration per visit. Zero
administration costs assigned
to oral erlotinib.
Loveman et al.[101] CEA/CUA of topotecan compared to
existing regimens in second-line
chemotherapy for small cell lung cancer.
Pharmacy cost for dispensing and outpatient
attendance to receive oral topotecan; outpatient
attendance to receive chemotherapy, pharmacy
preparation cost (i.v. topotecan)iv.
Both £200 = administration costs for
oral topotecan per cycle;
£1059 = administration costs
per cycle for i.v. topotecan
Morris et al.[91] CEA/CUA comparing recombinant
activated factor VII (rFVIIa, eptacog alfa,
NovoSeven®) given as i.v. bolus injection
with placebo for the control of bleeding in
people with severe blunt trauma.
None reported. Each NovoSeven® pack
contains 1 vial of the drug, 1 vial of sterile
water, 1 sterile vial adapter, sterile syringe and
infusion set, and swabs.
Not specified It appears an assumption of
zero administration costs was
made.
Robinson et al.[73] CEA/CUA comparing i.v. GC with
MVAC combination therapy given by i.v.
in the treatment of people with locally
advanced or metastatic bladder cancer.
Cost per day of inpatient chemotherapy
delivery = £355. Cost per outpatient
attendance for chemotherapy delivery =
£292.41.
Both £3639 = per patient
administration costs of GC
inpatient; £5429 per patient if
administered in outpatient
settings. £3157 = per patient
administration of MVAC
inpatient; £4522 if
administered in outpatient
settings.
Starling et al. [102] CEA/CUA comparing i.v. cetuximab plus
irinotecan against BSC for the treatment
of people with metastatic colorectal cancer
who failed on previous chemotherapy.
Not reported. Not specified £304 per day = administration
costs for cetuximab plus
irinotecan.
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Sweetenham et
al.[68]
CEA/CUA comparing i.v. CHOP with a
purine analogue, i.v. fludarabine, and an
i.v. anti-CD20 monoclonal antibody,
rituximab, in the treatment of people with
relapsed indolent B-cell non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma.
Tests, inpatient stays (£382 per day) and
outpatient visits (£98 per day) for drug
administration.
Both £1271 = administration costs
for rituximab per patient per
treatment course; £1725 =
administration costs for
CHOP; £3939 = administration
costs of fludarabine.
Ward et al.[76] CEA comparing gemcitabine with two 5-
FU regimens (de Gramont regimen and
PVI 5-FU) in first- and second-line
treatment of people with pancreatic
cancer.
Outpatient visits for gemcitabine infusion.
Administration of PVI 5-FU involves insertion
and removal of central line (as day case), and
the cost of checking and flushing a central line
and ambulatory pump.
Both £153.50 = per month cost of
medical oncology outpatient
visit for gemcitabine
administration. £1181 = total
administration costs of PVI 5-
FU per monthv.
Woolacott et al.[74] CEA/CUA of three treatment options (s.c.
etanercept, i.v. infliximab and palliative
care) in people with PsA who have failed
DMARDs.
As reported in Bravo et al.[23] Both As reported in Bravo et al.[23].
Colquitt et al.[103] CEA/CUA of CSII with the aid of an
insulin pump versus MDI in people with
type I diabetes.
Acquisition and maintenance costs of insulin
pump, insulin cartridges/ reservoirs, infusion
sets and batteries. Three types of insulin
pumps considered: Disetronic H-Tron,
Disetronic D-Tron and MiniMed 508.
PAc £5196 = net administration
cost of Disetronic H-Tron;
£4785 = net administration
cost of Disetronic D-Tron; and
£4826 = net administration
cost of MiniMed 508.
Cummins et al.[104] CEA/CUA of CSII with the aid of an
insulin pump versus MDI in people with
type I diabetes.
Acquisition and maintenance costs of insulin
pumps and cost of consumables consisting of
infusion sets, insulin reservoir, needles,
lancets, test strips and glucometer.
PAc £2319 = annual cost of CSII
£513.27 = annual cost of
MDI.vi
Cummins et al.[105] CEA/CUA of s.c. golimumab and other
TNF inhibitors given subcutaneously in
people with active PsA.
Outpatient visits and staff nurse time. Drug
monitoring costs estimated separately.
Both Administration cost = £341 (1
outpatient visit + 4 hours of
nurse time) over an initial 12
week period; £94 (1 outpatient
visit) over the next 12 weeks.
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Hoyle et al.[77] CEA/CUA comparing dasatinib and
nilotinib versus high-dose imatinib in
people with chronic phase CML, who are
resistant to normal dose imatinib; and
dasatinib and nilotinib with interferon alfa
in people with chronic phase CML, who
are intolerable to imatinib.
District nurse visit for s.c. interferon alfa
administration in those not able to self-
administer. Oral treatments (dasatinib,
nilotinib and high-dose imatinib) incur no
administration costs.
PAc £28 = administration cost of
interferon alfa. Average cost
per 2-month cycle = £421.
Lloyd et al.[78] CMA comparing s.c. highly purified hMG
and s.c. rFSH in women aged 18 to 36
years with infertility for more than one
year and who are undergoing in vitro
fertilization or intracytoplasmic sperm
injection.
Staff costs of administering injections plus
cost of clinic visit.
Both £53.53 = cost of administering
injections (£25.33) + cost of
clinical visit (£28.20).
Martin et al.[79] CEA/CUA of providing antiviral
treatment (s.c. peginterferon plus oral
ribavirin) for IDUs at risk of hepatitis C
virus transmission compared with treating
ex/non-IDUs or no treatment.
Staff costs and tests related to evaluations,
further investigation visits, treatment
appointments, assessments, sustained-viral-
response surveillance and IDU psychiatric
visits.
Both £2821.14 = total delivery costs
per treatment over a 48 week
period.
Pinot et al.[86] CEA of screening UK-born and
Bangladesh-born first-time pregnant
women for varicella infection and then
vaccinating those who are susceptible.
Nurse consultation (two nurse consultations
needed for the two adult doses given s.c.).
PAc £13 = vaccine administration
costs.
Palmer et al.[106] CEA/CUA comparing s.c. IDet-based
basal/bolus therapy with NPH-based
basal/bolus insulin in people with type I
diabetes.
Costs of needles and devices. Unit cost of
NovoPen 3® device = £28.60 and needles
(NovoFine®) = £14.40 per pack of 100.
PAc £62 = annual cost of needles
and devices for both IDet- and
NPH-based insulin therapy.
Rogers et al.[107] CEA/CUA comparing dasatinib and
nilotinib in people with CML in chronic
phase.
As reported in Hoyle et al.[25] PAc As reported in Hoyle et al.[25]
Wolowacz et al.[80] CEA/CUA of oral dabigatran etexilate
compared with s.c. low-molecular-weight
heparin (LMWH, also enoxaparin) for the
Inpatient and outpatient visits for
administration of LMWH. Inpatient visits
comprise of nurse time for injection of
Pc (outpatient); Both
(inpatient)
Zero costs for oral dabigatran;
£0.85 = cost of inpatient visit
(both TKR and THR); £26 =
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prevention of venous thromboembolism in
people undergoing TKR and THR surgery.
LMWHvii. cost of outpatient visit (for
only THR).
Chilcott et al.[81] CEA/CUA comparing three AADP
regimens for immunization against
haemolytic disease of the newborn in
primagravidae and all pregnant women
who are rhesus D negative.
Cost of midwife administering i.m. anti-D IgG
during a normal antenatal visit.
PAc £12 = cost of administering
two doses of anti-D IgG per
pregnancy.
Fenn et al.[82] CEA/CUA of vaccination programmes for
hepatitis B in infants, children aged 6
years and above, and adolescents aged 11
years and above.
Cost of GP consultation except for the primary
infant vaccination schedule. Doses given i.m.
PAc £20 = vaccine administration
costs per dose (applies to both
initial and booster doses).
Jit et al.[84] CEA/CUA of vaccinating women in their
second or third trimester of pregnancy
against seasonal influenza in England and
Wales.
Item of service payment to GPs. Doses given
i.m.
PAc £7.78 = vaccine administration
cost per person vaccinated.
Mangtani et al.[108] CEA/CUA of adding universal hepatitis B
vaccination for infants and preadolescents
to a policy of selective vaccination of
adults.
Staff costs (nursing time) for i.m. dose
administration in all programs. Cost of needles
and syringes applies to only selective adult and
universal pre-adolescent vaccination. Cost of
visits for second or third dose applies to only
selective adult vaccination.
Both £4.3 = administration cost per
dose for universal infant
vaccination. £8.70 =
administration cost per dose
for universal preadolescent
vaccination. £51 =
administration cost per dose
for selective adult vaccination.
McIntosh et al.[85] CEA/CUA of 7-valent PCV in infants and
young children ≤ 2 years of age. 
Not reported. Doses given i.m. Not specified £13 = vaccine administration
cost per child or infant
vaccinated.
Nuijten et al.[89] CEA/CUA of i.m. palivizumab, a
preventive therapy for severe respiratory
syncytial virus infection versus no
prophylaxis in children at high risk of
hospitalization, i.e. preterm infants of ≤ 35 
weeks gestation, children with
bronchopulmonary dysplasia and children
Visit to a hospital outpatient facility, which
includes a specialist fee.
Both £161 = cost of outpatient visit.
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with congenital heart disease.
Siddiqui et al.[83] CEA/CUA of universal infant or
adolescent vaccination of hepatitis B as
well as selective vaccination of ethnic
infant populations.
Not reported. Doses given i.m. Not specified £5.40 = administration costs
per dose (for adolescent
vaccination programme). Zero
costs for the infant vaccination
programme.
Trotter et al.[85] CEA/CUA of MCC vaccination
programme in infants and children < 18
years of age in England and Wales.
Payment for vaccine delivery (by GP or in a
school). Doses given i.m.
PAc £8.80 = vaccine delivery
payment per dose if
administered by a GP (£6.06
per dose if more than one dose
is required, in which case the
fee charged is for all doses
with the exception of the last
dose in the series). £1.4 if
administered in schools.
Vick et al.[88] CEA/CUA of three regimens of routine
AADP in populations at risk of having
babies with Rh haemolytic disease.
Midwife’s time and consumables used. AADP
given i.m.
PAc £4.40 = administration costs
per injection.
Jit et al.[90] CEA/CUA of rotavirus vaccination in five
European countries (Belgium, England
and Wales, Finland, France and the
Netherlands) in infants and young
children.
10 minutes of practice nurse time (assuming
administration in GP clinics). Doses given
orally.
PAc £6.10 = vaccine administration
cost per dose.
Lowin et al.[109] CEA/CUA of levodopa/carbidopa
intestinal gel versus standard care in
people with advanced Parkinson’s disease
at Hoehn and Yahr stages 3, 4 or 5
experiencing more than 50% of waking
time in the OFF stateviii.
Temporary insertion of NG tube requiring one
day of inpatient stay plus permanent insertion
of PEG requiring one day of inpatient stay.
PAc £987 = costs of NG tube
insertion (£204) + cost of PEG
tube insertion (£783).
Walleser et al.[110] CEA/CUA of first-line maintenance
erlotinib versus best supportive care in
people with locally advanced and
metastatic NSCLC.
Not reported. Not specified Zero administration costs as
erlotinib is given orally.
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i Abbreviations used: CEA = cost-effectiveness analysis; CUA = cost-utility analysis; TNF = tumour-necrosis-factor; s.c. = subcutaneous; i.v. = intravenous; PsA = psoriatic
arthritis; DMARDs = disease-modifying antirheumatic drugs; PAc = physical administration costs; Pc = proximal costs; 5-FU/LV = 5-fluorouracil with leucovorin; RA =
rheumatoid arthritis; CD = Crohn’s disease; BSC = best supportive care; NSCLC = non-small-cell lung cancer; NHS = National Health Service; HRG = healthcare resource
group; 5-FU = 5-fluorouracil; AIO = Arbeitsgemeinschaft Internistische Onkologie; CHOP = a combination therapy of oral cyclophosphamide, intravenous doxorubicin,
intravenous vincristine and oral prednisone; DLBCL = diffuse large B-cell lymphoma; CMA = cost minimization analysis; VNB = vinorelbine; GP = general practitioner; GC
= gemcitabine plus cisplatin; MVAC = methotrexate, vinblastine, doxorubicin and cisplatin; PVI 5-FU = protracted venous infusion of 5-fluorouracil; CSII = continuous
subcutaneous insulin infusion; MDI = multiple daily injections; CML = chronic myeloid leukemia; hMG = human menopausal gonadotropin; rFSH = recombinant follicule
stimulating hormone; IDUs = injecting drug users; IDet = insulin detemir; NPH = neutral protamine Hagedorn; LMWH = low-molecular-weight heparin; TKR = total knee
replacement; THR = total hip replacement; AADP = antenatal anti-D prophylaxis; i.m. = intramuscular; IgG = immunoglobulin G; PCV = pneumococcal conjugate vaccine;
MCC = meningococcal serogroup C conjugate; NG = nasogastric; PEG = percutaneous endoscopic gastronomy.
ii Cost of a single infliximab infusion is equal to half rheumatology day case (3 day case attendances needed over the initial 3 months). Within the initial 3 month period,
administration cost of etanercept includes educational visit for etanercept self-injection (equal to one outpatient rheumatology attendance) and four visits to a staff nurse to
check on treatment progress. Over 12 months, infliximab infusion costs = £1994, corresponding to 6.5 of half rheumatology day cases.
iii It is assumed that 50% of patients will receive B3 regimen inpatient with the other 50% receiving the treatment as one day hospital attendance. Administration costs of B3
regimen requiring inpatient stay = £4245 (for 12.9 cycles of inpatient stay and 1 insertion of a catheter). Administration costs of B3 regimen requiring day hospital attendance
= £2676 (for 12.9 cycles of day hospital attendance and 1 insertion of a catheter).
iv The study estimates the cost of chemotherapy administration separately from on-treatment monitoring costs. Oral and i.v. topotecan incur the same on-treatment monitoring
costs (£95) covering full blood count, liver function tests, renal function tests, chest radiograph and computed tomography scan every two cycles.
v The monthly administration cost of PVI 5-FU consists of £235 in infusion costs (covering insertion and removal of a central line/pump and flushing of the central
line/pump), £711 in costs of hospitalization for drug administration, operational costs of £209 and £26.10 for concomitant medications.
vi Annual cost of CSII includes the cost of infusion sets (£1,058.87); insulin reservoirs (£325.82); insulin cartridge (£312.21) and annualized capital cost of insulin pump of
£620 (assuming a 4-year pump life). Annual cost of MDI includes the cost of needles (£31.83), insulin cartridge (£466.44) and annualized capital cost of pen devices of £15
(assuming a three-year lifespan). The costs of lancets, test strips and glucometer are the same for both CSII and MDI.
vii Cost of outpatient visits incurred by 13% of patients unable to self-administer refer to one district nurse visit per day. For the 87% able to self-administer, a one-time cost
(= 30 minutes of nurse time [£11.92]) for training in self-administration is incurred during hospital stay. This gives an average administration cost for LMWH per injection of
£13.75.
viii OFF state refers to the period where effects of standard oral treatments for Parkinson’s disease wear off and symptoms return.
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Appendix 5A: Demographic characteristics of the UK sample
Characteristics (of 442 respondents) N (% of sample)
Gender
Male* 181 (40.95)
Female 261 (59.05)
Respondents’ age
17 – 34 years 151 (34.16)
35 – 49 years 155 (35.07)
≥ 50 years 136 (30.77) 
Employment status
Employed 307 (69.46)
Unemployed* 135 (30.54)
Household-income category
< £15,000 (per year) 109 (24.66)
£15,000 – £29,999 (per year) 134 (30.32)
£30,000 – £49,999 (per year) 118 (26.70)
£50,000 – £75,000 (per year) 52 (11.76)
> £75,000 (per year)* 29 (6.56)
Highest education achieved
GCSEs O & A levels 189 (42.76)
Higher education* 212 (47.96)
Vocational training 41 (9.28)
Prior illness (in the past year)
Yes 178 (40.27)
No* 264 (59.73)
Notes: N = number of respondents; * indicates the reference category for the effects coding used (see also Table
5.3 on page 126).
204
Appendix 5B: Demographic characteristics of the US sample
Characteristics (ΣN) N (% of sample)
Gender (209)
Male* 65 (31.10)
Female 144 (68.90)
Respondents’ age (208)
Under 50 years 105 (50.48)
≥ 50 years 103 (49.52) 
Type of healthcare institution (209)
Solo medical practice 14 (6.70)
Government-run 15 (7.18)
Private-for-profit 67 (32.06)
Non-for-profit 89 (42.58)
Other* 24 (11.48)
Patient case-mix (209)
Inpatients 78 (37.32)
Outpatients 80 (38.28)
Accidents & emergency 22 (10.53)
Other* 29 (13.88)
US census region (206)
East North Central 31 (15.05)
East South Central 10 (4.85)
Middle Atlantic 27 (13.11)
South Atlantic* 38 (18.45)
Mountain 16 (7.77)
New England 22 (10.68)
Pacific 24 (11.65)
West North Central 20 (9.71)
West South Central 18 (8.74)
Notes: N = number of respondents. * indicates the reference category for the effects-coding used (see also Table
5.4 on page 127-128). This dataset offered a complete sequence of 12 choices for each of the 210 survey
respondents. However, for three respondents, data was missing on some of their characteristics whilst for one
respondent there was no information on all characteristics.
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